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These days there is a lot of debate about the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) and the transition in stages towards it. Besides the economic aspects one should,
for sure, not neglect the cultural, social and political aspects of this ongoing EMU process
in the European Union (EU). Taking all the consequences of the different aspects of this
integration process into consideration and weighing out the pros and cons is extremely
difficult, if not impossible. Also the opinions on how and how far the EMU process should
proceed vary not only by country but also through time. A nice example of this last aspect
is Denmark where the Danish people rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum on
June 2, 1992. However, almost one year later the Danish people approved the Maastricht
Treaty in a referendum on May 18, 1993.
This thesis attempts to enlighten some economic aspects of the EMU process. In particular,
we study the role of the European Commission in this process from a global macroeco-
nomic perspective. The analyses will be carried out in an international policy coordination
framework and will focus on the implications of the growing international macroeconomic
interdependence between various European economies.
1.1 The European Commission
In the literature the European Commission (EC) is described as a supranational institution
whose broad objective is currently to guide the EU-Member States in their transition
towards an Economic and Monetary Union  (EMU) (see Molle [56]).  Most of these objectives
are elaborated in EC treaties. Such a treaty must be seen as a rough framework: specific
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rules and regulations still have to be worked out by various institutions of the EC. The
most important institutions are the Commission and the Council of Ministers. They are
jointly responsible for coordinating national policies, issuing regulations and directives
and taking decisions in areas not foreseen in the treaties. Further they take care of the
supervision of the treaties. Important in the decision process of the EC is that regulations,
directives, decisions and recommendations are initially born from a Community's point of
view. Further, the specific structure of the EC can be called supranational, which means
that created regulations and laws by the EC institutions overrule national regulations and
laws.  The most important source of income of the EC are the contributions by each Member
State, which yearly pay a certain percentage of their GDP to the Commission. Another
important source of income are the value added tax (VAT) income in every country. A fixed
percentage of the VAT received by each Member State has to be transferred to the EC. At
this  moment the total EC budget is about  1.5%  of the aggregate  of the Member States.
This is a relatively small figure and since it has to be transferred back to the Member
States (according to Article 199 of the EC Treaty) via a list of expenditure programmes
in different fields, the EC can only exert no more than a little direct influence on the total
economy. So in conclusion one can say that there certainly will be some redistribution
effects but for an effective macro-economic policy the total EC budget must be considered
too small.
1.2  The EMU process
The process of the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union started with the Werner
Report which was completed in 1970 (see Steinherr [72]). This Report describes a transition
towards a monetary union in various stages and can be seen as a predecessor of the Delors
Report which was published in 1989 (see Delors [18]). Both Reports report a gradual
approach towards EMU. However, there were some differences in the final interpretation
of EMU and the transition in stages towards it. One of the differences is the role set out
for the European Commission. In the Werner Report the Commission should envisage
more central control of national fiscal policies than in the Delors Report. The Werner
Report also sketches the European Commission as the centre of decision for economic
policy which will exercise independently, in accordance with the Community interest, a
decisive influence over the general economic policy of the Community. However, in a
concession to political realities, the Delors report did not propose transferring control
of national budgetary policies to the Community but instead simply recommended that
the Community should 'monitor the overall economic situation' and should 'assess the
consistency of developments in individual countries with regard to common objectives'
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(see also Eichengreen [24]).
As a follow up of the Delors report, the Treaty designed at Maastricht 1991 was a major step
forward in the EMU process. The Maastricht Treaty describes the realization of a monetary
union in three stages. The Treaty also maps out conditions and a timetable for countries
in order to proceed to Stage III of EMU which is characterised by the establishment of an
independent European central bank and transferring to it the responsibility for the conduct
of monetary policy. The four conditions specified at the Maastricht Treaty for admitting
an EU-country to an EMU are specified as follows:
(i)  A consumer price inflation of no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average of
the three countries with lowest inflation rates.
(ii) An average nominal long term interest rate of no more than 2 percentage points above
the average for the three EU-countries with lowest inflation rates.
(iii) No exchange rate realignments for at least two years.
(iv) A sustainable government financial position, defined as a general government deficit
to GDP ratio of less than 3 percent and a gross government debt of less than 60 percent
of GDP.
The purpose of these four rules are clear, it is to prevent the EMU being destabilised by
the premature admission of an EU-country whose fundamentals are not yet compatible
with a fixed exchange rate (see Bean [4]).
In order to guide this process of closer convergence and increasing integration the European
Commission sets out broad policy guidelines for the EU-Member States (see, e.g., the 1994
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines as published by the European Commission [16]). These
broad guidelines for economic policy provide targets for economic policy in the short and
medium term and are specified such that if EU-countries follow these guidelines they will be
able to participate at Stage three of EMU, which has been provisionally dated at January
1st, 1999.
1.3 International policy coordination
As the Delors Report states [18, page 5]:'By greatly strengthening economic interdepen-
dence between member countries, the single market will reduce the room for independent
policy manoeuvre and amplify the cross-border effects of developments originating in each
member country', and on page 6:'The integration process thus requires more intensive
and effective policy coordination, even within the framework of the present exchange rate
arrangements, not only in the monetary field but also in areas of national economic man-
agement affecting aggregate demand, prices and costs of production'. The Delors Report
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recommends a stronger tightening of international policy coordination among the EU-
countries which should be guided by the European Commission. Thus the success of the
internal market hinges on the one hand to a decisive extent on a much closer coordination
of national economies as well as on the other hand on more effective Community policies.
The Delors Report reports however a warning note since the decision-making of national
governments may fall between two stools.  This is nicely stated at page 6 of the Report:
'Decision-making authorities are subject to many pressures and institutional constraints
and even the best efforts to take into account the international repercussions of their poli-
cies are likely to fail at certain times. While voluntary co-operation should be relied upon
as much as possible to arrive at increasingly consistent national policies, thus taking ac-
count of divergent constitutional situations in member countries, there is also likely to be
a need for more binding procedures.' It is precisely this tension between the objectives of
national policy-makers and the international binding procedures set out by the Commis-
sion to which a main part of this thesis is devoted.  In this thesis we use policy coordination
(and also cooperation) in the sense that it refers to decision making that maximises joint
welfare and thereby tries to exploit international interdependencies positively. Maximising
joint welfare is done by jointly setting the national instruments. On the other hand a lack
of coordination means that each country sets its own instruments and tries to maximise
its own welfare. In a game theoretic context the latter situation can be viewed as a non-
cooperative outcome which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium whereas the first situation
can be viewed as a Pareto efficient outcome. For an explanation of the various terms in this
field, which are often used in different ways with different meanings, we refer to Horne and
Masson   [46]. The policy coordination literature is growing  fast  and  to  give an extensive
overview would already be a severe task. We therefore restrict ourselves and mention only
briefly some main contributions in this field.  In the next subsections we, firstly, very briefly
mention some important contributions to the policy coordination literature and, secondly,
we will discuss a side path of this literature called hierarchical control.
1.3.1 The international policy coordination literature
The main impulse to the empirical part of the literature probably originates from the paper
by Oudiz and Sachs [61] published in 1984. They provided the first empirical estimates of
the gains of coordination, which they found to be rather small. Subsequently there was a lot
of research about the gains (and also possible losses) of international policy coordination.
An example is Holtham and Hughes Hallett [45].  In that research the robustness of esti-
mates of policy coordination gains and non-cooperative losses were investigated with ten
different macro-economic models. All the experiments predicted rather large cooperation
gains but they found a considerable variation in the optimal strategies. This observation
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raised the question in the literature whether discretionary policy rules are really preferred
over simple policy rules.  This lead to a branch of research which investigated whether
simple policy rules could emulate full policy coordination reasonably well.  For a more
extensive overview on this line of the literature we refer to Gosh and Masson [34] and
McKibbin and Sachs [55} and their references.
A related line of research is the study of dynamic aspects of policy-making.  The main
research in economics on this subject probably started with the controversial article of
Kydland an Prescott [541. A lot of ideas introduced in this branch of literature found its
origin in game theory and control literature. A main work in the game theoretical field is
Bajar and Olsder [3], which is often quoted by economists.  This work presents  also  a good
mathematical description of the various concepts used in (dynamic) game theory, such
as information patterns and (strong) time (in)consistency problems. A lively economic
discussion about various types of non-cooperative game outcomes, information patterns
and time (in)consistency problems can be found in de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg [86] and
the comments on that paper by Hughes Hallett [36]. A thorough description of the use of
optimal control in macro-economic models, which also discusses related economic problems
such as uncertainty, the Lucas critique, rational expectations and the (re)construction of
preferences  can be found in Brandsma  [81 and Petit  [66].
Another line of important research deals with uncertainty.  In the empirical policy coor-
dination uncertainty glooms everywhere. For a recent good overview of this literature we
refer to Ghosh and Masson  [341.
A thorough description of the mathematical formulars for calculating various types of game
outcomes for economic problems specified in a linear quadratic framework can be found in
de  Zeeuw  [85].
A recent collection of articles about the relevance and reality of international policy coor-
dination is Blommestein [7] which contains also a contribution of Frenkel, Goldstein and
Masson [32] with a survey of key issues in the international coordination of economic poli-
des. We refer also to the references of this article for a more extensive overview of the
literature.
For the remainder of this thesis we ignore the issue of uncertainty and consider only a
deterministic framework. Furthermore, we assume that countries who participate at the
game have complete information. Thus we focus on the application of dynamic game the-
ory and measure outcomes under cooperative and non-cooperative agreements in one 'true'
model. This is already a severe assumption but it appears that even if we would know the
'true' model, then game aspects provide such a richness of complexity that good future
predictions are still almost unattainable.
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1.3.2 Hierarchical control
A less developed part in the economic policy coordination literature is the one on hier-
archical control. The introduction of hierarchical control models in economics probably
originates from researchers of the former Eastern Europe.  At that time it was popular
among these researchers to model their plan-economy as a certain type of hierarchical con-
trol system. Simply stated, a hierarchical control system can be viewed as a system where
the coordinator's policy strategies at the upper level are transmitted (and often imposed)
to the subsystems at the lower levels. In the literature hierarchical control is often com-
pared with outcomes using decentralised control (see, e.g., Jamshidi [50] and Findeisen
[29]). Some researchers, familiar  with the hierarchical control literature, introduced these
ideas in order to describe certain aspects of policy coordination within the European Union
(see Ito and de Zeeuw [48]). In Ito et al. [49] a hierarchical model was designed and subse-
quently estimated. In this model the European Commission is modelled as a coordinator
which adjust the actions of underlying countries in order to achieve an overall performance,
whereas the countries may aim at their own objectives. A strong point of the model was
the presence of the tension of national governments who's decision making is influenced by
their own objectives and the Community objectives. With the model various experiments
were undertaken which are reported in  van  der Wal et  al.   [79] and Weeren et  al.   [82].   How-
ever some main drawbacks of the model were also discovered. Besides some unconvenient
model properties, the role of the European Commission in the model was rather extreme.
Firstly, their available policy instruments were not in agreement with reality and secondly
the role of the European Commission was rather strong in the sense that countries had no
possibility to deviate from policy implications imposed by the Commission. In order to
cope with these drawbacks the structure of the model needed to be changed. This, however,
appeared to be an almost impossible task and therefore the hierarchical control research
was abandoned in favour of the research presented in this thesis.  In this thesis we still
consider the tension between Community objectives and national objectives but the role of
the EC will be modelled more flexible in the sense that in our concept it is possible to vary
the impact of EC on the national economies. By choosing this framework we return to the
more traditional views of policy coordination as described in the previous subsection. A
recent study on modelling coordination issues in hierarchical control is Weeren [81].
1.4 Contents of the thesis
In this thesis the impact of convergence on coordination aspects are studied for Stage two
of the EMU process. The restriction to consider only Stage two had to be made since we
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wanted to obtain empirical results with the help of an estimated multi-country model. It is
clear that with such a model the welfare gains and losses if countries are already assumed
to be in Stage three of EMU are very hard to grasp.  Not only is Stage three relatively
far away in time but also will Stage three be characterised by huge structural changes in
the Community which are very difficult to predict. On the other hand, economic policy-
making of the EU-economies in Stage two depends very much on the expected welfare
gains in Stage three.  If a EU-country expects to gain a lot from Stage three of EMU
then that country is willing to accept more costs, in terms of welfare loss, in Stage two.
Political reality suggests the same, however, sometimes arguments which put forward this
point are negatively stated in the sense that they state that it will be very costly for those
countries which will not enter Stage three of EMU. For instance, in the case of the United
Kingdom, Ashdown [1] argues that staying out of the monetary union would have the
main disadvantage that one isolates from the union and thus looses important economic
and political influence. Such an isolation is likely to diminish trade, attract less foreign
direct investment, increase exchange rate uncertainty and diminish influence in global pol-
itics. These arguments suggest also that the more countries in Europe participate at the
European Union the harder it will be for those countries who stay outside. However, in
the theoretical and empirical analysis in this thesis we will not consider the possible gains
of Stage three, or differently stated the gains (or losses) for each country in Stage three
is assumed to be zero. We will only briefly indicate how a part of the theoretical analysis
will change if countries expect positive welfare gains from Stage three.
During Stage two of the EMU process it is assumed that the EC has some global objectives
but has no direct control over policy instruments to reach them. This assumption fits real-
ity probably quite closely since, as mentioned before, the only way for the EC to influence
the Member States is to make (public) recommendations (see, e.g., the broad economic
guidelines as published by the European Commission [16]). Although most countries posi-
tively react on these guidelines set out by the EC, the EC institutions themselves can only
hope that each Member State will really act according these guidelines.
Now the main research of this thesis results from the question: How can we model the
impact of decisions made by the European Commission on the underlying EU-economies?
We consider the EC not only as a coordinating institution in the sense that it coordi-
nates countries in order to establish Pareto efficient outcomes but there is more at hand.
Firstly, it is, a priori, unclear whether the recommendations and guidelines set out by the
Commission really coincide with the policy rules obtained as obtained in Pareto efficient
outcomes. Secondly, one can even claim that certain rules set out by the EC may hamper
welfare in Stage two, not only for some countries but also for the total union. For instance
if we look more specificly at the four convergence conditions set out by the EC then each
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particular EU-country should raise itself the following question (see Crockett [17]): 'are
the convergence rules consistent with a satisfactory performance in other domains of pol-
icy?'. For example, is low inflation not reached at the expense of low growth and high
unemployment and is there sufficient structural flexibility in each economy to maintain a
fixed exchange rate regime? It is clear that the answers on these question are different
for each EU-economy. Some countries will find it harder to follow certain rules during
Stage two than others. To study these aspects we model the EC-objectives as a seperate
function. Constructing this function we use the convergence conditions as set out at the
Maastricht Treaty 1991. It is clear that other (real) objectives, such as GDP per head or
unemployment in the total union are respectable alternatives as well, but the convergence
rules are more convenient for practical research since they are clearly specified.
The theoretical framework considered in this thesis is, therefore, as follows. Recall the
situation just before the Maastricht Treaty 1991. Assume that each Member State enters
Maastricht with an own objective (welfare) function in which they have specified their de-
sired policy objectives and priorities for the coming years. We follow the traditional policy
coordination theory, in which there are more than two players involved in the game and
compare a situation where the EU-countries agree on a cooperative outcome, e.g. repre-
sented by a Pareto efficient outcome, versus a situation of a non-cooperative agreement,
e.g., a Nash equilibrium.
Remark. In the case of more than two players this gives already some additional prob-
lems, such as coalition forming. In this thesis we refrain from coalitions and just consider
two extreme regime types, a fully cooperative regime versus a fully non-cooperative regime,
where the last regime implies that if one player decides to play non-cooperatively, all the
players will do so. This assumption is made for convenience sake since the amount of
coalitions, e.g., in the case of more than five countries is already very large.
The new contribution to the policy coordination literature is that besides these traditional
game experiments we study the impact of conditions imposed on this game by a suprana-
tional institution. In theory we can distinguish two types of conditions (see Siebrand [71]):
(1) central conditions:
These are conditions which are imposed on the total economy such as in our example the
EU, where the total economy is described by aggregate variables such as GDP per head in
the EU, total employment in the EU, average price deflators etc. The central conditions
we will use in this thesis are the two convergence conditions as specified in the Maastricht
Treaty: convergence in nominal long term interest rates and convergence in consumer price
deflators.
(2) decentral conditions:
Decentral conditions are conditions which are imposed by the supranational institution on
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the national economies, where the national economy is described by national variables such
as GDP per head or total employment in that particular economy. Examples in the Maas-
tricht Treaty of decentral conditions are the two requirements for the national budgets.
Remark that the main difference between these two types of conditions is that, in principle,
the second type of conditions can be fulfilled by one particular economy through individ-
ual policymaking whereas the first type of conditions have to be fulfilled through collective
policymaking. In this thesis we formalise these conditions imposed by the supranational
institution by an EC-objective function. The introduction of this EC-objective function is
interpreted as a restriction on the negotiation game of the EU-countries. Theoretically we
can now distinguish two different views of policymaking.
Firstly, a cooperative point of view:
If we assume that countries play cooperatively then any restriction imposed on the game
will decrease total welfare in comparison to the case where there is no restriction imposed
on the game. Thus in this framework, if countries decide to put some weight on the EC-
objectives they will envisage less room for policy-making concerning their own objectives.
A priori, it is however not clear how total welfare losses are distributed among countries.
For instance for some countries the Community objectives may coincide more with their
own objectives than for others. Such outcomes depend for each individual country very
much on its own structure of the economy and more in particular on the signs and sizes of
the various international interdependencies of the economies.
Secondly, a non-cooperative point of view:
In a non-cooperative world the outcome of imposing restrictions on individual policymak-
ers is unclear, it may be benificial but it may also be malicious for total welfare but also
for each individual country. In comparison with a non-cooperative framework without
EC-objectives this depends again on the structures of the underlying economies. It may
be benificial if the EC-objectives are specified such that the size of the negative spillovers
decreases and/or such that the size of positive spillovers increases.  On the other hand
it may be malicious if the size of positive spillovers decreases and/or the size of negative
spillovers increases.
Thus from a non-cooperative point of view the outcome of the empirical experiment hinges
decisively on the international interdependencies in the economies and the restrictions im-
posed on them, whereas in the cooperative framework the impact of restrictions is always
malicious. Therefore, to study these aspects in the EU we have to get an idea of the
(inter)dependencies of the various EU-economies (see for related subjects Hughes Hallett
[35, 371).
Remark. Weakening the assumption of zero profits or zero losses at Stage three could
influence the game in a cooperative framework at least in two important ways. Firstly,
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if countries expect positive gains during Stage three then Pareto optimal policies during
Stage two, which do not give a guarantee for a transition to Stage three of EMU, are not
acceptable. In that case countries will search for policies which yield welfare gains which
give a guarantee to enter Stage three of EMU and are not too far away from Pareto ef-
ficient solutions. This last argument is used in chapter two and explains why we do not
consider in our analyses only policies on the Pareto frontier but also policies which yield
a lot of convergence. Secondly, assume that the non-cooperative game outcome, where
each country tries to minimise its own welfare without restrictions, is the threatpoint of
the game.  If now each country expects a positive amount of welfare gain in Stage three
then one could argue that during Stage two a country would be willing to consider even
(restricted) cooperative policies which yield less welfare gain than the welfare gain obtained
at the threatpoint if this policy is a guarantee for entering Stage three.
This thesis can be divided in two parts, a theoretical one and an empirical one. The theo-
retical exposition is given in chapters two and three. In these chapters we study properties
of the (restricted) cooperative game and related aspects from a cooperative point of view.
The empirical part of this thesis is presented in chapters four and five. In chapter four
we design a dynamic macro-economic model of eight EU Member States, the USA and
Japan and in chapter five we compute (restricted) cooperative as well as (restricted) non-
cooperative game outcomes for this model. The thesis is organised in such a way that each
chapter is more or less self contained. Chapters two till four are preliminaries for chap-
ter five. In that last chapter we report the empirical results obtained with the theory of
chapter two and three and the estimated dynamic model of chapter four. In the following
subsections we present a brief overview of the contents of each chapter separately.
1.4.1   Chapter two
This chapter is largely based on Douven and Engwerda [19] and presents a theoretical
framework in which the functioning of the European Commission is studied from a cooper-
ative point of view.  In our dynamic game analysis the impact of the European Commission
is modelled by formulating a convergence function. This aspect of convergence is modelled
as a dynamic constraint on the individual loss functions.  We show that if each individual
country is not willing to accept a lower welfare than the welfare obtained in the threatpoint
we have that the maximum degree of convergence is completely determined by this threat-
point. To illustrate the theory we present a (theoretical) two player example. The example
shows that the costs involved to obtain convergence can differ substantially between coun-
tries and that, ultimately, these high costs can result in non-cooperative behaviour of both
countries. Furthermore, it is shown that a small deviation from a Pareto optimal solution
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can increase convergence considerably. An algorithm is devised how to obtain solutions of
the game which are politically more feasible than Pareto optimal solutions and improve on
the non-cooperative solution.
1.4.2 Chapter three
This  chapter is based on Douven and Engwerda  [20]. We concentrate on Pareto optimal
policies in the unrestricted cooperative game. We look at properties of N-person axiomatic
bargaining solutions under the technical assumptions that the Pareto frontier is strictly
concave and twice differentiablel. It contributes   to the policy coordination literature  in
several ways. Firstly, a fast algorithm is given for computing the Nash bargaining solution,
which is a well known solution in axiomatic bargaining theory. Secondly, we give empirical
and theoretical arguments for the fact that the Nash bargaining solution and an other
well known axiomatic bargaining solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, are often very
closely situated on the Pareto frontier in policy coordination games. Thirdly, we consider
effects of certain changes in the threatpoint, say d = (di, ···, dN)' for the Nash bargaining
as well as for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution if the Pareto frontier remains fixed.  If
d, increases, while for each j 96 i, dj remains constant, then the corresponding Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution has the property that player i is the only one who gains. This
property is however not generally met for the Nash bargaining solution.
1.4.3    Chapter four
In order to compute empirically the theoretical implications of chapters two and three we
need a macroeconomic multi-country model which contains various international linkages.
In this chapter, which is a slightly extended version of Douven and Plasmans  [22], we build a
smalllinear interdependent model (SLIM) of eight EU-Member States (Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), the USA and
Japan. Since the Mundell-Fleming model became, and still remains, the starting point
of open economy macroeconomics, we introduce in this chapter a modified version of this
theoretical two-country framework. The Mundell-Fleming model is extended in three ways.
Firstly, it is extended to more than two countries using the principal trading pattern of each
i Since this chapter  is more related  to  the game theory literature, where games are defined in terms  of
maximising payoffs, we consider concave Pareto frontiers whereas in chapter two and five, where difference
games are defined in terms of minimising costs, we consider convex Pareto frontiers.  It is clear that
there exists a homomorphism between the two frameworks since one can replace the payogs by costs and
maximisation by minimisation.
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individual country. Secondly, we extended the model by including country-specific labour
market characteristics, wage-price spirals and long term interest rates. Thirdly, we included
dynamic responses into the model which make it possible to distinguish between short- and
long-run behaviour of the economy. In each country direct linkages are modelled through
outputs, prices, exchange rates and interest rates. For estimation we use annual data for the
sample period 1960-1991. This estimation process is based on error-correction arguments.
Historical simulations and shock analyses are performed to show various properties of the
model and the outcomes of the model are compared with those for existing models in
literature.
1.4.4  Chapter five
In chapter five we apply the theory developed in chapters two and three on the SLIM-
model of chapter four. Starting from the Maastricht Treaty 1991, we assume that Stage
two of EMU takes place during the period 1992-1999. We construct for this planning period
welfare functions which describe the EU-countries' objectives and the EC-objectives.  Next
we compute and compare four possible scenarios. Two scenarios, a cooperative and a
noncooperative, where the EU-Member states neglect the restriction imposed by the EC
and two scenarios, a cooperative and a noncooperative, where the EU-Member States give
some weight to the EC-objective function. In these last two scenarios the EU-Member
States pursue a restricted policy. This restriction is modelled through the EC-objective
function and represents conditions elaborated at the Maastricht Treaty. The chapter is





Due to the integration process within the EU countries there is an increasing demand for
price stability. To that end the European Council decided, at the Maastricht meeting in
1991, to start, at least in 1999, with irreversibly fixed exchange rates and to establish
a European Central Bank. This final step towards the realisation of the EMU sets out,
however, that uneven developments in the process of integration are set aside. Therefore,
greater convergence of economic performance is needed (see the report of Delors Committee
[18]). Another aspect of the integration process is that as a consequence of the strength-
ened economic interdependence between member countries the room for independent policy
manoeuvre is reduced considerably and that cross-border effects of developments originat-
ing in each member country become increasingly important. So, the stages towards an
economic and monetary union involve on the one hand a process of closer convergence,
and on the other hand coordination of the macroeconomic policies of the various countries.
Important to note is that this of course does not imply that if there is convergence of
economic policies and/or coordination of macroeconomic policies between countries, the
integration process will be balanced and thus the establishment of a single market is justi-
fied. In other words convergence and coordination are prerequisites for obtaining a single
market but don't guarantee a succesful establishment of it. Now, there is a general con-
sensus amongst the participating countries that convergence and coordination of policies
is needed for moving towards an economic and monetary union. There is, however, much
less consensus how far and how fast this process should take place. This has, of course,
everything to do with the internal forces working on the markets of each individual coun-
try. The possibly long run significant increases in economic welfare in the Community are
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much less tangible than the short term welfare losses incurred at various domestic markets.
Therefore, a natural reaction one can expect from participating countries is that they do
strive for convergence in economic variables, but that they are only willing to pay a price
(in terms of welfare loss) for it if the additional increase in the degree of convergence will
be significant. Studies with respect to macroeconomic policy coordination in a dynamic
games context appear frequently in economic literature, see e.g. Brandsma [8}, McKibbin
and Sachs [551, Hughes Hallett [391 However, the influence of the aspects of convergence,
analysed in a dynamic games setting, on the effects of macroeconomic policy coordination
are not studied before.
Starting from the point of view that each country has its own individual social welfare func-
tion it wants to minimise in cooperation with the other countries, we develop a theoretical
framework to analyze the trade off between extra welfare loss and more convergence. The
analysis will be done in a dynamic games framework. We assume that each policymaker
has an individual objective function, he/she wants to minimise and that there is some com-
mon sense on a convergence function which they want to minimise simultaneously. In the
case of the EMU this convergence function may e.g. represent the convergence conditions
which are specified in the Maastricht treaty (1991). In particular the two conditions of
convergence in consumer price inflation and convergence in long term interest rates that are
necessary for admitting a country  to the monetary union  (see  e.g.   Bean  [4])  can be incor-
porated in such a function. Under the assumption that all policymakers like to cooperate,
we analyze the set of solutions which are obtained by the policymakers when they simul-
taneously minimise their welfare loss functions and convergence function. We assume that
the degree of convergence, which is represented by the value of the convergence function,
depends on the agreements of the outcome of a negotiating process between countries. In
particular we will show that if reducing welfare loss is the primary interest of countries, the
degree of convergence countries can obtain is limited. So, if countries strive for a degree of
convergence which is set too ambitious, the result can be that (some) countries will show
non-cooperative behaviour. In a theoretical example we illustrate two additional aspects
the game may have.
(1) The price (in terms of individual welfare loss) that countries have to pay will for some
countries be higher than for other countries.
(2) There are situations in which by a minor deviation from the Pareto solution, a large
increase in convergence degree is possible. In other words, by paying a small price (in
terms of individual welfare loss) high revenues (in terms of convergence) can be obtained.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. In section 2.2 we will introduce the theo-
retical framework. We consider N countries which cooperatively agree on minimising a
Incorporating convergence criteria 15
convergence function and, moreover, all have their own individual objective function they
like to minimise. The aspect of convergence is modeled as a dynamic constraint on the joint
social welfare function. Under the assumption that all of these functions are convex and
(some mild regularity conditions) we show the above mentioned aspects. Furthermore we
show that the cooperative outcome which yields the largest degree of convergence coincides
with the Nash solution of the game. To help the reader to understand the basics of the
presented theory we illustrate the approach in section 2.3 by means of a simple theoretical
example. In section 2.4 we present the conclusions.
2.2 Incorporating convergence criteria: a theoretical
framework
We consider an integrated economy of the European Community with N interdependent
economies, where the policymakers in each country face a dynamic economic model which
connects the endogenous variables (denoted by y), instrumental variables (denoted by u)
and other noncontrollable variables. Each country has control over a set of instruments
for economic policy, denoted  by  u;. In stacked  form  u'  =  (u;,-..,ul,). We assume  that
each policymaker has a convex objective function, which we specify by 1, which he/she
wants to minimise. We denote  the  set of Pareto optimal solutions  in  the Ji'..., JN-plane
by P. The point N. corresponds to the non-cooperative (Nash) solution, which is used as
a bargaining threat-point, denoted by Nc := U ,···,JMj· Furthermore we assume that
the countries agree to strive for a certain amount of degree of convergence for some of their
economic (endogenous and/or instrumental) variables. This agreement will be reflected
in a convex convergence function, denoted by C, which is included in the optimisation
process. It is important to stress that the convergence function differs from the countries
objective functions in a way that the latter contains only variables which belong to its own
country whereas the convergence function contains variables of all the countries.  Thus
minimising a costfunction is something that can, in principle, be done by a country alone
whereas minimising the convergence function has to be done simultanously.
The decision-making process of the policymakers concerning what strategy to follow, will
depend on the following set:
{(A(U),.-,JN(U),C(U)) U€ U}, (2.1)
where we suppose that the strategy-space U is a convex set. The policymakers have to find
a cooperative strategy which results in a point in (2.1) which is acceptable for them all.  Now
note that whenever two different strategies yield the same individual costs Ji,   i = 1,-.., N,
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but different values for the convergence function, only the strategy yielding the lowest value
for the convergence function is of interest to all policymakers.  So, the set of relevant control
strategies consists of:
U = {u€U I V O€U (49) '...1 JN(U)) = (.4(0)'..., JN(tl)) =* C(U) 5 C(1 )}.
This observation makes it possible to consider the decision problem from the following point
of view. By varying the strategies over the whole set U, we obtain the set of all possible
objective outcomes in the .4,.-, JN-plane.   To each point in this set is attached a unique
value for the convergence function. The problem for the decision makers is now to select
cooperatively a point within this set that is acceptable for everyone. Now, as mentioned
in the introduction we will assume that minimising their own cost function is the primary
interest of countries and that striving for convergence is of secundary interest. In that
case the aspect of convergence acts as a dynamic constraint on joint social welfare. If
we, furthermore, refrain from the possibility of side-payments and assume that the axiom
of individual rationality holds  (see e.g. Petit  [661  1), then countries will cooperatively
minimise the joint convergence function as long as their individual costs will be lower than
their non-cooperative costs. So, the set of possible objective outcomes will then restricted
on the one hand by the non-cooperative Nash threatpoint NC, and on the other hand by
the set of Pareto solutions. We will call this set in the sequel the negotiation area (see
figure 2.1 for an illustration in a two player context).
Remark. To complicate matters not unnecessarily we, here, do not address the issue of
information patterns and period of commitment (see Basar and 01sder [3]). For explaining
our ideas it is suflicient (and most convenient) to use an open-loop information structure
and binding commitments, which fixes the 'negotiation area' throughout the entire planning
period. In the closed-loop case, we have to take account of multiple (Nash threatpoint)
equilibria and if we also take account of the possibility of renegotiation our 'negotiation
area' would vary over time. In the case of multiple equilibria, in literature various kind
of arbitration schemes and algorithms have been proposed to discriminate between these
equilibria. An overview of the literature can be found in de Zeeuw and Hughes Hallett
[86,36].  We use the convergence-criteria as an arbitration scheme to discriminate between
the cooperative points. However, when introducing such an arbitration scheme points
outside the negotiation set (i.e., the Pareto optimal solutions between A and B in figure 2.1)
become interesting too. This is what we will investigate in the sequel.
The basic question is now of course, how we can determine this negotiation area and
1This axiom states that policymakers, if they behave rational, will never accept an outcome for their
individual object function which is worse than the one a policymaker can obtain by acting independently
(which is represented by the non-cooperative outcome NC)




  = negotiation area N
Figure 2.1: Representation of the negotiation area in a two player context.
its corresponding convergence function values in an efficient way.  We will not give a
complete answer to this question, but present a solution which we expect will work for the
applications we are aiming at (i.e. situations in which the set of Pareto-solutions and the
Nash-threatpoint are situated not too far from each other). The solution we will present has
a number of nice properties. First of all it attaches to every point in the negotiation area
a unique control strategy that can be obtained by minimising a strict convex combination
of the individual object functions and the convergence function. Secondly, we will show
that this control strategy is parametrised by N parameters and that this parametrisation
is  a continuous function  of its parameters. By varying the parameters between  0  and   1,
the whole negotiation area can then be covered (in general (see note above)).
The solution is motivated by our assumption that each policymaker is primarily interested
in minimising his own objective function in a cooperative setting and that convergence plays
a minor role. We model this aspect by rewriting the convex combination of individual cost
and convergence cost in a special way. Consider
N+1
61.4 + ... + ON JN + ON+IC, with E a, = 1.
:=1
This is equivalent with (in the non-trivial case &N+1 96 1):
(1 - A)(aili + ··· + aNJN) + AC, where  A = aN+1,  and  ai = 6,/(1 - LPN+lh
which has the nice property that Eli ai = 1.  If we minimise this second convex combi-
nation of the individual object functions and the convergence function then we have the
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property that A=0 resembles the case that countries completely ignore the convergence
goal (and because Elia, =l w e find the Pareto optimal solutions), and that A=l
corresponds with the case that countries only pay attention to their mutual convergence
interests. We will show (under some smoothness conditions) that the set of cooperative
optimal strategies corresponding with these adapted object functions for each of the N
countries,  can be parametrised by the N-1 parameters al, •··,aN-1  and  A, and that  this
parametrisation is a continuous differentiable function of all these parameters. By varying
these parameters, in particular A, it is then possible to analyze the trade off between the
costs individual countries have to pay and more convergence. First, we present a prelim-
inary result. The next theorem shows that if one considers a certain convex combination
of all object functionals .4,   i  =  1,.., N and  C, the optimal strategy minimising this
combination will be a continuous differentiable function of N out of N+1 parameters.
Theorem 2.1 Suppose U  is a convex set,  J,(u), i = 1,..., N and C(u)  are strictly convex
functionals which are twice continuously diferentiable in u E U. Consider
tN
J(u, ai,...,aN, A) := (1 - A) 1 Ea,J,(u)   + AC(u)\:=1
for u € U, A E [0,1] and Qi € [0,1] for i - 1,..., N, with Zili a; = 1.  Let
11.  := arggin J(u, al, ···, aN, A).
Then, for every A E [0,11  and a, € [0,11 for i = 1,..., N,  with Eli a, = 1,  u-  is uniquely
determined as a function of the parameters al, ···,aN-1, A,  i. e.  u' = u*(al,·••,aN-1, A).
Moreover, this function  u-  is  a  continuously  diferentiable function  in  (al, ···,aN-1,  A)  E
[0,11 x ... x [0,11, with Elit ai 5 1.
Proof.  Let a := ( 1, ···,  N, A) C [0,11 x ... x [0,11 be fixed numbers, with Zilia, = 1. The
strictly convex properties of Jl, ..., JN, C imply that the function J(u) is strictly convex in
u €U. So for every a, J has a unique global minimum on U. Denote this element in U,
which depends on a, by ua. Since J is differentiable we conclude that the derivative of J
with respect to u, evaluated at the point ua is zero. So,
F(ai,·••, &N, 1, u)):= 2 1 - (1 - 1)ai el(u) + 1)ai 83(u)+... + (1 - MaN O +A.. =0
-       OJN(U)     - ac(u)
UU au UU 011
evaluated at the point u = u:. Note that, since J is by assumption twice continuous
differentiable, the functional F is continuous differentiable in (al, ···, aN-1, A, u) € [0,11 X
... x [0,1] x U. Furthermore, since Ji, ..., JN, C are strictly convex functionals in u, we have
that
Va f [0,11 x ... x [0,1] det 40.
OF(a, ua)
0U
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Applying the implicit function theorem yields then that there is an unique continuous
differentiable function, say  f,  such  that for all  a  :=  (al,···,aN, A)  €  10,1]  x ... x  [0,11,
F(a, f(a)) = 0, with f(a) = ua.  So, 11* := u*(al, ···,aN, A) := f(al,•••'aN, A) is a contin-
uous differentiable function in a € [0,1] x ... x [0,11. Using the fact that Eli a, = 1 gives
U'=u'(01,···'aN-1, A). 0
Remark.  In the sequel we will use the notation (ai, ..., aN-1) € [O, l] x... x [0,1],but, by do-
ing so, we implicitly assume that the ai, i = 1,...,N-1 satisfy the constraint Et-11 a, 5 1.
Using the previous result we show now that the set of control strategies deflned in theo-
rem 2.1, parametrised by
0 := {u'(al, ···, aN-1, A), 1 (al,···,aN-liA) C [0,11 x ... x [0,11}
has the advertised properties. Formally the result reads as follows:
Theorem 2.2 There exists a bijective mapping between the set of unique points
{u'(al, ···, aN-1, A) 1 (al, •••, aN-1, A) € [0,11 x ... x [0,11}
and the set
{(Ji(u.)'..., JN(u'),C(u')) 1 (al,··•,aN-1, A) € [0,11 x ... x [0,11}.
Furthermore Ji (u-), ..., JN(u' ), C(u') are continuous functions in (al, ·•·,aN-1, A) € [0,1] X
... X [0,1].
Proof. Because (1 - A)(Ell ai) +A=l, with A E [0,1] and a, C [0,1],for i =1,..., N,
the unique solution u- of J(u) is a Pareto solution for the objective function J(u) which
represents a game with N+1 players, where each player minimises the objective function
represented by I for player i, (i = 1,..., N) and C for player N + 1. According to,e.g., de
Zeeuw [85, lemma 3.4.2 and 3.4.31 there is a bijective mapping between the Pareto solutions
for Ji, ···, JN, C and the optimal solution for J.  The set of Pareto solutions can be found
by varying the parameters (al, ·•·, aN, A) between [0,11  x ... x [0,1] with Eli ai = 1.
Because u' is a continuous function in (01, ···, ON-1, A) C [0,11 x ... x [0,1] it is straightfor-
ward that Ji(u*(01,..., aN-1, A)),..., JN(u*(al, ···, aN-1, A)), C(u'(al, •••, aN-1, A)) are con-
tinuous functions in (al,..., aN-1, A) C [0,11 x ... x [0,1].       o
Using the theorem, the set of control strategies 0 gives us the following subset of (2.1):
{(Jlcul), -, JN(u ),C(u*))   11' E 0} (2.2)
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To see that this reduction of the set in (2.1) still contains all the interesting points, we
analyze the set in (2.2) in combination with J more specifically. We have that:
(:)  the set in (2.2) contains the whole set of points (Ji, ..., ./N) which belong to the Pareto
optimal solutions. To find these solutions we substitute A=O i n D and fill in the resulting
control strategies in (2.2).
(tz) the set in (2;2) contains the points where C is minimal. To find these points we sub-
stitute A=l i n U and fill in the resulting strategies in (2.2).
Furthermore, from theorem 2.2, we have that the set of points in (2.2) form a continuous
surface in the Ji,..., ·IN, C-plane, which indicates that we have parametrised all the inter-
esting points between (z) and (z:) as well. These points can be found by varying A between
0 and 1.
From now on we will skip the u- in the notation and describe the set in (2.2) as:
{(Ji,..., JN, C)  1  (al, ···, aN-1, A) €  10,11 X  ...  X [0,1]}. (2.3)
We will now define some sets of interesting points. A projection of the set in (2.3), on the
Ji'..., JN-plane is:
S:= {(Ji,...,JN) | Cal,···,ON-1, A) E [0,1] x...x [0,1]}
The subset of S:
P := {(.4,...,JN) 1 (al,···,aN-1,0) E IO, 11 x ... x [0,11}
represents the set of Pareto solutions. Iso-convergence lines, i.e. lines with the same degree
of convergence, are defined as follows:
4:=  {(·41..., JN)  I  C(al, ···,aN-1, A)  = 7,    (Ji,···, JN)  E  S,    7  C IR+}
Note that a small value of 7 corresponds with much convergence (and vice versa).  The
negotiation area is defined by:
A  := {(Ji,..., JN) 1 Ji S JlN' ..., JN 5 JNN,   (Jh ..., JN) € S}
Using the axiom of individual rationality it is clear that policymakers will not agree to a
certain degree of convergence, denoted by 7, if 4 n A/ = 0. Moreover, the largest degree
of convergence policymakers are willing to accept is given by:
7. := nljn{714 n K} 4 0.
So, in general policymakers should set their degree of convergence with care because if this
degree is set too ambitious policymakers are not willing to cooperate anymore. In the next
theorem we will prove fact that the point in the negotiation area which yields the largest
degree of convergence is the non-cooperative threat point NC. This (unique) point in (2.3)
will in the sequel be denoted by Cm".
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Theorem 2.3  UN C S then the point in the negotiation area N, represented by aTEU,
for which C(z) = 7* equals N:
Proof. According to Theorem 2.2., there is a bijective relationship between 0 and the set of
Pareto solutions which correspond to a game of N+ 1 players, where player i, (i  =  1,..., N),
minimises an objective function represented by J,, and player N+1 minimises C. Suppose
that u <0 yields a point in S which lies in the negotiation area Af which differs from
Nc  but for which convergence is maximal. Since u yields a point  (Ji(u), ...,JN(u))  in
the negotiation area it satisfies the property that J,(u) 5 J,N Because the strategy u
corresponds  with a point  in  S that differs  from NC, there  is  an  i   El,..., N for which
J;(u) < JN Making use of the angular shape of A/ and the assumption A/ C S, it is
now always possible to find a strategy v E D which corresponds with a point in S which
lies on the boundary of N and for which Ji(v) = .4(u),...,J,(u) = J,N '....JN(v) = JN(U).
Comparing these two points in the negotiation area, we have that of all the Jj-values
(j  =  1,..., N),  only the J,-value of the two points differ.   Due to the fact  that  u and
v are both Pareto optimal solutions it follows from the definition of Pareto optimality
that the convergence value in both points differs as well. This observation implies that
C(u) < C(u). The fact that strategy v corresponds with a lower convergence value than
u, violates the assumption that u corresponds with a point in A/, for which convergence is
maximal.        0
It is important to note at this point that the non-cooperative strategy which results in
the point Nc €Sin general differs from the cooperative strategy which results in the
point Cmar . In general, the convergence outcome of the non-cooperative strategy and the
cooperative strategy will differ in the sense that the convergence value for the cooperative
strategy will be lower than the convergence value for the non-cooperative strategy. So,
the gains in convergence policymakers will receive by playing cooperatively will be at most
7* - C(UN•), where uN' represents the non-cooperative strategy which yields N:  Thus, in
general, Pareto solutions will not yield maximal convergence. Therefore, if policymakers
want a certain degree of convergence, it will usually not be possible to keep up with the
Pareto optimal solutions. Usefull Pareto solutions will only coincide with solutions with
a certain degree of convergence, say 7, if 4 n A/n P 4 0. Note, furthermore, that the
price to be payed for reaching convergence of a certain degree will not be the same for
every country.  We will illustrate this in an example in the next section.  If N ¢ S, the
threatpoint is not guaranteed to fall within S. In that case our approach will not work,
because we can not calculate all the points within the negotiation area. However, it is our
experience that Al" CS will apply in most applications 2.
2 Counter examples can be constructed by introducing erratic convergence functions or specifying dy-
namics for which the Pareto solutions and the Nash threatpoint are situated very far from each other.
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2.3   An illustrative example
We consider a theoretic example in a (discrete time) deterministic linear quadratic differ-
ence game framework with two players (countries). The dynamic behaviours of player 1
and player 2 are described by:
y:(t) = yl(t - 1) + ul(t) + 0.3Y2(t - 1), Yi(0) = 1,
Yl(t) = 72(t - 1) + U2(t) + 0.6yl(t - 1), Y2(0) = 0,
where, for i =  1,2,    7,(t)  €  Ill is the target variable and  u.(t)  E  IR is the instrumental
variable.  From the interaction terms (0.3Y2(1 - 1) for player 1  and 0.671(t - 1) for player 2)
follows that each player faces a different dynamical structure. Player 2 is more influenced
by player 1 than vice versa. Each player makes his plans for the future. We assume that
each player has a planning period of 2 periods and chooses his desired paths for the future,
as follows:
f player 1:  y;(1) = 2,   y;(2) = 3
desired paths <l player 2:  y;(1) = 1.5,  y;(2) = 3.
These desired paths reflect the policymakers own wishes of the future and are obtained
independently from each other. In this example the players have different preferences but,
as can be seen from the ideal paths, both players are striving for convergence of their target
variables in period 2. It is of course not necessary to choose desired paths wich converge
but by doing so we will be able to demonstrate the fact that Pareto optimal solutions do
not coincide with convergence solutions, even if policymakers strive for convergence in their
desired values. We represent  the cost functions  Ji,J2 for every individual player by:
A = 0.5((11(1) - 2)2 + (11(2) - 3)2 + ul(1)2 + ul(2)2),
./2 = 0.5((72(1) - 1.5)2 + (72(2) - 3)2 + u2(1)2 + u2(2)2).
Each player wants to play a strategy, during his planning period, which minimises his costs.
So the control problem for every individual player (i = 1,2) is:
min      J,.
u. (1),u.(2)
Because the target variable (and indirectly the instrumental variable) of each player is
directly related to those of the other player, the control problem of each player depends on
the actions undertaken by the other player. This gives rise to various solution concepts.
From the non-cooperative solutions we will just consider the open loop Nash solution,
which we denote by Ne. The cooperative solutions are represented by the set of Pareto
solutions which can be found by solving:
min ali + (1 - a).12.U
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for a € [0,11 where u := (ul(1),ul(2),uy(1),u2(2)).
However, before playing the game both players want to be sure that there will be some
I
degree of convergence of their target variables.  Iii this example we assume that both players
want to converge to the average of their target variables. We take as a measure for the
degree of convergence the following convergence function:
2
C = E(y,(1) - y(1))2 + 4(yi(2) - 11(2))2,
i-1
where  y(t) := 0.5(yi(t) + Y2(t))  for  1  =  1,2.    So, both players agree  that  they  want  to
minimise the variance of their target variables in each period. Moreover, minimising the
variance in period  2 is given more weight than minimising the variance in period 1, which
is represented by the weights of 1 in period 1 and 4 in period 2. These weights indicate that
both players find it more important that there is convergence at the end of the planning
period than during the planning period·3.
Now, together, the players have to take a decision about the strategy they are going to
follow. In order to choose a strategy they have to weigh out all possible strategies. So,
ultimately they have to find a strategy which is 'optimal' in some sense. In the next
subsection we demonstrate the solution concepts developed in section 2.2 and analyze the
space of interesting outcomes. After that we give one possible interpretation of 'optimal'
and give a proposal to determine a feasible degree of convergence, 7, for both players.
2.3.1    Analysis of the possible outcomes
As stressed in section 2.2, the decision about what strategy to follow, will depend upon
the following set:
{(·4(U), .12(u),C(u)) 1 U € 1114} (2.4)
Because  Ji, J„ C are strictly convex functions which are twice differentiable in  u,  the  set
0 can be found by solving the following problem:
Let a, A  E [0,11, and
J(u) := (1 - A)(a.4 + (1 - a)Jy) + AC
3The above mentioned convergence criterium is in our two player case the same as minimising the
quadratic  sum  of the differences between the target values:  C  - 0.5(yi (1) - 72(1))2 + 2(yl (2) - 92(2))2.
Furthermore, note, that for convenience sake we not included control strategies in the convergence function
which would make the problem indefinit.  If one wants to use our approach for practical purposes, one
should realise that scaling of the object functions and convergence function might be necessary.
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Find now for every a, A E [0,11:
u'  := arg mjn J(u)
From section 2.2, the set of control strategies 0 is given by:
{u'(a, A) 1 (a, A) E [0,11 x [0,11}
Substituting these control strategies in (2.4) gives the following set (compare with (2.3)):
{(Ji(a, A),J2(a, A),C(a, A)) 1 (a, A) e [0,1] x [0,1]}. (2.5)
In the sequel we will analyse this set of points for the given example.
Remark. Computing the outcomes for A=1,a=O,a=1 gives some difficulties because
in that case we have a singular system of equations. However, we are not particularly





0.5           p
S                                    L3
0.4                                      L2
N
0.3
0.2                                                                Jl
0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65
Figure 2.2: The parametrised area S, the most left curve represents the Pareto solutions
P, the small triangle on this curve represents the negotiation area K.
A  projection  of the surface  in  (2.5),  on  the  Ji, .4-plane is drawn in figure  2.2.   This  set of
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points is denoted by S, like in section 2.2.
S ={(Ji(a, A),6(a, A)) I (a, A)€ [0,11 x [0,11}
The black lines in figure 2.2 represent the edges of S.  One of these edges is the set of Pareto
solutions, which is given by the left black line. It is obtained by computing for various a:
P={(·4(a, 0), ./2(a, 0)) la€ [0,11}
Points on the upper part of the Pareto line correspond with a high value of a and points on
the lower part to a low value of a. The edge Ll in figure 2.2 is obtained by computing for
various A €  [0,1]:  (Ji(1, A), .12(1, A))  and the edge L2 bycomputing for various A € [0,1]:
(Ji(0, A), J,(0, A)).   The edge in the figure which corresponds  to  (.4(a, 1), ./2(a, 1))  for
a E [0,1] is reduced to one point in the figure. We denoted this point by L3· The small
triangle on the Pareto line denotes the negotiation area N as defined in section 2.2. Note
that the negotiation area N is completely covered by S.
To get an idea of the degree of convergence in every point of the set in (2.3) we plotted
figure 2.3. This figure shows a three dimensional plot of the following surface:
{C(a, A) 1 (a, A)€[0,11 x [0,11}
Note that the points where A=O give the degree of convergence for the Pareto solutions.
As can be seen in the figure, points on the Pareto line where a almost equals 1 or 0,
give a very high C value, which indicates that in those points the degree of convergence
is rather small. Moreover we marked in this figure the point with the largest degree of
convergence on the Pareto line. It is denoted by D and it corresponds with a = 0.836. In
table 2.1 the corresponding  (Ji, 6, C) of point  D is given. Moving away from the Pareto
Jl J2 C a A
Cooperation
Cm= 0.505 0.370 0.1059 0.080 0.270
A 0.497 0.370 0.1258 0.625 0
B 0.505 0.359 0.1483 0.523    0
D 0.472 0.451 0.0896 0.836    0
Non-Cooperation
N. 0.505 0.370 0.1365 -  -
Table 2.1: Characteristics of some interesting points.
line, by increasing A just a little bit, we see that the degree of convergence increases also.
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Figure 2.3: A three dimensional plot, where for each a, A E [O, 11 x [0,11 the corresponding
convergence outcome is plotted. The curve on the back, where A = 0, represents the Pareto
solutions P.
This means that if the players choose an outcome outside the Pareto line P their costs
will increase but in return for these increasing costs the value of the convergence function
will decrease, which means more convergence.    In this example,   if A increases  to   1,   the
convergence function will go to 0, which means complete convergence (in period 1 and
period 2). Zooming in on figure 2.2, around the negotiation area A/, gives us figure 2.4.
Specific information about the points A, B,Cmax and NC can be found in table 2.1. In
table 2.1 the cooperative outcome C corresponds with a strategy which yields a lowermax
convergence value than the non-cooperative outcome NC. The reason for this is that the
non-cooperative strategy differs from the cooperative strategy. Playing the cooperative
strategy gives, with the same individual costs, an increase in convergence of 0.306!  In
figure 2.4 we draw some iso-convergence lines, as defined in section 2.2.  In the figure
for each iso-convergence line the corresponding convergence value is given. The degree
of convergence on the Pareto line increases from B to A. As proven in section 2.2 and
visible in the figure, the point with the largest degree of convergence CmaI lies on the
edge of the negotiation area and coincides exactly with the Nc point which belongs to the
iso-convergence line Io,1059· So, the 7*, as defined in section 2.2, equals 0.1059.
Zooming in on figure 2.3, from a different viewpoint, we get an indication of which values
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Figure 2.5: Zooming in around the negotiation area (0.05 S a s 0.65) and (0 S A S 0.4).
The curve on the back (A-0) represents a subset of the Pareto solutions P. The interior
of the curve drawn on the surface represents the negotiation area A/.
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of a, A  belong to the negotiation  area Af, which is drawn  on the surface in figure  2.5.
The corresponding a, A-values for A, B, and NC are given in table 2.1.  As one notes, the
convergence value declines (so convergence increases) as A increases.
2.3.2   Fixing the degree of convergence
In this subsection we assume that both players agree they want a degree of convergence
of at least 7. So, the players will play a strategy which results in a point in (2.4) which
belongs to the iso-convergence line 4. In figure 2.6 we have drawn for three different values
of A the convergence values for all a  €  [0,1].   On  the one hand it gives an indication of how
quickly convergence declines when increasing A, and on the other hand it illustrates how
the convergence depends on a for constant A. Again, A=O corresponds with the Pareto
optimal strategies. Moreover, in figure 2.6 four different levels for 7 are drawn. Each level
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Figure 2.6: For various A, and varying a E [0,1] the corresponding convergence outcome
is plotted.
(a) 7 < 0.0896
Both players play a strategy which results in a point on the iso-convergence line 4. However
(see figure 2.4), for this 7,4 n P=0, and I,n A/ =0, which implies that the chosen
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strategy  is  not a Pareto optimal strategy  and  that the corresponding  (Ji, 12) point falls
outside the negotiation area. So, at least one of the players will have higher costs than
when he plays the non-cooperative open loop Nash strategy. Such an ambitious setting
of the degree of convergence is very unrealistic, it means that convergence prevails over
individual costs. Therefore we excluded this possibility in section 2.2 by our assumption
of rational behaviour.
(b) 0.089657< 0.1059
For this 7 (see figure 2.4), I i n N  - 0, but 4 n P 4 0.  So, a strategy can be played
which coincides with the Pareto optimal strategies. From figure 2.6 follows that there are
two possible Pareto optimal strategies, which corresponds in both cases wih an a > 0.625.
So player 2 will have higher costs than when he plays the open loop Nash strategy. On
the other hand, playing one of the two Pareto optimal solutions will be very profitable for
player 1. Without any other additional agreements between the players  (see (a)), player 2
will never accept such an outcome.
(c) 0.1059 5 7< 0·1258
In this case, 4AA/' 4 0, and 4n P 0 0, but 4nA/n P = 0. If the players decide to play a
Pareto optimal strategy, player 2 will again have higher costs than when playing the open
loop Nash strategy. More likely is an outcome within the negotiation area A/. For instance
if the players agree on a 7= 0.1104 then they have to find a point in Io.1104 n N Looking
again at figure 2.4, we see that there is a whole range of possible outcomes. A unique
outcome may be obtained using bargaining theory As already can be seen in figure 2.4,
any outcome of such a game will be that player 2 does not gain much in a bargaining
situation whereas the gains for player 1 can be considerable.
(d) 0.1258 5 7
Now, 4 n N n P 0 0, which means an outcome can be played on the Pareto line between
A, B.  Also here, bargaining theory can be applied to select a unique outcome.
Concluding we see that if the desired degree of convergence is set too high the players
have to pay a price for that and can not obtain Pareto optimal solutions. Furthermore,
if they can not obtain solutions within the negotiation area the player(s) will have an
incentive to deviate towards the threatpoint and forget about any degree of convergence
at all. Moreover, we observe that in almost all cases player 1 can gain more than player
2. In the figures this depends on the shape of the iso-convergence lines and ultimately is
traced back to the fact that player 1 has more influence on player 2 than vice versa.
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2.3.3 An approach to determine a reliable degree of conver-
gence
In this section we present an algorithm to determine a feasible degree of 7. The previ-
ous subsection states that, without any other agreements between the players, a degree of
convergence which has no correspondending outcome in the negotiation area is unlikely to
happen. The question remains, however, which degree of convergence within this negoti-
ation area ultimately will be selected by the players. In fact without making any further
assumptions on the negotiation process, every point in the negotiation area is possible.
One way to come to a unique point within the negotiation area is by axiomatising the
negotiation game. We shall not elaborate this subject here, since for the moment we are
more interested in qualitative rather than quantitative statements.  All we will do is sketch
how a feasible degree of 7 can be determined, using some heuristic arguments. First we
will give an example and then we will present two algorithms which illustrate the approach
in general.
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Figure 2.7: For the edge of the negotiation area, from A to Ne, the convergence value is
plotted. Point E is the point where the derivative of the tangent of the curve is -1.
A to NC, where the costs of player 2 remain constant. Starting at point A and moving
towards Nc, the convergence value declines rapidly. This continues untill the point where
(Ji,C)  = (0.4987, 0.1098). After that point the derivative of the slope of the curve gets
larger than -1. In figure 2.7 we denoted this point by E. From that point on, towards
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Nc, the costs increase more rapidly than the degree of convergence. If player 1 has to
choose an outcome on the line in figure 2.7, he will start in point A where his costs are
minimal. From thereon, if player 1 wants to increase convergence, he will have to weigh
out costs against convergence. For instance, if player 1 starts in A and moves towards N°
and accepts only points where the slope DC/BA 5 -1, the result will be the outcome E.
The general idea expressed in the above example is that players accept an increase in con-
vergence only if the corresponding costs stay within a prespecifed region. So, a sketch of
a numerical approach for determining a feasible degree of 7 would be the following:
(1)  Start  from a point  (Ji, J-2)  on the Pareto line between  A, B. It seems reasonable  to
start at an axiomatic bargaining outcome (see chapter 3).
(2) Determine the direction u= (vt, vy), for which there is a t>0 for which (.4, 32)+t(Ul, v2)
€ N, and convergence increases maximal.
(3) Choose a small t > 0.
(4) Calculate Xc = -BC/Qu. Check if B.4/Ov < Xi(Xc), for i = 1,2 where Xi(Xc), i = 1,2
are (decreasing) functions of Xc which indicate the weight players want to assign to the
tradeoff between convergence and costs. That is, if the additional increase in convergence
(reflected by a smaller value for C) equals X. then the additional increase in costs for each
player seperately should be less than X,(X.) for i = 1,2
(5) If (4) holds then use this new point as a starting point and start again in (2). Stop, if
no point in K can be found for which (2) and (4) hold.
A drawback of this approach is that it is rather time-consuming, even for small models.
The reason is that the functions Ji, J2, C are parametrised in a and A and therefore calcu-
lating 'simple looking' expressions like DC/av or DJ,/Bv for i = 1,2, or finding a direction
v in step (2), take a lot of time.
A good alternative which is strongly related with the previous algorithm, but is easier to
compute, is the following algorithm:
(1)  start  in some feasible point between  A, B.   With this point there corresponds  an
uniquely determined a.
(2) Fix a.
(3) Increase A from 0 to 1 by using a stepsize of, for instance, 0.01. Check if the point
stays in the negotiation area N.
(4) Check for every A whether -BC/BA > BJJBland -BC/8X > 8Ji/81.
(5) Stop if no A can be found for which (3) and (4) holds.
The conditions in step (4) of the algorithm can be compared with the conditions in step (4)
of the previous algorithm. These conditions state that if for each player seperately costs
rise less than convergence falls when A increases by one unit both players are willing to
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Figure 2.8: For increasing A, the three curves -DC/OA, 8Ji 18X and BJ, 8X are drawn.
accept more convergence  (as  long  as  they stay within the negotiation  area).   Note  that  for
our convenience we took Xc = Xi(x.) = X2(Xc). We used the last algorithm to determine
a feasible outcome in our example.  As a starting point we choose the axiomatic Nash
bargaining solution (see chapter 3). This solution corresponds with a = 0.575 and lies
on the Pareto curve approximatly in the middle between A and B. In figure 2.8 we have
drawn for 0 5 A 5 1 the curves -DC/BA, 0Jl/DA and 86/DA. The figure shows some
interesting facts. First of all the conditions of step (4) of the algorithm are violated when
A > 0.26.  Secondly, when increasing A the costs of player 1 fall! This lasts till A = 0.4
where 8Jl lax gets positive. On the other hand players' 2 additional costs for increasing
convergence are for all A higher than the additional costs player 1 is faced with. Finally in
figure 2.9 we have drawn a small part of the curve:
{(.4(0.575,A),J2(0.575, A)) 1 A€ [0,1]}
The curve tends to stay very close to the Pareto curve and crosses the negotiation area al-
ready for a very small A = 0.04. This corresponds with a (A, ./2, C) = (0.498,0.370, 0.1150).
Remarkable is that player 1 (the stronger player) has lower costs than he would have in
the Nash bargaining solution, a solution which would be accepted if the players did not
have to reckon with any convergence aspects at all.
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Figure 2.9: Starting from the Nash bargaining solution, fixing a and slowly increasing A
gives a curve which tends  to  stay very close to ·the Pareto solutions.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented a theoretical approach how to deal with the issue of con-
vergence between EU countries. Based on the assumption that the primary interest of
the countries is minimising their own individual welfare loss, we considered the question
how cooperative strategies that yield maximal convergence can be determined. We showed
that for a large class of problems, i.e. problems where the individual cost functions and
convergence function are twice differentiable and convex, a parametrisation for a large set
of cooperative strategies can be determined. This set covers the Pareto optimal solutions
by construction and, in general (see note in section 2.2), covers all the cooperative strate-
gies which improve over the non-cooperative solution. Using this approach a number of
interesting questions can be considered. For instance whether it is possible that for a
particular time horizon the EU countries can satisfy the convergence conditions in such a
way that for every country the corresponding costs are acceptable, and how these costs
differ among countries. In section three we showed in a simple theoretical example how to
analyze such questions. In chapter five we use this approach on a more realistic dynamic
(macro)econometric model. In dealing with that problem countries should realise that
(1) it must be clear where one should converge to (see van der Ploeg [67]). If we consider
the two convergence conditions of the Maastricht Treaty, convergence in the nominal long
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term interest rate and convergence in the consumer price deflator, then it is, a priori, not
clear what the optimal common rate should be. In our approach this means that countries
should agree on a common convergence function C, which contains implicitly the optimal
common rate.
(2) the preferences of countries should be finetuned on each other. It is clear that if these
preferences differ strongly among countries, convergence will be a very tough issue.  In
the dynamical game approach this can be analysed with the desired paths and choice of
weights for the target/instrumental variables (see Kendrick [52]). The theoretical example
was chosen in such a way that in the last period of the planning horizon the countries,
at least, strive for convergence, which was implemented by choosing equal values for the
corresponding desired paths.
(3) the time-horizon, necessary for reaching the convergence conditions within a limited
period, plays a crucial role too. This aspect is strongly related to the determination of the
degree of convergence. We expect that for a short planning period the costs for convergence
can be very costly and this may ultimately result in non-cooperative behaviour of some
countries.This subject remains, however, a topic for future research.
(4) costs for convergence differ among countries. The example in the chapter gives a
way how to determine these costs for any given degree of convergence. In general these
differences will depend on the economical structures of the participating countries. The
theoretical example gives already an indication that these costs could be much higher for
countries which have less influence in the Community.
The approach designed here for analysing convergence can be used for many other prob-
lems as well. If players in a dynamic game have common objectives, apart from their usual
costfunctions, the approach can be used as long as we take twice differentiable convex func-
tions.  If we stay in a multicountry setting, common objectives appear in e.g. environmental





As indicated in the introduction of this thesis we concentrate in this chapter on Pareto op-
timal policies in the unrestricted cooperative game.  We will  look at properties of N-person
axiomatic bargaining solutions under the technical assumptions that the Pareto frontier is
strictly concave and twice differentiable. We study properties of two well known axiomatic
bargaining solutions often used in the policy coordination literature, the Nash bargaining
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Formally, an N-person bargaining problem  can be represented  by  a  pair  <  S, d > , where
SCIRNis called the feasible set and d the disagreement point or threatpoint.  In this chap-
ter we consider a particular class of N-person bargaining problems, i.e., problems where the
Pareto frontier of S can be described by a strictly concave and twice differentiable function.
Among other areas, this class of problems is extensively studied in the policy coordination
literature (see e.g. Ghosh and Masson [341, Hughes Hallett [38,39], McKibbin and Sachs
[55], Oudiz and Sachs [61], Petit [66], Raith [68,69] and de Zeeuw [85]). In the sequel we
will use this stream of literature as a starting point. The class of problems studied in this
literature is, however, a subclass of the problems studied in the main stream game theory
literature. The main stream game literature considers, generally, problems where scaN
is a convex set, i.e., the Pareto frontier of S is concave (see, .e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein
[60], Peters [65] and Thomson [77]). In the policy coordination literature it is usually
assumed that each player maximises his individual utility (or welfare, payoff), where the
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utility of each player is represented by a strictly concave and twice differentiable function.
In that case the Pareto frontier can be found using a maximization problem where a social
planner maximises a convex combination of these N utility functions (see, e.g., Takayama
[741). From this also follows that each point on the Pareto frontier is uniquely characterised
by a suitable choice of nonnegative weights, say a, 2 0, z =  l,..., N, which are assigned
to the individual utility (or welfare) functions when maximising this convex combination.
Without loss of generality one can furthermore assume that Elia, = 1.  Consequently an
outcome on the Pareto frontier of an N-person bargaining problem can be characterised
by N-1 nonnegative weights. Now, it is common practice in the empirical policy coor-
dination literature to choose some points on the Pareto frontier which can be viewed as
acceptable cooperative game outcomes. Since in most (real) policy coordination problems
the utility functions of the players are not symmetric, the 'social outcome', which assigns
to each player equal weight, is not very representative.  It is argued by various authors (see
e.g.,  Ghosh and Masson [34], Petit  [66],  Raith  [68,69}  or de Zeeuw  [85])  that  the  Nash
bargaining solution is a more acceptable outcome. In empirical studies of Hughes Hallett
[38,39],  Petit  [66]  and de Zeeuw  [851,  Nash bargaining outcomes are compared with other
axiomatic cooperative approaches, such as the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [51]. In all the
empirical (two player) examples not much differences are found between the correspond-
ing weights of the two most popular cooperative outcomes, the Nash bargaining and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. For instance, in de Zeeuw [85] both solutions have the same
weights, Petit [66] finds weights which are almost the same, 0.80 and 0.78, and Hughes
Hallett [38] reports weights of 0.67 and 0.68. As a result, the authors found also not much
differences between the utility function values and corresponding strategy responses of each
individual player in both outcomes. To find more variability in the strategy space Hughes
Hallett [39] compares the Nash bargaining solution with some other 'arbitrarily chosen
weights' outcomes.
Since, till now, the two most 'favourite' axiomatic cooperative outcomes in the policy co-
ordination literature are the Nash bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome, we will
restrict ourselves to these two outcomes. Both solutions have been defined for the N-player
case, where the Nash bargaining solution can be calculated by maximising a product of
the player's benefits in relation to the gains of the disagreement point and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky point can be found by determining the intersection point of the line through
the disagreement point and the 'ideal point' with the Pareto frontier (see Thomson [77},
Nash [59]and Kalai and Smorodinsky [51]).
In the introduction of section two we will formulate the policy coordination problem.
Then we will derive in section three for the Nash bargaining solution a unique relationship
between the tlireatpoint, the weights and the utilities the players receive in the Nash bar-
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gaining solution. Using this relationship we will present an algorithm for calculating the
Nash bargaining outcome which is faster and more reliable than the traditional approach.
In the traditional approach the researcher uses a standard optimization algorithm, such
as a Gauss-Newton or Gradient method, and maximises a function which is described by
the product of the players' benefit in a Pareto optimal point in relation to the gains of the
disagreement point. Since, in general, the disagreement point is known and each point on
the Pareto curve can be described by a suitable choice of the weights we have that this
function depends only on the weights a, for each player i, i -  1,..., N.  In the traditional
approach, therefore, the optimization process can be compared with the maximization of a
strictly concave function in N variables. In this section, however, we suggest an approach
where we first derive a unique relationship for the Nash bargaining solution and next use
this relationship to obtain a more computationally efflcient algorithm. An other advantage
of this relationship is that it enables us to present some strategic arguments for choosing
the Nash bargaining solution on the Pareto frontier in policy coordination games (see for
similar arguments Ghosh and Masson  [34] and Raith  [68,69]). This under the assumption
that interpersonal utility is comparable. This approach is quite different from the one
used by Osborne and Rubinstein  [60],  who  use an explicit model of bargaining in order  to
describe the strategic behaviour of the players.
In section four of this chapter we present a possible explanation for the empirical re-
sults from the policy coordination literature that the weights corresponding to the Kalai-
Smorodinsky and the Nash bargaining solution are almost similar in policy coordination
problems. A combination of two arguments makes these findings plausible. First, a the-
oretical one; we will show that it is possible to design a subset of the Pareto optimal
solutions in which both solutions always lie. And second, an empirical one; it seems to be
the case that, at least in empirical policy coordination studies, the Pareto curve is often
rather flat and, thus, does not contain extreme bendings. Combining the two arguments
yields, in general, that the Batter the Pareto curve the closer the two outcomes.
As argued by many authors in the empirical policy coordination literature, one is not so
much interested in a certain outcome on the Pareto frontier, but more interested in the
properties of these outcomes. One of these properties is how Pareto efficient solutions qual-
itatively react to small changes of the Pareto curve or the disagreement point.  In the policy
coordination literature where empirical models are involved this issue is studied by varying
the modelparameters.  This kind of sensitivity analysis will generally shift the whole Pareto
frontier and the question now arises how the Nash bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
outcome react to this parameter change (see Raith [69]). This aspect is interesting since the
previous arguments show already that both outcomes often coincide, if we now furthermore
could prove that both outcomes react qualitatively in the same manner when applying sen-
sitivity analysis then given our previous computational arguments one could argue that in
practice it would be sufficient to calculate only one of the two bargaining outcomes. It is
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clear that a theoretical analysis of this subject is difficult, since a good description for the
class of the empirical models used in practice is not available, and therefore computing
the effect of certain parameter changes is not possible. What we will do in section five of
this chapter is that we study the response for the Nash bargaining and Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution to certain changes in the disagreement point d, for a fixed Pareto frontier (or,
equivalently, a fixed set S). It seems that this type of analyses is closest to the problem
sketched above and which is still possible to analyse in a theoretical context.   For  this
analyses, we will follow Thomson [78], who considers this problem from an axiomatic game
theoretical point of view. He considers two types of axioms. First, the d-monotonicity
axiom. This axiom states, for a fixed set  S, that if d, increases, while for each j  # i, dj
remains constant then player's i's payoff should increase. Thomson [78] shows that this
axiom holds  for both solutions  i f  S  is a convex subset  of IRY. Secondly, he considers  the
strong d-monotonicity axiom, which states that not only player's i's payoff should increase,
but also the payoff's of the other players should decrease. Thomson [78] shows that for
the Nash bargaining solution and for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution this axiom does not
generally hold. However, for our special class of bargaining problems, where the Pareto
frontier is strictly concave and twice differentiable, we show that this axiom does hold for
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution but not, generally, for the Nash bargaining solution. This
finding may, in particular cases, be an argument in favour for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tion since it is clear that in practice, if one is involved in sensitivity analysis with respect
to the disagreement point, the strong d-monotonicity property is a useful one.
Another context where these monotonicity properties are relevant are situations in which
each player has some control over the position of the disagreement point (see Thomson
[78]).
3.2 Problem formulation
In general, a bargaining problem of N-players can be described as < S, d >, where S c IRN
is compact and convex,d€ S, and there exists J€ S such that Ji  > di for i=l,...,N
(see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein [60]).  S is often called the 'feasible set' of utilities.
Each element in S represents a tuple (Ji, ..., JN) where J, represents the utility (or welfare,
payoff) of player i, i = 1,..., N.  d is called the 'disagreement point' or 'threatpoint'.
In this chapter we will describe a special case of the bargaining problem which is charac-
teristic for the policy coordination literature. In this literature S is not only a convex set
but furthermore it is assumed that the Pareto frontier of S can be described by a strictly
concave and twice di fferentiable function. Formally, the utility (welfare,   payoff)   for  each
player i, i =  1,..., N is assumed to be described by a strictly concave and twice differen-
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tiable function Ji in u EU, where U is denoted as the strategy space. Furthermore, we
assume  that  U  is a convex and compact  set  and  that  each  u  =  (ul, ••·,UN)  € U contains
the strategies of each individual player i, u'.   Now each player wants to maximise utility,
i.e., this problem can for each player i be described as:
max J(u),     i = l,..., N. (3.1)
U€U
Since each player i has only partly control over u, through u„ it is clear that in order
to solve the maximization problem each player is dependent on the strategy choices of
the other player.  Now we represent S in the utility space, the Ji,..., JN plane, by those
outcomes for which each player is individually better out than the utility he would receive
in the disagreement point. Thus
S= {J(u) I u€U, ./(u) = (Ji(u),6(u),...,JN(u)), ./(u) 2 d,}.
Remark, first that since Ji, i - 1,..., N are strictly concave functions, S is a convex set in
IRN. And second, since all outcomes in S for each player are better (or at least not worse)
than the disagreement point, bargaining on outcomes in S is of interest to all players. The
advantage of the above characterisation in (3.1) is that the set of Pareto optimal solutions
can be presented formally. First, let Up be the set of Pareto optimal strategies then this
strategy  set  can be described  as:   (see, e.g., Takayama  [74]).
N N
U  = {u*  EU l u* = arg max  Ea,J,(u),  a, 2  0,  E a, = 1} (3.2)
11€U
:=1 :=l
In the sequel we assume  that  Up   lies  in the interior  of  U. This assumption guarantees
that  u* is uniquely determined  as a function  of the parameters  al, ···, (IN-1, i.e. u* =
u(al, ···,aN-1), and that u* is a continuously differentiable function in (al, ···, aN-1)  (see
theorem 2.1). Furthermore, from this characterization we can derive the following property:
Theorem 3.1 Suppose J, (u) is strictly   concave   and   twice   diferentiable   in   u    €U.      Let
a, > 0 and the corresponding solution in (3.2) be u-. Let J; = J,(u-), for t = 1,..., N,.
Then the following holds:
84.  = -21
(3.3)81 i    aC
for i = l,..., N, i 96 j.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
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The set of interesting Pareto optimal solutions, P C S, can be characterised as:
P ={Jg-) lu* € Up,J(u*) 2 d}
P is called the bargaining set (see, e.g., Petit [66]). Remark, that P represents only
those outcomes for which all players are better of than in the disagreement point. Thus,
in general, P represents only a subset of the Pareto optimal outcomes. Because of the
strict concavity and the twice differentiability assumption of J,(u) in u€U w e have
that P represents a hyperplane  in  the  .4,..., JN-plane for which  it is possible to write
·.4 = 4'(Ji'..., Ji-h Jiti, ···, JN)' for every i =  l, ..., N (see also proof theorem 2.1). Starting
from this problem formulation we will study in section three the Nash bargaining solution,
which we denote by NB, and in section four and five we compare this solution with the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, which we denote by KS.
3.3   The Nash bargaining solution
Nash [58] proposed four axiom's on a bargaining solution of the bargaining problem
< S, d > which are: (i) Invariance to equivalent utility representations, (ii) Symmetry, (iii)
Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (iv) Pareto efficiency. For a broad discussion
about these axiom's see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein [60], Peters [651 or Thomson [771.
Nash [58] proved that these four axiom's determine a unique outcome in the utility space
which can also be found by considering the following problem:
N
JNB=argmax H(J,-di) (3.4)J€P ·=1
According to the previous section we have that JNB is determined by exactly one strategy,
say uNB,for which JNB = JNB(UNB) and that there is also exactly one a, which we will
denote by aNB,for which (3.2) yields uNB. In the following subsection we will derive a
relationship between d, aNB and JNB which characterise the NB solution in the N-player
case. In the next subsection we will use this relationship for deriving an algorithm which
computes the NB outcome faster and more reliable than the traditional approach, which
is implementing (3.4) straight away. Furthermore, we will discuss in subsection three also
some strategic arguments, which make sense in the policy coordination literature.
3.3.1  A relationship between d, aNB  and  JNB
In this section we will derive a relationship between d, aNB and JNB of the NB solution
in the N-player case. For the two player case this relationship is already shown by Nash
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[59].  This relationship states that aNB(.INB - di) . (1 - al)NB(J2NB - (12)·  In the N-
player case this proof yields some additional problems since in that case it is no longer
possible to parametrise a by one single element as is usual in the two-player, where a =
(C r l,1-a l) depends  just  on at. However,  for the N-dimensional  case  we can derive  a
similar relationship.
Formally, consider a bargaining problem  <  S, d  > as described  in the previous section.
Suppose u = (ul, ···,un)' where u, is the strategy of player i E l,.-, N, and a = (al, ••·,aN)·
Then the Pareto optimal solutions P can be derived by solving for each a the maximization
problem (3.2) and the unique NB solution can be found by maximising (3.4). This yields
the following theorem.
Theorern 3.2 The following  relationship holds between the  utilities JNB,..., J B of the
players, the threatpoint d = (di,···,dN) and the weight aNB = (ai B'...,aR:B) of the NB
solution:
UNB -    n'*itJNB - di (3.5)'   - Eli Ili*j(J,NB - di)
fori=   l,...,N.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Remark that a>0 and that the relationship in theorem 3.2 implies that:
QNBC  TNB  - dl') =  a Bi.1 B  - d.1') =...= albB (.11 B  - dN), (3.6)1  (Jl
To get a better understanding of this result we illustrate in figure 3.1 the proof geometrically
for the two-player case (see, e.g., Nash [59], Peters [651 or de Zeeuw [85}). The NB solution
on the Pareto curve is the solution for which the angle of the line through d =  (dl, (12) and
(JNB,Ji'Bl on the Pareto curve and the .4-axis exactly equals the negative angle of the
tangent of the Pareto curve in the point (JP'B, J2NB) and the .4-axis. Both angles are in the
figure 3.1 denoted by B. The derivative of the first line is given by (,J2NB  - C12' 1<J B  - dl'j·
Now from the figure 3.1 we see that tan# = iJ  B  - d2 )/(.INB- dl) The derivative of the
tangent on the Pareto-curve a.4 + (1 - a)12 in the NB point is, according to theorem 3.1
given by aNB /0 -aNB ). Now from the angle of this slope with the Ji-axis follows that
tanB = (1 - QNBjtaNB Combining the two outcomes yields that (1 - a
NB\/ INB   3\_'1(Jg    - u2,1 -
NBI INB   3 \
U   (Jl    - ul)·
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Figure  3.1: A property  of  the NB solution  (NB)  in the two-player case.
3.3.2 Numerical calculation
A major advantage of the relationship specified in (3.5) is that numerical calculation in
real problems becomes much easier. Before explaining and comparing our algorithm with
the traditional approach we will first give a brief description of the traditional approach.
Since each point on the Pareto frontier is uniquely determined by a set of (al, •··,aN-1) we
have that in practice the maximization algorithm contains the following steps:
(i) Start with an initial ao =(09,..., atv) E IRN, with a,020, i =l,..., N and El, a9 - 1.
A good guess is often a° = (1/N,..,1/N).
(ii) Compute (3.2) which yields a Pareto optimal strategy, say u- = u(ao).
(iii) Check if J(u-) € P, if not, use this result for making a new guess for an initial value
ao. Continue this procedure till J(u(ao)) € P.
(iv) Check whether for this J(u-), (3.4) holds.
(v) Calculate a new al according to a certain decision rule and compute (ii)-(v).
This algorithm description is typical for problems of finding maximum points of a con-
strained multivariable function by iterative methods.  Most of these algorithms are already
implemented in existing computer packages and the type of problems are in the numerical
literature generally referred to as constraint non-linear optimization. Since, in many cases,
the Pareto frontier can be very flat, the solution of this kind of problem is not straightfor-
ward, even if we have a convex surface.
Interpretation of the NB solution 43
However, the existence of relationship (3.5) leaves us with a non-linear equations problem
which facilitates the following approach:
(i)-(iii) as described above.
(iv) Check whether for this J(u-), (3.5) holds.
(v) as described above.
These type of algorithms are in the numerical literature referred to as non-linear equations
problems. There are many solution methods for these kind of problems, such as a Gauss-
Newton algorithm or a line-search algorithm (see e.g. Stoer and Bulirsch [731).
Remark that in a N-player case the outcome in the second algorithm in (iv) already gives
an indication which m, i = l,..., N should be adjusted to a lower value and which one to
a higher value.
The main point, however, is that for large problems the second nonlinear equations prob-
lems in practice use less computertime than the first constraint maximization problems.
This is a well-known fact in the numerical optimization literature. The advantages are
clear. Firstly, we do not have to check if the Nash-product really is maximised and sec-
ondly step (iv) of the second algorithm will automatically take care of the fact that the
a's satisfy the constraints a, 20 and Eli a, = 1.
3.3.3   Interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution
In this section we present an interpretation of the NB solution which typically fits in the
policy coordination literature. In order to make comparisons among the utilities of the
players possible we replace in this section Nash's assumption of independence of equivalent
utility scaling by the assumption that interpersonal utility is comparable. For a possible
interpretation of the NB solution in a more general context we refer to Rubinstein, Safra
and Thomson [701. In the policy coordination literature Ghosh and Masson [34}and Raith
[69,68] describe a possible interpretation of the NB solution in the two player case. Since
NB, 7NBinterpersonal utility is comparable, it is possible to interpret the relationship al    l''l     -
di) = afB(JfB-di), as that the player who gains more from playing cooperatively is more
willing to accept a smaller welfare weight than the player who gains less. Alternatively, the
player who gains less may demand a higher welfare weight by threatening not to coordinate,
knowing that the potential loss from no agreement is larger for the other player. Using
this interpretation we can construct a more general interpretation of the NB solution. For
instance in the two player case we assume that each player faces the maximization problem:
max J,(u) - di for player i =  1,2U
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Now all Pareto efficient strategies of this two-player maximization problem can be found
by maximising for every (al, a2) the convex combination:
max at(Ji(u) - di) + a2(•4(u) - d2) (3.7)U
Now both players simultanously determine a in the following way:
They agree that the more gain a player receives the less weight he will get in the maximiza-
tion problem. They formalise this agreement by giving player 1 a weight of (J2 - (12) and
player 2 a weight of (.4  - dl),  If we substitute these weights  in the maximisation problem
(3.7), we get:
m2XCJ,(u) - di)(.11(u) - di) + (Ji(u) -di)(• 2(u) - d2)
which gives us back the original NB problem, which is charactarised by maximising the
Nash-product (3.4).
This idea can easily be extended to the N-player case. In that case the weight ai of player
i=1,..., N, is determined by the product:  (Ji - di) · · · (Ji-1 - di-i)(J,+1 - 4+1) · · · (JN -
dN). So, the weight a player gets in the minimisation problem which determines the Pareto
optimal strategies is characterised by the product of the gains of the other players.
3.4    A comparison: the Nash bargaining and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution
Choosing a certain outcome on the Pareto frontier has almost always some arbitrariness.
Many objections have been raised against Nash's independent of irrelevant alternatives
axiom. To understand this axiom we have to consider a bargaining problem  <  S, d  >.
Now, if for some reason, the players only have at their disposal a subset of alternatives in S,
in which the bargaining outcome of < S, d > is included, then this axioma tells us that the
players still agree on the same outcome as in the original bargaining problem. For the two
player case an alternative solution is proposed by Kalai and Smorodinsky  [51]. They replace
Nash's axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives by an axiom of monotonicity. This
axiom requires that if we consider two bargaining problems < S, d >  and < T, d >, with
S  C  T,  and  if the maximum utility a player can obtain  in  <  S, d  >  and  <  T, d  >  are
the  same  then the utility each player receives  in  <  T, d > should  be at least  as  high  as
in the solution of < S, d >. An important feature of the KS solution is that it responds
much more satisfactorily to expansions and contractions of the feasible set (see Thomson
[77]). The KS solution has mainly been studied for the two-player case, in which it has a
greater number of appealing properties than for the N-player case (see Thomson [77]). In
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practice,  the KS solution is computed as follows. Consider a threatpoint  d =  (dl, ···, dN).
Compute now N strategies u, C Up, i = 1,..., N with the resulting property that for each
ui the outcome in S is such that 4(v,) = dj, j = 1,..., N, and i 96 j. Remark that these N
points are exactly the edge-points of P. These N outcomes determine the so called "ideal
point", which can be written as JI = (Ji(vi),···, JN(UN)).  Now the intersection point
between the Pareto curve and the line which connects JI and d yields the KS solution.
Remark that to compute the KS outcome one has to solve N + 1- non-linear (constraint)
equations problems. In practice the computer time involved for computing each of these
N + 1 non-linear equations problems is about equal to the computer time involved for
computing the second algorithm for calculating the Nash bargaining solution, as proposed
in the previous section. Therefore, for large problems it takes much more time to compute
the KS solution than the NB solution.
J2
(dl, 4) . -7tJI,J 1C
NB
KS
(dl, (J  + d2)f
P
C     u            , 4
(di,(12) ( (./11 +di),(6) (JlI, d2)
Figure 3.2: The Nash bargaining solution (NB) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (KS)
lie on that part of the Pareto curve which intersects the right upper rectangle.
As noted in the introduction the empirical policy coordination literature suggests that both
outcomes yield very similar results. These empirical findings have, of course, everything
to do with the formulation of the considered bargaining problems. In this section we will
prove that it is possible to determine a subset of P that contains both; the NB and the KS
solution. Before showing this aspect for the general N-player case, we first take a look at
the two-player case. In figure 3.2 we draw the utility axis Ji, J,  and the curved line which
46 N-person axiomatic bargaining solutions
represents  P.   As  can  be seen the whole bargaining problem  can,  in  the  Ji, 6-plane,  be
imbedded in a rectangle with angles  (di, d2)' (di,Ji),(JA,  dy)    and (J/,Ji) . This rectangle
can be divided in four smaller rectangles of similar shape in exactly one way. Now, as
illustrated in the example in the figure 3.2, it will always be the case that the NB solution
and the KS solution fall in the upper right rectangle with angles  (JI+d), ( (.11'+di),J71),
(4,  (JI + di)) and JI.  In the following theorem we proof such a property for the general
case: the N-person bargaining problem.
Theorem 3.3  Let d = (di,..., div)  be the disagreement point and JI = (Jj,-.., J be the
ideal point. Consider now the N-dimensional cube, say C, with the 2N angular points:
 (Zi' ···, KN) I xi E {di, J,/}, i = 1,..., N}.
Let ri = di + 5-1(JiI - di), for i =  1,..., N.  Now consider the following sets of angular
points:
au  =  {(Zi, ···,ZN) 1 {xi = di V Zi = J/} A zk = dk,  k - 1,...,N, k 4 i},
aij  =  {(Zi,···,ZN)| {zi=divz,=J/}Azj=rj Azk=dk,  k=l,...,N,j#klki},
N
a,      =       \-'  aij,
j=1
for i, j  = 1 1...1 N, i  96  j·   Let  A,   be  the  convex  polytope  of the  set  a,.    Then  both,  the  NB




Proof. see Appendix A.3.
First, observe that if the Pareto frontier is relatively flat then the Pareto frontier is closer
t.htehar, 1.s'Ill.,o, :„:tto tli.„lt-,ctowI= .1.irchcali, il .he'....c.1,¢ cll„I,„.,,C
Secondly, observe that since the KS solution lies on the main diagonal of the truncated
cube C we have, in the case of a flat Pareto frontier, that the KS solution will always
lie somewhere in the 'centre' of the subset which lies in the truncated cube. Combining
both arguments yields that the KS and NB solution will not diverge too much. As the
figure 3.2 in the two-player case already suggests, the flatter the Pareto curve, the smaller
is the intersection of P with the right upper rectangle and thus the closer are the NB and
the KS solution  1. This aspect seems  to be particularly important  in the empirical policy
1We refer to Appendix A.3.1 for a graphic representation of truncated cube in the three-player case.
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coordination literature, since the empirical research in this field suggests that the Pareto
curve does not show extreme bendings. For readers who are interested in more examples
of figures of Pareto curves in which the KS- and NB-solution are drawn we refer to Hughes
Hallett [38], Petit2 [661 and de Zeeuw [851
3.5 Strong d-monotonicity properties
Another relevant question, if we are concerned about the choice between the NB and the
KS outcome, are the qualitative properties of both solutions. As stated in the introduction
of this chapter, in this section we will study the problem how both outcomes, NB and KS
change when the disagreement point changes for a fixed set S. There is some research in
this field undertaken by Thomson [78] for the more general case where the set S is convex.
If,   for a fixed   set   S, the threatpoint   d   for one particular player, i, increases while   for
each other player j, j ti, dj remains constant, then both solutions recommend an increase
in player i's welfare. This property is called d-monotonicity (Thomson [78]). However,
Thomson [781 investigates also a stronger requirement, called strong d-monotonicity. This
axiom states that if the threatpoint d for one particular player, i, increases while for each
other player j,jti, dj remains constant, not only the welfare for player i increases, but also
all other players' welfares decrease. Remark, that this property of strong d-monotonicity is
always satisfied in two-player bargaining games, since the increase of one player's welfare
is always at the costs of the other player's welfare. Less clear are these properties however
in the general case: the N-dimensional bargaining game. Thomson [781 shows that in the
N-player case (N >3), the stronger requirement that player i is the only one to gain is
not generally met. For the 3-player case Thomson [781 gives for both solutions. NB and
KS, an example were d, increases for player i which leads also to an increase in welfare
for a player j, jgui,  i.e; the general requirement of strong d-monotonicity does  not  hold for
both solutions. For the sequel it is important to remark that both counterexamples were
constructed for a bargaining game < S, d > where S C IiP was a convex set in which the
surface of S could not be represented by a strictly concave function. Since we are looking
here at a smaller class of problems we immediately conclude from Thomson's result that
in this case d-monotonicity holds for both outcomes. However, strong d-monotonicity is
less clear.  In the following theorem we show that the requirement of strong d-monotonicity
holds for the Kalai Smorodinsky solution but not, always, for the NB solution.
2Remark, that theorem 4.1 implies that the position of the NB-solution and the KS-solution as drawn
in figure 9.2 on page 249 cannot be correct.
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Theorem 3.4  Let <  S, d  >  be a N-person bargaining game (N 2 3), where the Pardo
frontier of S can be represented by a strictly concave and twice diferentiable function.
Then the AS solution satisjies the requirement of strong d-monotonicity, whereas the NB
solution does not.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we considered N-person axiomatic bargaining games for which the Pareto
frontier of the feasible set can be described by a strictly concave and twice differentiable
function.
For this special class of games we have derived a relationship for the Nash bargaining solu-
tion. This relationship describes the Nash bargaining outcome in relation to the threatpoint
and the corresponding weights, which follow from maximising a convex combination of in-
dividual utility (or welfare) functions. With this relationship, the computation of the Nash
bargaining solution becomes far more easier than using the traditional approach, which
is maximising the Nash-product straightforward. Since the Nash bargaining solution is
commonly used in the policy coordination literature, there is some research in this liter-
ature for the strategic reasoning of this solution.  If we assume that interpersonal utility
is comparable then a possible interpretation might be that the player who gains more by
playing cooperatively is more willing to accept a smaller welfare weight. On the other
hand, the player who gains less may demand a higher welfare weight by threatening not
to coordinate, knowing that the potential loss from no agreement is larger for the other
player(s).
The two 'most favourite' solutions used in the the policy coordination literature are the
Nash bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. In this chapter we proved for the
N-player case that it is possible to derive a subset of the bargaining set, in which both
outcomes fall. Combining this result with the empirical results in the policy coordination
literature where usually the bargaining set does not show extreme bendings, we have that
in practice both solutions mostly lie 'fairly close'. Given the fact that using our algorithm
for calculating the Nash bargaining solution is computationally much more efficient than
calculating the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution these findings suggests that in policy coordi-
nation problems it suffices to calculate the Nash bargaining solution.
In the last section we considered strong d-monotonicity properties, for the N-player case,
of both solutions. We investigated how both solutions respond to certain changes in the
disagreement point  d.   If d,· increases, while dj, j  96 2, remains constant,  then the Kalai-
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Smorodinsky solution recommends an increase of the gains of player i and a decrease in gain
for all the other players. This result is opposite to the result which is found for a more gen-
eral class of games where the feasible set is a convex set.  In that class of bargaining games
the strong d-monotonicity requirement is not generally met for the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. Finally we showed that in our class of games, the strong d-monotonicity re-
quirement is, however, not generally met for the Nash bargaining solution. From a policy
coordination point of view this suggest that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution makes more
sense. Unfortunately, however, as we noted before the computation of this solution takes
more time.
So, our final conclusions for the policy coordination literature are therefore as follows. If
the computation of the Nash bargaining and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are fairly easy to
compute, we propose to use the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution as a representative bargain-
ing outcome, since for this solution the property of strong d-monotonicity holds.  On the
other hand, if the computer-time involved for computing a bargaining outcome is a major
problem we suggest to calculate the Nash bargaining outcome since this outcome can, on
average, be calculated N+1 times quicker than the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (where N
represents the number of players). Furthermore, since in the policy coordination literature
the weights corresponding to the Nash bargaining and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are al-
most the same, the strategic interpretation we derived for the Nash bargaining solution




4.1    Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to build a smalllinked multi-country model of eight EU-Member
States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom), the USA and Japan. The model is primarily designed for the dy-
namic game experiments as described in the previous two chapters. Especially, we want to
study empirical gains of coordinated- versus non-coordinated policies if: (1) strong link-
ages among countries exist, (2) countries differ substantially in size and structure, (3) the
number of countries (players) is pretty large.  To keep this dynamic game analysis tractable
we decided, therefore, to build a small (log-) linear dynamic model in which the main links
between countries are modelled. In the applications of dynamic game theory in multi-
country models, researchers often use a linearised version of the original non-linear model.
The outcomes of the dynamic game experiments on the linearised version should then
be representative for the orginal non-linear model (or if not, just holds for its linearised
version). For intrinsically non-linear models, the outcome of a dynamic game experiment
could be quite different from the outcome, which is obtained from the linearised version of
the model. This is another reason why we directly designed a (log-) linear model.
The theoretical starting point will be a modified version of the theoretical Mundell-Fleming
model (see, e.g., McKibbin and Sachs [55]). The advantage of this framework is that it is
linear and that direct linkages are already in the model. The theoretical model is intro-
duced as an equilibrium model between two countries. We extend this two-country model
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to more countries using the principal trading pattern of each individual country. As argued
by Wallis [80} comparative modelling seems to be the major way to improve macroecono-
metric models; therefore our model will be compared to the five multi-country models, as
mentioned above. We apply the same shocks to our model as Whitley [83] applies to the
multi-country models in his comparative study.
The theoretical model contains six linear behavioural equations for each country and will
be estimated using annual  data for the sample period 1960-1991. The eight EU-Member
States represent economies in the European Union for which there is a growing mutual
economic activity and for which the annual data, used for estimation, is (almost) com-
pletely available. The USA and Japan are included in the model because they are the
most important countries outside the EU with the strongest impact on the EU-countries.
Due to the increasing integration process between (especially) the EU-countries, exter-
nal (transmission) effects (by which we mean the effects of how a macroeconomic policy
change in one country affects the macroeconomic performance of another country) will
become more and more important.  In the model we will focus our attention especially
on these external effects, which are modelled through direct linkages. The links between
the countries considered are of various types. We will include in the model financial links
such as interest rates and exchange rates, links between price variables such as consumer
prices and GDP-prices and links between volume variables such as output volumes. The
economic functioning of the individual economies and their links will be explained in this
chapter by carrying out simulation experiments and shock analyses.
There is still a debate in the literature for multi-country studies about the direction (and
also strength) of the impact of external effects. In an overview of multi-country modelling
Hickman [42] reports of various early multi-country studies where some external effects are
investigated. The first research projects on this issue led to the general finding of rather
weak spillover effects to other countries from disturbances originating even in large coun-
tries. It seems that even today this view has not changed very much. Buiter et all. [13]
report the same findings: "Economic multi-country models for simulation imply that under
the ERM the output and interest rate effects of a fiscal expansion are confined mostly to
the originating EU-country and that the international spillover effects will be insignifican-
t". Furthermore, they quote Bryant et al. [12] who claim that even the sign of a spillover
effect is likely to be ambiguous.  In a comparative study of five multi-country models, Whit-
ley [83] also finds that in these models spillover effects to the other European countries,
originating from single-country European expansion, are negligible. In the case of a fiscal
expansion, Whitley reports some quantitative figures of spillover effects: «Spillover effects
to the other European countries are largest in MIMOSA (a multi-country model used by
the Observatoire Frangais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE) and Centre D'Etudes
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Prospectives et D'Informations Internationales (CEPII)), where the increase in GDP in the
other countries following a shock in Germany or the United Kingdom is some 20% - 30% of
the increase in output in the country shocked; comparable estimates for the other models
are around 10%". The other models considered in Whitley [83} are EU's model (QUEST)
as operated by the Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), the model of the
National Institute of Economic and Social Research and jointly operated with the London
Business School (GEM), the Oxford Economic Forecasting model (OEF) and the OECD's
Interlink model (OECD). Whitley also reports figures of the effects on EU-countries of a
fiscal expansion originating in the USA. The increase in GDP in the EU-countries following
a shock in the USA is on average somewhat higher than 10% of the increase in output in
the USA. Again, Whitley finds higher figures which range between 20% and 30% for the
MIMOSA model.
We argue, and will show with our model, that these findings are mainly a result of the
followed modelling strategies. We will show that with a (slightly) different modelling strat-
egy it is possible to construct stronger external effects. The main reason for finding only
small external effects in the large scale multi-country models is that foreign effects are
modelled through export or import equations and, so, only indirectly influence aggregate
demand. Furthermore, except trade, almost all multi-country models neglect important
international transmission mechanisms among countries like foreign investments, labour
force migration and various knowledge spill-over effects (see, e.g., Burda and Wyplosz [14]
and Whitley [84]).
It  is  clear that to exactly reveal the international interdependencies is  not  an  easy  task.
However, the growing interdependence of the EU-economies indicates that the importance
of spillovers will further increase in the future which makes it necessary to study models
with stronger interdependencies. A priori, e.g., one would expect at least as strong spillover
effects in case of an output shock originating in Germany (or another large EU-economy)
on other EU-economies as, for instance, in the case of an output shock originating in the
USA. There are two basic reasons for this. First, trade among EU-countries is higher than
trade with the USA. Second, yearly data show strong correlations between growth out-
put figures of the EU-countries. This last aspect may be due, for a certain part, to similar
cyclical behaviour or common shocks but, nevertheless, both aspects indicate that spillover
effects among EU-countries could be more important than most multi-country models sug-
gest. Our model is specified such that foreign variables are directly linked with variables
of the home country. For example, the aggregate demand equation of the home country
will be directly explained by foreign variables, such as foreign output/aggregate demand,
the exchange rate and foreign output prices. So, our model does not contain particular
export or import categories. This does not necessarily imply that our model is inferior
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to the large multi-country models, which distinguish many more categories. For instance,
in the case of aggregate demand, in our simple model a broad measure such as foreign
output/demand represents also indirect effects such as foreign investments and knowledge
spill-overs. Such spillovers among countries are better captured by a broad measure such
as foreign output/demand than by parts of output such as export or import figures.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. In section two we introduce the theoretical
model. Furthermore, we explain the extension of the two-country model to a multi-country
model. In section three we will explain the estimation procedure and our estimation re-
sults. Various properties of the model will be investigated in sections four and five. In
section four we will present the historical tracking performance of the model. We present
static, as well as dynamic, simulation results for all the endogenous variables of the model.
In section five we apply shock analysis, and compare the results to live other multi-country
models. Finally, we will present our conclusions in section six.
4.2 The theoretical model
As indicated in the Introduction, the starting point of our multi-country model will be a
simple two-country model in the Mundell-Fleming framework (see Mundell [57] and Flem-
ing [31]). The main motivation behind this choice is that the Mundell-Fleming framework
has a relatively clear economic interpretation, is small, contains direct linkages, and seems
to work in practice. A research by Whitley [84, pages 228-231} , who compares the Mundell-
Fleming mechanisms with mechanisms as modelled in various multi-country models, states
that: 'In summary, therefore, we can conclude that the basic Mundell-Fleming framework
and its many extensions can and have been reflected in empirical models, although not all
the features are present in many of the models.'. In table 4.1, a modified and extended
version of a theoretical two-country Mundell-Fleming model is shown (see, e.g., McKibbin
and Sachs [55] for a theoretical interpretation and Papell [63] and Ghosh and Masson [341
for an estimated rational expectations version of the standard Mundell-Fleming model.).
This standard Mundell-Fleming model contains an LM-curve which is replaced by a long
term interest rate equation in our model, since during the eighties the major monetary pol-
icy pursued in the various countries was an interest rate policy. Furthermore, a wage-price
spiral is included in this model and, because employment is used as an explanatory variable
of wages, we decided to endogenise employment. The model, described in table 4.1, con-
tains five exogenous variables: the exchange rate, government expenditure, labour force,
taxes and the short term interest rate. We will use this (almost completely) static model
as a starting point for building our multi-country model. In the next subsections we will
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describe the model and explain how the theoretical model is extended to one which can
handle more than two countries.
4.2.1    Description of the theoretical model
The model, as defined in table 4.1, refers to one (home) country. The equations for the
second (foreign) country are similar. In the theoretical model, it is assumed that each
country produces one (type of) good(s), which is an imperfect substitute for the other
country's (type of) good(s). Both (types of) goods are tradable.
The first equation defines goods market equilibrium and is a standard IS-curve for aggre-
gate demand with the real long term interest rate instead of the real short term interest
rate.  The long term interest rate is interpreted as a measure for the cost of capital. It
represents either the costs of borrowing new capital or the opportunity cost of reinvesting
retained earnings in the firm. It follows from equation ( 1) that real aggregate demand is
assumed  to  be a function  of  the real exchange rate, expressed  as  (E t  P; -P y) ,  the  real
long term interest rate, real foreign demand, real government expenditure and real taxes.
Important to mention is that Py is the output price level of the only (type of) good(s)
in the home-country and that E is defined as the price of one unit of foreign currency in
terms of domestic currency.  So, a rise in E corresponds to a depreciation of the home
currency. The degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods enters this
equation explicitly by the Y--variable. Theory assumes a,  2 0 for i = 1,2 ,... , 5,.  Direct
linkages between the domestic and foreign country are modelled in equation (1) through
the Y-- and P;- variables and the exchange rate E.
In equation (2) the output price level is explained in a standard way. The output price
level depends on factor costs, which are represented by per capita wages W of the private
sector (cost-push inflation). Furthermore, the output price level depends on foreign prices,
indicated by (E + P;), and the deviation of gross domestic product from its trend output
Y. All parameters are assumed to be positive.
Consumer prices in equation (3) are assumed to be (positive) linear combinations of do-
mestic output prices  Pv and import prices, represented  here  as  (E + P:).
The labour demand function in equation (4) is determined in a fairly standard way. Three
factors explain labour demand, namely, real wage costs, output and the gap between for-
eign and domestic prices. Output is assumed to have a positive effect on labour demand
and real wage costs a negative effect. The effect of the difference between the foreign and
domestic price levels is ambiguous.  From the competitive point of view, if foreign firms
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raise their prices domestic firms will follow and raise prices as well, in order to get more
profits. As a consequence there is room for hiring more labour.  From the intermediate
product view, a rise in the price of the intermediate (foreign) good will influence the fir-
m's choice between labour and intermediate goods. This choice, however, depends on the
production-structure of the firm. In general, we expect a negative sign.
Table 4.1: The theoretical model for one country
Equation number Equationa
(1)                          Y = al(E + P; - Py) - ap(RL - APY) + a3Y' + a4G - asT
(2)                  Py =7,W+72(E+Pi)+73(Y-Y)
(3)                                   Pc = 61 Pv + 62(E + pi)
(4)                            N =-41(W- Pv) + 71,Y + 43(E + Pi- Py)
(5)                          W = #1Pc - 192(U - 793U-1) + 04(Y - N) - 05(Pc - Py)
(6)                     RL= BtRL-+F2 RS +113ACG- T)+114APC
(7)      U=L-N
a. Variables are defined as follows (asterisks indicate foreign country variables and A indicates
'first differences'; all variables, except RS, RL and U which are rates, are in logarithmic form):
Y = real aggregate demand (equal to supply, measured by gross domestic product (GDP))
f = trend volume of real gross domestic product
G = real government expenditure
T = real taxes
RS = nominal short term interest rate
RL = nominal long term interest rate
E = exchange rate defined as the nominal price in domestic currency of a unit of foreign currency
4 = price level of aggregate demand
Pc = consumer price level
W = nominal wage per employee in the private sector
L = labour force (labour supply)
N = employment
U = unemployment rate
Nominal per capita wages (of the private sector) are modelled in equation (5). They are
assumed to depend positively on the consumer prices, according to a price indexing elas-
ticity 191, and negatively on the unemployment rate, defined  as the difference between  the
(exogenous) labour force and total employment (see definitional equation (7)). With rising
unemployment, workers are more solicitous about their jobs as compared to their wages,
so their wage claims will be restrained. Moreover, employers will have a larger number
of employable workers at their disposal, so their wage offers can be expected to decline.
The difference between the short run and the long-run impact of unemployment on the
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nominal wage is determined by the persistence parameter 193, which reflects the vulnera-
bility of wages to hysteresis. With prolounged unemployment, the people unemployed can
no longer be considered as strong job-candidates who can put significant pressure on the
labour market (owing to the deterioration of their skills, motivation and search intensity).
In the long-run, the negative effect of unemployment on wages may therefore be much
weaker than in the short run. Finally, the nominal per capita wages depend positively
on the average labour productivity, represented by (Y - N), assuming that the impact
of labour productivity is involved in wage claims, and negatively on the terms of trade,
represented by (Po - Pv) (see, e.g., Heylen [41]) .
Equation (6) explains the domestic long term interest rate. It is assumed that the long
term interest rate is explained by the domestic short terni interest rate RS, the foreign
long-term interest rate RL*, the clianges of government deficit A(G - T) and consumer
price inflation which is expressed as APc. In the sequel we will use the short term interest
rate as the price of the money supply and, therefore, it will be used as a policy variable.  It
is clear, however, that this is a simplification, because, for many countries in a quasi-fixed
exchange rate system as the EMS, the short term interest rate is, obviously, a variable
which can be controlled only partially. Furthermore, it is assumed that a substantial in-
crease in a country's government deficit will push up the long term interest rate (long
term debt financing of the government). By including consumer inflation prices implying
a long-run relationship between ongoing inflation  and  (long term) interest rates,  we  also
consider the Fisher effect.
Due to our precondition to keep the model simple, we had to choose from the outset to take
certain effects not into account. For instance, the model excludes expectations, we do not
assume that there is a natural rate of unemployment, there are no particular expenditure
categories and the model fixes the supply of labour as being exogenous. Furthermore, at
this stage, the exchange rate is assumed to be exogenous.
In the next subsection we extend the theoretical model to one which can handle more
countries. For this extension we will use the principal trading pattern of each individual
country with the other countries considered in the model.
4.2.2 The extension of the theoretical model to more countries
In this section we discuss the extension of the model to one which can handle more than two
countries. The structure of each individual country is given in table 4.1. However, we have
to specify now how each country's model is linked to the other countries' models. Direct
linkages appear in the two-country model through the real exchange rate (E+P; - P,), the
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real foreign aggregate demand Y*, the foreign nominal long term interest rates RL' and
the import prices  (E + P;). In macroeconometric modelling, the standard approach for
the extension to more than two countries is to consider trade linkages, where the impact
of foreign countries is linked through import prices and export and import equations (see,
e.g., the Quest model [10]). An other (more simplified) method is estimating the export
equations of a home country by adding (trade) weighted averages of foreign outputs (see,
e.g., the Taylor model in [76, 751 where, e.g., Y- in the export equation is replaced by
a 'trade weighted average of foreign outputs').  One of the main drawbacks of these ap-
proaches is that, in these models, spillover effects among European countries, originating
from a single-country European fiscal policy measure, are negligible (see Whitley [831). A
possible reason for these small effects could be that foreign effects are modelled through
export or import equations and, so, indirectly influence aggregate demand. Furthermore,
using trade weighted averages means that a priori the weight of importance of a foreign
country is imposed, which can trouble the final outcome. The existence of many more
international transmission effects than just trade, makes it likely that the importance of
the various international linkages among countries could be different from those suggested
by trade figures. The approach we select here is that we do not replace the --variables in
table 4.1 by a trade weighted average of the foreign variables, but incorporate only those
countries in the model which were (the most) important trading partners during the sam-
ple period 1960-1991. The inclusion of all the foreign countries would generate estimation
problems because of our limited number of observations. So, instead of one (E + P; - Pv)-
or Y'- variable in the aggregate demand equation, we got several --variables, each implying
an important foreign country for the domestic country in question. The same approach
will be applied for the other equations in table 4.1 which contain foreign variables. As a
consequence we get different foreign variables for different countries.
Table 4.2 and table 4.3 give an indication of the importance of trade between the specified
countries within the sample period. In table 4.2, the importing share of each country with
respect to other countries is given, and in table 4.3, the exporting share of each country.
From both tables it is clear that direct linkages exist between (nearly) all countries. No-
tice that the figures should be read from top to bottom. For instance, the first figure in
table 4.2, 2.92, indicates that in the year 1963, 2.92% of Danish total imports came from
Belgium. ROW indicates figures for the rest of the world. These figures indicate that the
eight EU-countries, USA and Japan are responsible for more than 50% of the importing
and exporting shares of each EU-country considered.  This is not the case for the exports
and imports of the USA and Japan, where the EU-trade shares are below 50%. These facts
are, of course, not remarkable because it is well-known that there is a lot of trade within
the EU, whereas for the USA and Japan we ignored important trading partners outside
the EU.
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Table 4.2: Trade Balances: Import percentages for the years 1963, 1977 and 1991
Importing Country
YEAR Belg. Denm. Germ. Fra. Irel. Ita. Nld. U.K. Jap. USA
Ezporting
Country
Belgium 1963 2.92 6.19 7.53 1.91 3.23 17.37 1.88 0.4 2.24
1977 3.87 8.47 8.98 2.01 3.34 11.84 4.61 0.27 0.98
1991 3.29 7.97 10.27 2.18 4.88 13.01 4.41 0.67 0.92
Denmark 1963 0.39 2.28 0.62 1.02 1.33 0.7 3.21 0     0.74
1977 0.46 1.53 0.62 0.66 0.98 0.58 2.23 0.24 0.4
1991 0.61 2.15 0.91 0.86 0.98 1.13 1.83 0.49 0.34
Germany 1963 19.27 21.04 18.06 6.61 16.9 24.18 5.03 3.27 5.87
1977 22.25 19.64 18.49 5.91 16.77 24.56 9.82 2.12 4.98
1991 22.32 23.05 20.64 7.95 21.01 23.65 14.65 4.97 5.62
France 1963 14.95 3.82 10.68 2.41 9.64 5.13 3.44 0.76 2.53
1977 15.93 4.21 11.67 4.32 13.9 7.02 7.29 0.8 2.08
1991 14.92 5.87 12.25 4.2 14.15 6.97 9.19 3.26 2.64
Ireland 1963 0.06 0 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 2.98 0       0.24
1977 0.37 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.19 0.49 3.53     0       0
1991 0.61 0.63 0.81 0.99 0.64 0.76 3.67 0         0.03
Italy 1963 3.5 2.59 7.23 5.94 1.14 2.97
2.3 0.7 2.91
1977 3.97 3.09 8.85 9.57 2.37 3.48 4.22 0.66 2.08
1991 4.3 3.98 9.19 11.05 2.23 3.4 5.3 2.17 2.6
Netherl. 1963 14.89 5.52 8.7 4.36 3.3 2.96 4.03 0.74 1.24
1977 16.77 5.51 13.56 6.1 4.28 4.15 13.98 0.42 1.01
1991 17.82 7.16 11.78 6.53 5.1 5.76 7.63 0.51 1.02
U.K. 1963 8.33 14.58 4.78 6 51.08 6.18 7.33 2.21 6.29
1977 7.79 10.94 4.52 5.22 53.31 3.69 6.71 1.3 3.46
1991 7.96 7.67 6.39 7.58 45.54 5.63 7.94 2.07 4.05
Japan 1963 0.71 0.8 1.03 0.47 1.27 1.24 0.66 1.54 8.87
1977 1.6 3.11 2.75 1.96 2.05 1.31 2 2.93 12.78
1991 3.72 3.09 5.3 2.94 3.85 0.28 5.34 5.71 18.05
USA 1963 9.19 8.92 15.47 10.3 5.84 13.64 10.61 11.29 30.85
1977 6.03 5.74 6.85 6.94 7.07 6.95 8.53 10.51 17.6
1991 5.99 5.78 6.16 8.4 14.87 5.47 7.97 12.6 22.79
ROW 1963 28.72 39.81 43.52 46.6 25.41 44.78 28.98 64.31 61.07 69.07
1977 24.83 43.48 41.41 41.7 18 48.73 34.8 40.88 76.6 72.23
1991 21.77 39.49 37.99 30.7 13.23 41.21 29.83 34.99 63.08 64.72
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Table 4.3: Trade Balances: Export percentages for the years 1963, 1977 and 1991
Exporting Country
YEAR Belg. Denm. Germ. France Irel. Italy Netherl. U.K.  Japan  USA
Importing
Country
Belgium 1963 1.12 6.99 9.02 0.59 3.59 14.89 2.81 0.72 2.2
1977 1.77 7.86 9.96 4.49 3.56 14.66 5.58 1.02 2.59
1991 2.17 7.33 8.47 4.95 3.42 14.28 5.69 1.35 2.67
Denmark 1963 1.31 3.08 0.98 0 1.04 1.84 2.71 0     0.63
1977 1.4 2.2 0.81 1.12 0.8 1.71 2.42 0.4 0.44
1991 0.86 1.87 0.91 0.96 0.79 1.62 1.31 0.34 0.34
Germany 1963 18.56 17.17 16.71 3.36 18.15 26.26 5.3 2.11 4.73
1977 22.45 15.39 17.1 8.98 18.58 30.87 7.58 3.46 4.98
1991 23.87 22.52 20.98 12.7 21.25 29.45 13.69 6.2 4.77
France 1963 14.37 3.1 11.12 1.58 10.22 7.74 4.82 0.57 2.91
1977 19.11 4.32 12.3 7.43 14.29 10.5 6.52 1.25 2.92
1991 19.04 5.88 13.08 9.45 15.29 10.57 11.07 2.14 3.42
Ireland 1963 0.39 0.43 0.36 0.25 0.17 0.46 3.82 0 0.2
1977 0.27 0.37 0.28 0.41 0.27 0.42 4.98     0       0
1991 0.35 0.48 0.44 0.38 0.34 0.61 5.06 0.33 0.65
Italy 1963 5.17 5.19 9.31 9.19 1.38 4.57 3.85 1.49 3.84
1977 4.38 4.91 6.85 10.47 1.84 4.78 2.97 0.55 2.32
1991 6.04 4.86 9.12 11.08 4.25 6.32 5.78 1.19 2.05
Netherl. 1963 22.59 2.25 9.34 3.29 0.99 3.63 4.6 1.19 3.22
1977 16.79 3.51 10.06 5.11 5.69 3.78 6.48 1.62 3.99
1991 13.67 4.85 8.46 4.67 6.56 3.17 7.9 2.15 3.34
U.K. 1963 5.71 23.26 3.79 4.9 72.53 5.38 9.66 2.85 4.95
1977 6.85 14.01 5.34 6.5 46.95 5.28 7.47 2.41 4.48
1991 7.78 10.43 7.67 8.97 32.09 6.67 9.37 3.76 5.85
Japan 1963 0.73 0.48 1.4 0.53 0.2 0.86 0.77 1.31 7.33
1977 0.45 1.58         1.1 0.72 0.96 0.79 0.53 1.42 8.76
1991 1.2 3.59 2.47 2.01 2.26 2.21 0.93 2.24 12.47
USA 1963 8.63 6.63 7.2 5.28 6.72 9.49 4.09 8.11 27.97
1977 4.19 5.79 6.65 5.14 6.21 6.67 3.43 9.39 24.76
1991 3.78 4.9 6.28 6.01 8.68 6.88 3.75 11.08 31.69
ROW 1963 22.55 40.37 47.4 49.86 12.65 47.46 29.73 62.68 63.11 69.99
1977 24.12 48.35 47.36 43.77 16.33 45.98 25.64 52.66 64.54 69.52
1991 23.4 40.33 43.29 36.51 18.1     40 23.11 36.18 50.86 64.46
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Table 4.4: Domestic countries and their most important trading partners
Domestic country most important trading partners
Belgium Germany, France, Netherlands
Germany France, Italy, USA, Japan
France Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, USA
Denmark Germany, United Kingdom, USA
United Kingdom Germany, France, USA
Ireland Germany, United Kingdom, USA
Italy Germany, France, USA
Netherlands Belgium, Germany, France, United Kingdom, USA
USA Germany, Japan
Japan Germany, USA
Table 4.4 presents our choice of the foreign countries which will be considered as important
countries for the domestic country and which will appear as *-variables in the equations
of the domestic country. In general, the countries chosen are those with the highest trade
share in tables 4.2 and 4.3. However, we must confess that the boundary-lines, determin-
ing which country is included as importing/exporting country, are sometimes somewhat
arbitrary. For instance, we also took into account that large countries will generate more
externalities (e.g., knowledge spillovers) than small countries. Hence, sometimes, a large
country was favoured over a small country. For example, we excluded small countries
like Belgium and the Netherlands as important trading partners of Germany and France.
Furthermore, we included Japan as important trading partner of Germany. Of course, by
considering for each country only its most direct linkages many of the existing (weaker)
trade linkages between countries are ignored. However, as we will see later on, through
the strong direct interaction among countries still (nearly) all countries will be indirectly
linked.
Remark that, in our approach, we do not use trade share figures to determine the weight
of importance of an effect of a relevant foreign country. Iii our approach the estimation
procedure, which will be explained in the next section, will decide about the weight of
importance of a foreign country included. By doing so, we expect to get stronger spillover
effects and more differentiation between countries than found in the existing multi-country
models. A disadvantage of this estimation procedure can be that multicollinearity may
arise between variables of various countries, e.g., owing to similar cyclical behaviour in
these countries. Furthermore, spill-overs from countries which are not explicitly modelled
are supposedly reflected in the estimated effects of the trade partners which are included
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in the model.
In the next section we explain our estimation methodology and, finally, present the esti-
mation results for each equation of the model.
4.3 Estimation
We will start this section by explaining the methodology of estimation. Thereafter, we will
present in the various subsections the estimation results for each equation separately. For
estimation we use yearly data from 1960 till 1991. A description of the data can be found
in Appendix B.1.
In general, the equilibrium specification iii table 4.1 will be made dynamic according to an
Error Correction Mechanism (ECM). In the case of one endogenous variable, e.g., Yt and
one explanatory variable, e.g., xt, the ECM representation relates the current change in yt
to the past deviation of vt, y,-1, from its long-term path (a + Bxt-1), and to the current
change in zi, as well as to the past changes in zi and yi. Such ECM can be written as (see,
e.g., Fuss and Sekkat [33]):
Ay,  =  ACY,-1 -a- Bxt-1) +
60&1:t + 61AX:-1 + 62Azt-2 + ··· + 71Ayt-1 + 72AY,-2 + ··· + Et· (4.1)
In equation (4.1), A is called the error correction parameter and (Vt-1 -0- (zt-1) the
error correction term. The speed of adjustment of yi to its long-term path is determined
by A. It must be negative and less than one in absolute value for the ECM to be stable.
In the case that a and B are known, their values can be substituted into equation (4.1),
which indentifies the remaining equation. However, a and B are unknown in most cases.
Then, in order to estimate equation (4.1) we rewrite the long-run relationship in (4.1) as
follows:
A(yt-1 -a- BIt-1) =A o t Alvt-1 + Avxt-1 (4.2)
The approach that we follow here is that we subsitute (4.2) in (4.1) and then estimate
equation (4.1) in one step. This unrestricted ECM-procedure is advocated in Banerjee et
al.  [21 and Inder  [47] 1.  In our case, now,  the best  way to proceed would be to assume that
the long-term path for each equation is specified as given in table 4.1. Furthermore, we
1 In Banerjee et al.  [2] and Inder [47] there is some evidence that the estimation of the long-run equation
is more eflicient and less biased in the unrestricted ECM-procedure than in the two step procedure of Engle
and Granger [26], in which the long-term path is estimated first.
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would then have to add present (and lagged) changes of each variable in the equilibrium
equation of table 4.1 to get an equation as specified in (4.1). However, obviously, if many
variables enter the equilibrium equation, the amount of variables which enter the general
ECM in (4.1) can expand quickly. In our case we have a very small data set and, therefore,
we have to be very careful in selecting the variables for the ECM-model. Since, we use a
similar specification across different countries we first choose a long-run relationship wich
did reasonably well for all countries, i.e., cointegration seems likely. The next step was to
use this long-run relationship in combination with the difference terms and estimate this
equation in one step. Therefore, the approach we, finally, decided to use here, and which
worked well in practice, is that only domestic variables are chosen to enter the long-run
relationship and that all variables of the equilibrium relation, specified in table 4.1, will
enter the general equation in difference form. Remark, that with this procedure we give
more weight to short-term dynamics than to long-term dynamics.
Note, that with this approach we surpress some of the impact of foreign activity in the
long-run. Of course, it seems unlikely that there are no long-run effects between foreign
level variables, but we refrained from doing so for practical reasons. For instance, when
using the foreign levels of the countries specified in table 4.4, we found for many coun-
tries estimation results which yielded bad results for the influence of the level variables of
the foreign countries. These results did not disappear when using simultanous estimation
procedures. The main reason for these findings is that with the introduction of more si-
multaneity in the long-run relationships we encounter additional problems such as bias and
inconsistency  of the estimators  in our estimation procedures (see Hendry  [40]) and, there-
fore, stability problems iii our dynamic simulation results. With only a limited amount
of data available it turned out that these additional problems where very hard to solve,
when using an unrestricted ECM-method. Another possibility for modelling the influence
of foreign variables, which keeps more control over the weights assigned to the foreign level
variables, would be to use constructed weights for the levels of the foreign variables and
use  these  in the long-run relationship.    In  fact, this approach is close  to a restricted  form
of estimation, which introduces a lot of arbritrary choices such as the determination of the
weights. Furthermore, in that case the distribution of the spill-over effects to the foreign
countries are fixed beforehand, which was not our original intention. To conclude, with
our limited dataset, we could not find reasonable unrestricted estimation results which
ultimately yield a model in which the effects of the foreign long-run level variables were
modelled properly.
The estimation procedure we use is the general to specijic approach, in the sense of the
Hendry-methodology (see, e.g., Hendry [40]). Considering the limited number of available
observations, the general model (4.1) is generally overparameterised. By data-based sim-
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plification (i.e., deleting variables with inadmissible parameter impacts and, next, deleting
variables with insignificant parameter estimates) the general model is reduced to a more
parsimonious model. In the next subsections we specify, for each equation separately, the
general dynamic relationship and the decision criteria for determining the simplified equa-
tion.
It is common use in macroeconomic modelling that, in order to get a first-shot estimate,
each equation is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). It is generally known (see,
e.g., Brandsma et al.  [10]) that simultaneous estimation (e.g., 2SLS, 3SLS) adds little to
explanatory power when it is already high in single equation estimations. Furthermore,
we have the additional problem that in our case the number of exogenous variables ex-
ceeds the number of observations.  In the case of simultaneous estimation procedures like
2SLS, 3SLS, we have the additional problem of how to select the appropriate set of in-
strumental variables. For some cases we used the 3SLS-procedure as a test (for instance
in the estimation process of the wage-price spiral). In those cases where 3SLS-results did
not correspond (roughly) to the OLS-outcomes, we adopted the approach that we deleted
the variable which was responsible for this problem. In most cases that variable could be
traced by the fact that it was significant in the OLS-estimation procedure, but insignificant
in the 3SLS-estimation procedure. The problem of collinearity is circumvented as follows
(see Brunia [11]).  If more than one right-hand side variable is found to be significant, then
a variable is only retained if it is also significant when the other variable is dropped from
the equation, otherwise it is eliminated.
We want to stress that we did not apply the usual tests to see whether variables which enter
the long-run relationship are cointegrated or not. There are two reasons for this, which
are both related to the fact of a small data set. First, the appropriate tests are asymp-
totically valid, but the small sample properties of these tests can be questioned (Cochrane
[15]). Second, we put much emphasis on getting reasonable static and dynamic simulation
results in the process of modelling.  If one does so, it can happen that a good fit of a single
equation turns out to be a bad equation for the final model.
In this chapter we follow a simple diagnostic which is suggested by Banerjee et al.  [2} and
use the 1-value of Al in (4.1), after substituting (4.2) in (4.1), as a test for cointegration.
Now,  if this coefficient turned out  to be insignificant, which suggests  a lack of long-run
influence, then we followed the following procedure. We skipped the long-run relationship
from the equation if the static and dynamic simulations were worse with this relationship
than without it. The estimation results will show that the long-run relationship is fairly
significant for all the countries in the GDP-, employment, wage- and long term interest rate
equations. This is not the case for the GDP- or consumer price level. This last empirical
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finding is, however, a conimon result in macroeconometric modelling. 2.
We are aware of the critique on the general to specific approach that, when applying this
methodology, most researchers do not give an exact description of the decisions taken when
moving from a general  to a simplified model  (see, e.g., Pagan [62]). During the process  of
simplifying the general equation, there is always the interference between decision-making
on statistic, economic or simulation grounds and, therefore, a lot of re-estimation has
mostly taken place before the final equation is obtained. We should also notice that giving
an exact description of the decision-making process of the finally obtained simplified equa-
tions for all the sixty (estimated) equations would be very space consuming and, therefore,
will not be presented. Hence, we will describe our estimation procedure as clearly as pos-
sible, without going into unnecessary details of each estimation before coming up with our
final results.
We will present our estimation results for each equation separately. The results are pre-
sented with belonging t-statistics, R2, the standard error (multiplied by one thousand),
SE, and a statistic for (first-order) autocorrelation. Because of the occurrence of lagged
dependent variables, the Durbin-Watson statistic is not an appropriate test statistic on first
order autocorrelation. Therefore, we used the t-statistic on the estimated autocorrelation
coefficient  in the following model:
21 =PE,-1 + 7 4+91 (4.3)
where 21, t =  1, ..., T,  are the OLS-residuals from the originally estimated equation:  vt  =
0' St + Et. The statistic 1(b) from the OLS-estimation of equation (4.3) is shown for each
equation and it should be noticed that the null-hypothesis of zero autocorrelation is ac-
cepted if this statistic is smaller than 2 in absolute value. According to Kiviet [531 this
autocorrelation test is most useful in the case of small data-sets.
4.3.1 Output
The first equation we consider is the output equation (1) in table 4.1. This equation
contains five explanatory variables.  Two of these explanatory variables involve foreign
variables. As explained in the previous section, each foreign variable has to be replaced
by a set of foreign variables as indicated in table 4.4. As already noted, following this
approach may increase the number of explanatory variables to a large extent. Since we
only have a sample of 32 observations it is clear that we can only consider a subset of
2See Whitley [84, page 122] who argues:'Another explanation for the empirical inertia found in price
equations is that researchers have found it difficult to find evidence of a co-integrating relationship.'
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these variables. As explained in the introduction of this section we do not consider the
foreign level variables in the estimation process. Furthermore, we excluded taxes from
the estimation process, because it was not possible to find satisfying estimation results for
this variable.  For most countries, the data of T and G are growing in time with more
or less the same speed. Therefore, running a regression which includes both variables did
(most of the time) not yield an expected (positive) impact of G and a (negative) impact
of T; we also tried the combination (G - T), but this did not work out as well. For three
countries, USA, United Kingdom and Ireland, we used the real short term interest rate.
According to the literature in the USA, United Kingdom and Ireland, mortgage interest
payments are indexed to money market rates. Hence, higher money market rates can
impose a significant cost on house-owners (see, e.g., for the United Kingdom and Ireland,
Eichengreen and Wyplosz [251, and for the United States, Ghosh and Masson [34]).
Summarizing, we started our approach with the following general aggregate demand model
for all countries:
a}'I = ao + alye-1 + (12(71-1 + (13(RLt-1 - Apy,) +
a4AGt + asa(RLt-1 - APY,) + a6AY;-1 +
bia(Et + P;,1 -py,) t... + bka(Et + Pi,k -pv,) +
Cla]'71 + ... + CkAP;.k +
arDUM7475 + a8DUM7576 + agtime (4.4)
For each variable with an asterisk, indicating foreign countries, a foreign country denoted
in table 4.4 may appear in the equation. For Belgium, e.g., the general equation implies
k = 3 because there are three countries, according this table, which may have a significant
impact: Germany, France and the Netherlands. As level variables we, finally, included three
(domestic) variables,  }1-1, Gt-1, RLt-1  - APy„ assuming a long-run relationship between
them. Note, that for convenience sake, we do not consider a forward looking term like
8(RLe - APY,+1) 3. We included step dummies in the general equation: DUM7475 is
defined as one for the years 1960-1973 and zero for the years 1974-1991 and DUM7576
is defined accordingly. These dummies belong to the long-run relationship of the general
equation and are introduced to capture the oil price shock during the 1973-1974 period.
In Perron [641 it is shown that this oil shock had persistent negative effects on domestic
GDP growth of oil importing countries. Furthermore, a time dummy is introduced to
capture accelerated exogenous growth effects of domestic demand  4. We expect  the sign  of
a2,(14, (17,118, (19, 61,•··,bk, Cl,···,Ck 2 0, and (11,(13 5 0
The estimation results are presented iii table 4.5.  As can be seen from our results, the
3In general, the inclusion of this term would not alter the estimation results very much.
4 FairlY speaking, this time variable should be included in the long-run relationship where it can be
interpreted as an exogonous growth component.
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level variables  Y_i, G-i, rl-1(=   RL-1  - APY) showed significant results  in most cases,
except in the case of Ireland where G_i did not have an impact according to our supposed
theory and, therefore, was excluded. In the case of Japan we could not find any significant
impact of the real interest rate. Difference variables of government expenditure appeared
in all equations, except Japan and Denmark. In the case of France, Italy and the United
Kingdom, the significance of this variable is rather low. Direct linkages are modelled in each
equation; however, not all the countries, indicated in table 4.4, yielded significant results.
As expected, Germany has a (direct) impact on all other countries except on Ireland. Two
countries with considerable influence are also France and the USA; these two countries have
direct linkages with five other countries. Especially the impact of GDP growth of France
is strong in the equations of Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom. Real exchange
rates effects are largest in the countries Belgium, France and the Netherlands and absent
in Denmark, the USA and Japan. A component of foreign growth was found in every
country. Large foreign growth effects were found in Belgium, Germany, Denmark, United
Kingdom and the Netherlands. In five countries one dummy, capturing the oil shock, had
a significant impact and for eight countries the dummy time, indicating exogenous growth,
had a significant impact.
4.3.2  The GDP price inflation
Starting from the equilibrium specification in Table 1, we specified ECM-dynamics as
indicated in the introduction of this section. It should be stressed that the lagged level
component (Y-i - Y-i), being specified as the demand pull inflation component in table 4.1,
had no significant impact in the estimation results and, therefore, will not be considered
as level variable in the equilibrium specification of the following general equation:
A Pv, = ao + al PV,-1 + a2Wt-1 +
a3APY,-1 + (14& 14 + asal'V,-1 + a6ACY - Y)1 + aFACY -  )t-1 +
bid(E + py'i): + ... + bkA(E + Py'k)t +
ClaCE + P:1)1-it ... + CkA(E + P:k),-1 (4.5)
For estimating equation (4.5) we followed the same procedure as defined in the pre-
vious aggregate demand subsection. Our decision criterium was that all parameteres
a2, a4, bl, ···, bk, cl, ···ck should be nonnegative  and at should be negative. The signs  of
aB and a7 are ambiguous, where a positive sign indicates a demand effect and a negative
sign a supply effect. This procedure worked quite well for all the ten countries. The results
can be found in table 4.6. We have to make some additional remarks. The long-run impact
of the level of wages to GDP-prices was restricted to one in Italy. The simulation results
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Table 4.5: Estimation results of the aggregate demand equation"
Belgium:
AYB. = -8.94 - 0.34¥210 + 0.14Gff - 0.38riff + 0.29AGB• + 0.17ariff + 0.17AAB•Nt 12   =   0.80
(3.45) (0.15) (0.06) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.08) SE = 0.09
0.138YGe + 0.47AYFr   0.40AYN: + 0.026 DUM7576 +0.006time 1(b) = -0.97
(0.15) (0.23) (0.18) (0.01) (0.002)
Germanv:
AYGe = -6.30 - 0.37Y-* + 0.22GS; - 0.33riff + 0.51AGG  - 0.42Ariff + 0.26AYU. 72'   =   0.82
(2.16) (0.14) (0.08) (0.21) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10) SE = 0.08
+0.528YFr   0.09AY" + 0.03AAG'U.  0.031 DUM7475 +0.004time 1(b) = -0.32
(0.19) (0.12) (0.02) (0.015) (0.002)
Aunce:
AY,r = -5.16 - 0.11]'fi  + 0.03GfI - 0.33rls + O.12AGFr   0.28AYI'k + 0.168YGe 72   =   0.82
(2.53) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) SE = 0.06
+o.ioaAF'Ge   0.06AAFruk  0.023 DUM7475 +0.0031ime 1(b) = -0.73
(0.04) (0.03) (0.010) (0.002)
Denmark:
AYD" = -2.39 - 0.43Y9& + 0.14GD; - 0.13rlfi' + 0.46AYG• + 0.28AYI'k 72   =   0.82
(2.22) (0.10) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) SE = 0.12
+0.003 time 1(b) = -0.80
(0.001)
United Kingdom:
AYuk = -12.6 - 0.32Pl't + 0.04GMt - 0.17r,52 + 0.05AGuk - 0.08araf9 + 0.09AAUkG. 1 * =   0.68
(5.61) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) SE =   0.15
+0.61AYfr + 0.368Yu' + 0.02 DUM7475 +0.008 time 1(M = -0.34
(0.24) (0.36) (0.02) (0.004)
Inknd.
AYIr = -48.9 - 0.66]<4 - 0.38rsf5 + 0·21AGIr t 0.15Araff + 0.43AYI; + 0.228Yu. 72 = O.35
(11.8) (0.16) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.21) SE = 0.32
+0.03AA/ru, + 0.07AAIruk + 0.028 time 1(4) = 0.35
(0.04) (0.07) (0.007)
Italy:
AYI' = 0.64 - 0.11Yli + 0.06Gfii + 0.07AG" - 0.45arIL*1 + 0.34AYF' t 0.06AYU' 72   =   0.46
(0.49) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.22) (0.11) SE = 0.27
+0.028Aitus + 0.07AAGe/t #A   =   0.59
(0.02) (0.07)
Netherlands:
AYN: = -3.00 - 0.2OY-fi + O.1OG j - 0.3lriN: + 0.35AGN: + 0.258,151 + 0.25AYG.            72    =    0.83
(2.41) (0.11) (0.06) (0.24) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) SE = 0.08
+0.278Yfr + 0.46AYBI + 0.21AAN'Be + 0.13AAN<Ge + 0.02AANIU, + 0.002 time 1(0) = -0.57
(0.26) (0.18) (0.07) (0.12) (0.02) (0.002)
USA:
ayu' = -7.36 - 0.501'17 + 0.21651 - 0.26raff + 0.31AGE,8 - 0.38araff + 0.3981'17           7i     =     0.64
(5.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.15) SE = 0.19
+0.338YG' t 0.006 time 1(b)   =   2.03
(0.17) (0.003)
Japan:
AY" = 0.52 - 0.12Ylf + 0.09Git + 0·42AYGe + 0.06 DUM7475 72   =   0.73
(0.22) (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.02) SE = 0.29
1(b)   =   0.79
a.  The real echange rate between two countries, e.g., Belgium and the Netherlands in the jirat equation,
ABIN:, is defned as E + PNI _ PBs, where E ia the ezchange rate between Belgium and the Netherlands,
de/ined as the amount 0/ Belgion hancs for one Dutch Gui/der.  The real long term interest rote is delined
03 rl-1 := RL-1 - APY and the real short term interest rate as rs-1 := RS-1 - APy
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Table 4.6: Estimation results of the GDP-price equationa
Belgium:
APfs = -0.36 + 0.31AP 3 + 0.29AWB• + 0.32ACY - S')£T + O.18apBINI *' = 0.82
(0.62) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.07) SE = 0.11
-0.036P:r + O.026Wff t(b) = 1.48
(0.075) (0.044)
Germanv:
apr = -0.28 + 0.27AP,2, + 0.45AWG• - 0.188(Y - f')G' + 0.158(Y - Y)2;        72    =    0.87
(0.28) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) SE = 0.03
to.014aPfw' - 0•0281'2 to·026Wf t(b) = -1.07
(0.011) (0.045) (0.044)
France:
aP/' = -O.66 + 0.29AP//, + 0.57AWF• - 0.138(Y - 1')£; + 0.02apf;u• 72   =   0.97
(0.36) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.01) SE = 0.03
-0.037P72, + 0·035WS 1( ) = -0.29
(0.027) (0.019)
Denmark:
AP/" = -1.22 + 0.33Apt; + O.39AWD" - 0.25a(Y - Y)Dn + 0.168(Y - f')fr      72     =     0.88
(0.55) (0.14) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) SE = 0.08
+O.O3bpfi Uk + 0.O28Pfi'*U' - 0.126Pjl  + 0.101Wfi" 1(4) = -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.057) (0.044)
United Kingdom:
Apyuk = -0.80 + 0.718Pt , - 0.56A(Y - P)uk + 0.99a(Y - F.)9 72 = 0.89
(0.64) (0.09) (0.16) (0.23) SE = 0.26
+0.14DUM75 - 0.11Pirt + O·O8W-uk t(b) = 0.18
(0.02) (0.08) (0.08)
Indand:
APj' = -0.44 + 0.67AWI' - 0.43A(Y - f')Ir + 0.25AP/luk *' = 0.89
(0.69) (0.11) (0.16) (0.06) SE = 0.33
-0.058FyII, + 0.044Wfl «b) = -0.38
(0.098) (0.072)
Italv:
aPJ' = -0.13 + 0.40AJ'2, + 0.55AWI' + 0.228(Y - 1')1: + 0.06API:Ge 72 = O.95
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) SE = 0.13
-0.035(P ,  - Wle,) 1(*) = -0.19
(0.011)
Netherlands:
APyNI = -0.56 + 0.57AWNI - 0.178(Y - f')Ni + 0.18AP-fec + 0.078PNIUI 12 = 0.94
(0.37) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) SE = 0.05
-0.064PZ't + 0.O51Wf' t(b) = -0.20
(0.054) (0.051)
USA:
AP,u' = -3.72 + 0.71AP 2, + 0.118(Y - P)5; - 0.24PC + 0.22WY; li = O.80
(1.30) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) SE = 0.10
1(*) = 0.58
Japan:
AP  = -1.51 + 0.578Pil + 0.74AW ' - 0.54AW" - 0.308(Y - P)"t 72 = 0.83
(0.82) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) SE = 0.22
0.148(Y - F) 1 - 0.17PA + 0.10,e 1(4) = -1.21
(0.14) (0.10) (0.05)
a.  The con:petetive GDP price between a home and a foreign country, e.g., Belgium and the Nether-
lands in the first equation,  PB'Nt,  is dejined as E + P ',  where E i, the exchange rote between Belgium
and the Netherlands, dejined as the amount of Bdgian Francs for one Dutch Guilder.
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improved considerably when imposing this restriction. Furthermore, a first difference wage
effect, which was significant in the original OLS-regression but not in the 3SLS-estimation,
was excluded in the USA and in the United Kingdom. In the case of the GDP-price equa-
tion of the United Kingdom, the impact of the GDP-price of the year 1975 worked as a
lever. Therefore we included a dummy DUM75, which is one in 1975 and zero elsewhere,
into the equation.
The multipliers of differences in short run per capita wage costs (AW) are in the same
range (0-0.67) as published in the Quest model[10]. However, there are some differences
among countries, which can be explained, not only by the different data samples, but also
by the different sets of variables which were taken into account during the estimation pro-
cess. In our case, we included foreign variables in the estimation process and this had a
serious effect in almost every country as can be seen from the results. As expected small
countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland have strong foreign price effects.
In the Netherlands we see the remarkable fact that the lagged (home) inflation variable
disappeared but, instead, two foreign inflation variables were included. The appearence of
these foreign variables indicate a high degree of openness for the economy in the Nether-
lands. We see that the USA have a strong impact on other countries. Its competitive
GDP inflation level had substantial effects in four of the eight EU-countries. The variable
A(Y - Y) had serious effects in all the countries. In general, except for Italy and France,
the variable had a positive lagged effect and a negative current effect, indicating a cyclical
price behaviour. A rise in output instantanously lowers prices, and raises prices one year
later. Note, that the sign of the overall effect of a change in output from trend is unclear.
4.3.3 The consumer price inflation
The equation for the consumer price inflation was estimated in the same way as the GDP
price inflation. We used the equilibrium equation from table 4.1 and we made a dynamic
formulation of it as explained in the introduction of this section. A long-run relationship
in each country was assumed between the consumer price level Pc and the output price
level Py. The general equation is specified as follows:
aft, = ao + alpc,-1 + a2Pv,-1 +
(3apy, + a#APy,-1 + asaPC,_1
bid(E + P:,1) t... + bka(E + Pv, ) +
claCE + Pr_i) + ··· + bka(E + Pi,t.1) (4.6)
The estimation results, after applying the general to specific estimation scheme, can be
found in table 4.7. Our prior belief was that all parameters should be nonnegative, except
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al which should be negative. We have to remark that the error correction term (indicated
by the lagged level variables) was excluded for Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and
USA, since the significance of these terms was very low and the simulation results turned
out to be better without these terms. However, consumer price levels and output price
levels are still very strongly related with each other in all countries. The reason for this
is that the most important indicator for the consumer price inflation is the GDP price
inflator.   If we look at  the home effects indicated by APv„ APv,_,  and  APc,-   then we
see that in almost all cases these variables explain more than 80 % of the consumer price
inflation. We see that Germany had a significant effect in all countries, except in France
and Denmark.  If we consider the multipliers of the foreign effects, we see that small
countries like Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands are mostly influenced by
foreign countries. This is not astonishing because it is well known that these economies
are the most open ones of all the EU-countriess. The long-run elasticity, of the long-run
relationship between the consumer price and the GDP-price, equals almost one in those
cases where it had a significant impact.
4.3.4 The employment equation
For the general specification of total employment in the individual economies we followed
the scheme which includes all home level variables of the equilibrium equation, as specified
in table 4.1, and all present and past changes of all the variables. Furthermore, we included
a time dummy which represents an autonomous (technology) trend. The general equation
is specified as follows:
ANt = ao + eN:-1 + e(W- Pv):-1 + *E-1
+a#AN:-1 + asa(Ii/t- Py,) + a6&(114-1 - Py,-,) +
aTA¥1 + aBAY-1 + agtime +
bia(Et + P:,1 - py,) + ... + bka(Et + P2 - py,) +
cia(Et- 1  +  Pit,   -  Py,-,)  +  . . .  +  cka (Et- 1  +  ff-,   -  Py'-' ) (4.7)
According to economic theory our priors  were  that  al,a2, as  5  0  and  a3, a7  2  0·   The
estimation results can be found in table 4.8. The error-correction parameter was negative
and in absolute value smaller than one in all cases, except for Ireland were it did not
occur, indicating a stable relationship. Furthermore, most variables in the error correction
term (determined by the level variables Nt_i, Wr,-,(:= Wt-1 - 111,_,),PI-1) proved to be
significant. However, in some cases the level effect of real wages disappeared. Notice that
5For measures of openness, see, e.g., the Quest model [10]
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Table 4.7: Estimation results of the consumer price equation°
Be/gium:
apeB. = -0.008 + 0.81AP,Be + 0.07Ap- Ge + 0.13ApB.Fr   0.120.PfF. 72 0.87
(0.004) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) SE 0.10
t(R -0.35
Germany:
apfi = 0.007 + 0.4OAPVG' + 0.32&Pjt + O.03APG'Fr + 0.06APG.U. 722 O.91
(0.004) (0.10) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) SE = 0.03
-0.24PX; + O.22«, 1( ) 1.32
(0.05) (0.05)
France:
Ap:· = 0.00 + 0.946.P:r + 0.03APFruk + 0.04APFru. N, = 0.96
(0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) SE = 0.04
-0.37Pg + 0.37PS, 1(b)  =  -0.32
(0.12) (0.13)
Denmark:
appn = -0.00 + 0.81Apfn + 0.15Apt; + 0.06APDIUk R' . 0.85
(0.01) (0.14) (0.14) (0.03) SE = 0.13
-0.18'le to.18Pr; t(b)   =   -0.32
(0.09) (0.09)
United Kingdom:
apauk = 0.00 + 0,89Apyuk + 0.02&pukG• + 0.0721PyfF• + 0,03Apuku,          72'    =    0.98
(0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) SE = 0.05
-0.47,1'Kt + 0.45Pr, KA = -1.37
(0.09) (0.09)
Ireland:
AP<r = -0.004 + 0.43APjr + 0.13Ap;I, + 0.09ap/,Ge + 0.33AP/ruk 722 = 0.92
(0.006) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) SE = 0.26
+0.07Aptu.
1(4)   =   0.15
(0.04)
Italy:
AP/1 = -0.006 + 0.91&pr + 0.048.PI'Ge + 0.04AP/'Fr   0.038PI'U.            72    =     0.98
(0.003) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) SE = 0.05
t( ) = 0.40
Netherlands:
apeN' -O.008 + 0.86APVN' + 0.10APY'Go + 0.04APN,Uk   0. loap-NliFT 72' = 0.92
(0.004) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) SE = 0.08
t(f)   =   1.06
USA:
APu' = 0.000 + 0.94AP#" + 0.02APY'G, 722   =   0.92
(0.000) (0.05) (0.01) SE = 0.04
1(4)   =   0.32
Japan:
Apta = 0.00 + 0.78AP 'a + 0.13dpial + 0.05ap'au. + 0.04API'fG. 72 = 0.95
(0.00) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) SE = 0.08
-0.20Pt, + 0.22P2, 1(b) . -0.57
(0.15) (0.17)
a.  The import price between a home and a foreign country, e.g.  Belgium and Germany in the lirst
equation, PBeGe, is dejined as E+ 4Ge, where E is the exchange rate between Belgium and Germany,
dejined as the amount of Belgian Francs for one Detitschmark.
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Table 4.8: Estimation results of the employment equation.
Belgium:
ANB. = 1.73 + 0.15ANff + 0.35AYBO   0•18AY.5  - 0•05AABeG, 71 = 0.67
(0.47) (0.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) SE
= 0.03
-0.26Nff + 0.021<7 1(4)    =    -1.56
(0.06) (0.01)
Germany:
ANG. = 1.85 + 0.55ANff - 0.15AWrGe + 0.49AYGS 71 = 0.85
(0.90) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
SE = 0.03
-0.25Nff - 0.08Wrf + 0.1le t(b) = -1.98
(0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
Frnnce:
AN" = 2.56 - 0.158Wr" + 0·125Wrfr to.31AY'r + 0·20AY* - 0.04AAfIG'       7     =    0.88
(1.24) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) SE
= 0.01
-0.16NS - 0.O3WrS + 0.09Y/7 - 0.00ltime 1(b) = -0.59
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.000)
Denmark:
AND' = 3.08 + 0.39AN-DZ - 0.2OAWron + 0.39AYDn _ 0.02AADTu. 72 = 0.76
(0.84) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.01) SE
= 0.04
-0.58Nlr - 0.14Wrf;' + 0.24e t(b) = -2.40
(0.15) (0.06) (0.08)
United Kingdom:
ANCrk = 9.81 + 0.53AN-ut - 0.32AWruk + 0.46AYuk + 0.058XUAFr _ 0.03AA9f Ge      *     =    0.81
(2.46) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
SE = 0.05
-0.4ON9 - 0.17WrE  + 0.39Yy  - 0.005time 1(b) = -0.27
(0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.001)
Ireland:
AN" = -0.01 + 0.31ANLf - 0.19aW,£A + 0.28AYIr + 0.11AYII 12 = 0.60
(0.00) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) SE
= 0.07
-0.07AA'ru, + 0•03AA ruk 1(b) = -1.77
(0.02) (0.03)
Italy:
ANI' = 0.57 + 0.O9aWri:1 + 0.15AYI' + 0.14AY.Ii R' = 0.54
(0.54) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
SE = 0.04
-0.12Nft + 0.04YII + 0.02DUM65 1(4)   =   0.23
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Netheriands:
ANNI = 1.61 + 0.610Nf& + 0.34AYNg + 0.1OAKT *' = 0.88
(0.29) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) SE
= 0.02
-0.26NN - 0.03Wr51 + 0.08Yf 1(4)   =   -2.26
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
USA:
ANU• = -0.10 - 0.11AWrus + 0.52AYU• + 0.128]<Yt  + 0.02AA ;" *' = 0.81
(0.09) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01)
SE = 0.04
-0.18NYf + 0.14Yu? «0) = -0.40
(0.05) (0.04)
Japan:
AN'- = 0.86 - 0.19Wr" + 0.20AY' 72 = 0.38
(0.72) (0.06) (0.06) SE
= 0.03
-0.08Nif - 0.05Writ + 0.O4Yf t(b) = -0.01
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
a. Real wages, (W - Py), an presented as Wr in this table.  A, e.g.  AB.Ge in the jirst equation,
is dejined in ihe same way as in Table 5.
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we did not impose any restriction on the coefficients of the level variables. In general, the
estimated coefficient of the level of (lagged) employment is much higher than the estimated
coefficient of the level variable of real GDP indicating that in the long run the effect of
real GDP on employment is relatively small.  In the equation of the United Kingdom,
and to a lesser extent France, we found a significant negative time effect, indicating that
technical progress suppresses activity on the labour market. A lagged effect of changes in
total employment can be observed in all the equations, except the equations for France,
Italy, USA and Japan. This process is remarkably strong in the Netherlands where the
coefficient of ANt-i is 0.61. The impact of the change in real wages on employment is
negative as expected; however, a positive lagged effect was found in France and Italy. The
output elasticity on employment is significant (and positive) in each country. Remark that
the overall effect of the change in output is rather strong and ranges from 0.29 till 0.53 in
the EU-economies. The impact of foreign prices is ambiguous. We found a strong foreign
impact in France and Ireland. To improve the fit of the employment equation in Italy
we included a dummy, DUM65, which is explained in Appendix B.1. Looking at the R 
we see that the fit of the estimated equations in Italy, Ireland and Japan is not so good.
Furthermore, notice the high statistic for autocorrelation in three of the ten equations.
4.3.5 The nominal wage equation per private sector employee
It is well-known in macroeconometric modelling that the wage equation is one of the key
equations in the model. Usually this equation is adjusted when simulation results are
not satisfactory. First of all, we excluded the (lagged) terms of trade,Pc - PY since the
inclusion of these terms yielded a bad simulation performance (see, e.g., the Quest model
[10, page 1981, for the same findings: 'Another problem may arise in the case of any lasting
discrepancy between production and consumption prices. The terms-of-trade coefiicient
in  the wage equation has therefore  been  set  to  zero  in all countries.'). We started  with
the following general specification of the equation for nominal wages per employee in the
private sector:
AW, =     ao + at  1-1 + a2 ,_  t a3(Y - N)1-1 + a4(.4-1
asaw:-1 + aBAPc, + aTAP.,-, + aBA(11 - Nt) +
ag&(11-1 - Art-i) + aloAUt + all AUt-1
The selection procedure was based on our priors that ai, a4, aio 5 0 and a2, a3, ae, a8 2 0·
The estimation results can be found in table 4.9. We must remark that the specifications
listed in this table are merely equations which were a result of doing static and dynamic
simulation exercises and that the general to specific approach was used as a first indication.
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Table 4.9: Estimation results of the nominal wage equation 
Belgium:
AWBe = 0.26 + 0.31AW-Bf + 0.67AP.Be + 0.508(Y - N)Be                           R'            0.87
(0.57) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) SE 0.17
-0.13Wft + 0.21(Y - N)81 + 0.1le, - 0.25Uff 1(4) -1.55
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.19)
Germany:
AWGe = 0.01 + 0.27AW-Gf + 0.56AP,Ge + 0.68ACY - N)Ge _ 0.44&Uff R2 . 0.85
(0.07) (0.13) (0.18) (0.20) (0.34) SE =  0.13
-O.O6Wff + 0.13(Y - N)21 + 0.06 DUM70 t( ) = 0.07
(0.04) (0.10) (0.01)
Fmnce.
Awk= 3.00 + 0.36AWS + 0.86 APr + 0.28A(Y - Nyr _ 0.4OAUS 722 0.95
(1.25) (0.10) (0.11) (0.28) (0.44) SE 0.08
-0.23WS + 0.21Pr, + 0.23(Y - N)5 t(i ) -1.21
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Denmark:
AWDn = 1.77 + 0.4Odier + 0.81&,pcon   0.44ACY - N)Dn 72 = 0.85
(0.70) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.37) SE =  0.17
-0.34Wff + 0.33·PID-; + 0.43(Y - N)9; - 0.37Ufr Un   =   -0.14
(0.13) (0.12) (0.20) (0.26)
United Kingdom:
AWUk = 4.23 + 1.03AP,uk + 0.57a(Y - N)Uk - 0·88Zl(Y - N)ut 72'   =   0.95
(0.82) (0.06) (0.17) (0.15) SE =  0.10
-0.75Wfik + 0.73PYJ + 0.96(Y - N)Et - 0.32Uft t(f) = -0.11
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17)
Ireland:
AWI' = 0.03 + 0.05AWIi + 0.858/'f' + 0.3911(Y - N)'p - 0.20AUPI R2 . 0.78
(0.02) (0.19) (0.17) (0.25) (0.42) SE =  0.63
t(b) = 0.91
Italy:
Awn = -O.45 + 1.04AP:' - 0.4011,11 + 0.37/Vl, + O.46(Y - N)91 72 = O.89
(0.17) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) SE =  0.27
1(b) = -0.70
Netherlands.
AWNE = 0.81 + 0.24AW-N  + 0.828PN' + 0.44A(Y - N)m 2 = 0.93
(0.52) (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) SE =  0.15
-0.26Wft' + 0.16PZ', + 0.45(Y - N)51- 0.2OUN KA  =  -1.14
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.16)
USA:
AWU' = 0·16 + 0.48APS' + 0.48app, + O.18A(Y - N)u, _ 0.368Uu,     R'   =   0.88
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) SE =   0.04
-0.02WY; + 0.05(Y - N) 1 - 0.06Uff #A   =  -1.39
(0.01) (0.05) (0.15)
Japan:
AW'° = 2.30 + 0.268Wli + 0.89&,Pfa + 0.58A(Y - N)'a                            722            0.95
(0.70) (0.08) (0.15) (0.17) SE 0.16
-0.18Wff + 0.12PD, + 0.25(Y - N)il t( ) -0.35
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03)
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Table 4.10: Estimation results of the long term interest rates'
Belgium:
ARLB• =  0.014 - 0.47RLat + 0.34RSff + 0.31ARSB• + 0.29ARLFr + 0.02581'/2 722 0.84
(0.005) (0.15) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.032) SE 0.17
t(ti) -0.00
Gennany.
ARLGe .  0.028 - 0.71RLGf + 0.3712,951 - 0.21ARLfi + 0.24ARSGe + 0.14ARLE" R' 0.90
(0.005) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) SE 0.08
+0.268RL'a + 0.0838Pf' t(#) = 0.09
(0.08) (0.054)
A·unce:
SRI,F, = 0.005 - 0.32RLCT + 0.27RSS + O.338RSFr + 0.47ARLU' + 0·0568prr 72 = 0.82
(0.003) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.14) (0.039) SE 0.25
1( ) -1.06
Denmark:
ARLDn =  -0.007 - 0.60RLD; + 0.54RSfr + O.63ARSDn + 0.3894/,Dn                         Ry            0.85
(0.005) (0.13) (0.15) (0.07) (0.070) SE 0.61
t(R -1.06
United Kingdom:
ARLUB .  0.010 - 0.31RLut + O.15RSuik + 0.28ARSUk + 0.24ARLGe + 0.2OARLF,      722     =    0.74
(0.005) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07) (0.22) (0.15) SE 0.37
to.095Ap(uk t(b) = -0.85
(0.040)
Ireland:
ARL'r =  0.003 - 0.32RLft + 0.23RSL  + 0.23ARS'r + 0.548RLuk + 0.114Apt,r 722 0.71
(0.005) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.039) SE 0.56
1(R -1.78
Italy:
ARL't -  0.010 - 0.46RLOi + 0.38RSI't + 0.38ARLOI + O.37ARS/t + 0.28ARLGe *2 = 0.81
(0.004) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.21) SE = 0.46
+0.228RLFr 1( ) -0.40
(0.18)
Netherlands:
ARLN' -  0.007 - 0.27RLYI + 0.2ORSN + 0.19ARSN'to.23ARLGe + 0.15ARLFr       722     =    0.92
(0.002) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) SE = 0.07
+0.15ARLUk + 0.023Ae'l t(b) = 0.32
(0.08) (0.021)
USA:
ARLU• =  0.005 - 0.51RL  to.5ORS51 - 0.2OARLE; + 0.39ARSu• + 0.013Ae, 72' 0.80
(0.003) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.005) SE =   0.19
t( i) -2.08
Japan:
ARL'a -  0.012 - 0.35RLil + 0.14RS  to.19ARS'a + 0.29ARLGe + 0.067APe, 72 0.48
(0.008) (0.13) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.037) SE = 0.30
1(b) -0.87
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We included a shock-dummy DUM70 for Germany, which is one in 1970 and zero elsewhere
(for an explanation of this dummy we refer to Appendix B.1). Except for Ireland, where the
long-run relationship did not prove to be significant, most level variables are included in the
equations.  In the cases of Germany, France, Italy and Japan we could not find any evidence
of a significant negative impact of the unemployment level. The consumer price level did not
have any influence in Germany and the USA. The change in labour productivity proved to
be an important factor for explaining wages in all countries, except for Italy and to a lesser
extent the USA. For seven countries the estimation results of the coefficient of a(Y- N)
range from 0.28 till 0.68. Notice, that in the United Kingdom we found a very strong
negative impact of a lagged change of labour productivity. Significant effects of lagged
growth in wages are observed in all countries except for the United Kingdom, Italy and
the  USA. The short-run multipliers of consumer price inflation range  from  0.48  to  1.04,
which is usually considered as satisfactory (see, e.g., Brunia [11] or the Quest model [10]).
The absolutu value of the error-correction parameter is high for the United Kingdom
indicating a low speed of adjustment to its long term-path. Unemployment persistence
effects, reflecting the vulnerability of wages to hysteresis, seems only to be present for a
small number of countries. Remark, that for those equations which contain a significant
effect of a change in unemployment, the effect is one period lagged. Only for the USA we
find a current (negative) effect for the growth of unemployment.
4.3.6  The long term interest rate
Specifications for the long term interest rates in the various countries appeared to be a
difficult task. It is clear that during the sample period and the very short term behaviour
of the interest rates there were a lot of institutional changes which made it hard to find
a good general equation for the whole sample period. Furthermore, the data concerning
the short term interest rate were not very reliable during the sixties. For some countries
we had to rely on the discount rate as can be seen in appendix B.1. Especially the impact
of the short term interest rate in this equation is important since the short term interest
rate is a policy variable in our model. Viewing these problems we, finally, adopted a very
simple approach. As in the Quest model [5] and Brunia [11] we included RL and RS as
level variables in our equation. Furthermore, we added growth variables of the long term
interest rate of relevant foreign countries, as specified in table 4.4.  In this way we are sure
of the direct international monetary linkages. Furthermore, to ensure the linkage between
the real part and the monetary part of the model, consumer price inflation and (in first
instance) the growth of the budget deficit were included in the estimation process. This
last term did not improve the explanatory power of the equation. Hence, we decided to
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exclude this term from the general equation. The general equation is specified as follows:
ARLe= ao + aiRL,-1 + aiRS:-1 + a,A'Pc, +
a48RL,-1 + asARS, + aBARSe-1 + a7(APc, - APc,-1 )
biARL;1 + ... + bkARL;k
The estimation results can be found in table 4.10. In all the equations the sign of al is, as
expected, negative and smaller than one in absolute value, indicating a stable relationship
for the ECM-mechanism. For the sample period we found some strong effects concerning
the direct linkages. The long term interest rate of the USA seems to be important for
Germany and France, whereas all the other European Union countries, except Denmark
and Ireland, are linked with Germany and/or France.  In the equation of Germany we found
a strong impact of the long term interest rate of Japan. Remarkable is that in the case
of the Netherlands, we found three significant linkage effects: with Germany, France and
the United Kingdom. The consumer price inflation was significant in all countries, except
for Italy. The change in consumer price inflation did not yield a significant effect in any
country. Remark that for the USA and Japan we included lagged consumer price inflation
into the equation. This yielded better results than current consumer price inflation.
4.4 The historical tracking performance of the model
In the previous section we focused on reducing errors in single equations. In this section
we will investigate the performance of each equation in the complete model. In order to
assess the adequacy and validity of the model we present the historical simulation results
in this section. To show the performance of the model over the sample period considered,
we will perform static and dynamic simulations (see, e.g., Fisher and Wallis [301). For the
static simulation we present for each individual equation the MAE (mean absolute error),




the RMSE (root mean square error), which is defined as
t=T
RMSE:=   1/TE(pt - ot)2
 =1
and the Theil inequality coefficient, which is defined as
Theil:=
*Efircp  - 0 )2
v/E:zI(o: - o:-1 )2
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where Pt is the predicted outcome in the static simulation process and Ot is the ob-
served/actual value   for the variable in question   at   time  1,   with t ranging   from   1963   to
1991.  For the dynamic simulation we will just present the Theil inequality coeflicients for
each individual equation. As argued in Fisher and Wallis [30] static simulation is most
appropriate for analysing the historical tracking performance. However, it is our experi-
ence that, in practice, dynamic simulation (where residuals accumulate over time) quicker
traces certain misspecifications in the model than static simulation. Dynamic simulation
also shows some interesting dynamic properties of the model, such as robustness.
In table 4.11, the absolute mean of the sample, indicated by  XI, is compared to the mean
absolute error of the static simulation results. Although any classification of the mean ab-
solute errors is arbitrary, Brunia [11] proposes the following standard for the classification
of the mean absolute errors. He divides the range of possible values in three sub-ranges.
Values less than 0.02 are classified as satisfactory, values larger than 0.04 as poor and
values in between as less satisfactory. According to this classification almost all our val-
ues are considered satisfactory, except the values for growth in wages and values for GDP
inflation for Ireland and Japan and the value for consumer price inflation in Japan. Fur-
thermore, we included the RMSE, the root mean square error, in table 4.11. Considering
the fact that the model contains only four exogenous variables per country (labour force,
government expenditure, the short term interest rate and the exchange rate) the errors
are within range. Comparing these figures with the models for the United Kingdom in
Fisher and Wallis [30], we see that these figures have the same order of magnitude 6. The
figures should  be used to identify the source of particular difficulties in the model.   As
the statistics indicate, Ireland, Italy and Japan have higher MAE's and RMSE's than the
other countries in the model. This was, however, already implied by our single equation
estimates, where some equations of these countries  had  a low  R2.
In table 4.12, we present the Theil inequality coefficients. Our static simulation can be
compared with a one-step ahead forecast and our dynamic simulation with a one-step
ahead forecast for the year 1963, a two-step ahead forecast for the year 1964,..., till a
29-step ahead forecast for the year 1991. If the Theil inequality coefficient is higher than
one, the model predicts worse than the so-called naive prediction. This prediction is the
prediction of no change.  In our Static simulation practically all figures are smaller than
one. Some values for GDP inflation, growth in wages and the growth in unemployment
rate are slightly smaller than one. Only the Theil inequality coefficient of the growth of
the unemployment rate in Japan is considerably higher than one. The fact that in Japan
the unemployment rate figures are remarkably stable during the sample period explains
eOne should, however, be very careful in comparing these figures among models. There are many
differences among models, such as size, sample, exogenous variables, endogenous variables and so on.
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Table 4.11: Static simulation results
Output growth Growth in Wages
IXI MAE RMSE   IXI MAE RMSE
0.034 0.010 0.014 Belgium 0.081 0.011 0.014
0.032 0.010 0.012 Germany 0.066 0.011 0.014
0.030 0.008 0.010 France 0.095 0.016 0.019
0.036 0.010 0.012 Denmark 0.091 0.013 0.015
0.028 0.011 0.014 U.K. 0.100 0.015 0.018
0.041 0.012 0.015 Ireland 0.117 0.024 0.030
0.039 0.013 0.016 Italy 0.127 0.018 0.024
0.034 0.011 0.013 Netherlands 0.075 0.017 0.020
0.032 0.011 0.013 USA 0.057 0.007 0.009
0.061 0.012 0.016 Japan 0.080 0.020 0.026
GDP inflation Growth employment
IXI MAE RMSE            IXI MAE RMSE
0.048 0.009 0.012 Belgium 0.008 0.006 0.008
0.039 0.006 0.008 Germany 0.011 0.006 0.008
0.065 0.011 0.014 France 0.006 0.003 0.004
0.070 0.008 0.010 Denmark 0.012 0.006 0.008
0.077 0.011 0.013 U.K. 0.012 0.006 0.007
0.082 0.021 0.026 Ireland 0.010 0.006 0.008
0.094 0.016 0.021 Italy 0.008 0.005 0.007
0.048 0.011 0.013 Netherlands 0.011 0.005 0.006
0.049 0.007 0.009 USA 0.020 0.007 0.009
0.047 0.024 0.028 Japan 0.012 0.005 0.005
Consumer price inflation Long term interest rate
IXI MAE RMSE            IXI MAE RMSE
0.047 0.010 0.012 Belgium 0.084 0.003 0.004
0.035 0.005 0.006 Germany 0.075 0.002 0.003
0.064 0.013 0.016 France 0.095 0.004 0.005
0.068 0.010 0.013 Denmark 0.119 0.007 0.009
0.074 0.012 0.013 U.K. 0.098 0.004 0.005
0.081 0.015 0.019 Ireland 0.106 0.006 0.008
0.089 0.017 0.022 Italy 0.103 0.005 0.006
0.046 0.012 0.015 Netherlands 0.074 0.002 0.003
0.048 0.008 0.011 USA 0.083 0.003 0.004
0.051 0.021 0.025 Japan 0.073 0.004 0.005
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Table 4.12: Theil inequality coefficients
AY LJPY A Pc AW
static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic
Belgium 0.53 0.79 0.69 1.31 0.60 1.31 0.72 1.67
Germany 0.50 0.77 0.62 0.89 0.55 0.98 0.61 0.78
France 0.37 0.48 1.03 2.52 0.87 1.84 1.05 2.39
Denmark 0.76 1.13 0.58 1.46 0.76 1.57 0.77 1.93
U.K. 0.57 0.82 0.36 0.77 0.44 0.92 0.45 0.87
Ireland 0.54 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.87 0.83 0.77
Italy 0.58 0.67 0.79 1.46 0.83 1
.43 0.67 1.20
Netherlands 0.60 0.81 0.77 1.31 0.72 1.20 0.84 1.26
USA 0.52 0.74 0.74 1.41 0.80 1.44 0.78 1.60
Japan 0.58 0.60 1.01 1.34 0.86 1.30 1.00 1.53
RL ARL AN AU
static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic
Belgium 0.40 0.45 0.34 0.44 0.77 1.12 1.01 1.47
Germany 0.31 0.37 0.24 0.41 0.59 1.01 1.03 1.76
France 0.41 0.70 0.34 0.47 0.49 0.70 0.65 0.92
Denmark 0.43 0.81 0.29 0.41 0.47 1.01 0.63 1.13
U.K. 0.42 0.71 0.33 0.33 0.48 0.86 0.66 1.40
Ireland 0.56 0.76 0.41 0.41 0.51 0.65 0.54 0.70
Italy 0.39 0.56 0.37 0.37 0.52 0.70 0.87 1.16
Netherlands 0.30 0.47 0.24 0.24 0.65 1.26 0.68 1.31
USA 0.40 0.52 0.35 0.35 0.55 0.76 0.67 0.93
Japan 0.68 0.95 0.51 0.51 0.62 0.61 2.53 2.47
most of the difficulties. In our dynamic simulations, most figures of inflation and wages
are above one, but most figures of output growth, long term interest rate and growth of
employment  are  all  less  than  one.   This  is, of course, not remarkable because in dynamic
simulation errors accumulate. On average, the Theil inequality coefficients of the dynamic
simulation results are less than twice the Theil inequality coefficients for the static simu-
lation exercise.  If we look at the Theil inequality coefficients as published in Fisher and
Wallis [30], we see that for most U.K. models in the static simulation many coefficients are
above one. Therefore, the overall impression from the shown statistics is that the model is
capable of reproducing the most important developments during the sample period.
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4.5 Shock analysis
To show the dynamic properties of the model we applied several shocks to the model.
The shocks are similar to the shocks Whitley [83] applies to several large multi-country
models. The first five shocks applied to our model will be compared with the outcomes
Whitley obtains in his analysis. The models considered in Whitley [83] are the EU's
model (QUEST) as operated by the Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW);
the model of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and jointly operated
with the London Business School (GEM); the model used by OFCE/CEPII (MIMOSA);
the Oxford Economic Forecasting model (OEF); and the OECD's Interlink model (OECD).
These models are much larger iii size than our small multi-country model. Beforehand,
we can already stress that the striking difference with our model and the large multi-
country models is the representation of the aggregate demand equation, which in our
model equals aggregate supply. The fact that GDP in our model is expressed by only
one estimated equation, instead of separately modelled sub-categories like consumption,
investment, exports and imports, explains most of the differences. However, in order to
check the qualitative properties of the model, we compare the obtained results with the
outcomes of these models. Whitley's analysis [83] compares the four major European
economies, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. We will present his findings
together, with the findings of our model.
4.5.1 Single country shocks
First, we give an impression of some country-specific developments. We analyse the effects
of a permanent shock originating in a domestic country on the domestic variables of that
country. In the case of a linear model, the outcomes of applying a certain shock are base
independent. Therefore, it does not matter in which year the shock is applied. We used
for each shock the year 1963 as the starting point. Now, for each country separately, we
consider the following four shocks:
(1) Fiscal shock: a 1% of GDP shock to government expenditure.
Expenditure is raised by 1% of GDP of its base value in the years 1963-1991. The simulation
is carried out with fixed real interest rates. The real interest rate in our model is fixed as
follows:  a new variable is introduced which replaces the term (RLt-1 - APy,)  in the GDP
equation. This new variable keeps his historical value throughout the simulation exercise.
(2) Wage shock: a 1% wage shock.
The wage variable is made exogenous, which is performed by skipping the wage equation
in each country model. This exogenous wage variable is raised then by one percent of its
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base value throughout the period 1963-1991. Real interest rates  are kept fixed  and  wage
costs are held constant in all other countries.
(3) Monetary shock: a 1% nominal short-term interest rate shock.
The nominal short-term interest rate is raised by 1% point, throughout the period 1963-
1991.
(4)  Exchange rate shock: the dollar exchange  rate is reduced  by 10% below  base, in every
year  of the period 1963-1991,   for each country separately. Nominal interest rates   are
kept fixed. In our model several exchange rates between countries are modelled with the
USA as linking country. For instance, the exchange rate between Germany and Belgium
is modelled as Ec;*Be   =   EG,U' EU,Be (EG,Be , the exchange rate between Germany and
Belgium, is defined as the amount of German Deutschmark for one Belgian Franc). In our
experiment a 10% fall of the effective exchange rate was simulated by raising EG,U.  by
11.11%; hence, by depreciating the US Dollar vis-A-vis the Deutschmark .
The simulation experiments in Whitley [83]are conducted on a forecast base of each model
over a 6-year time horizon. The figures presented in his study  are of year 1, year  3,  year
5 and year 6.  For each simulation experiment, Whitley [83] presents the corresponding
change in output and GDP-price. Remark that, for some experiments, the figures in year
6 can be considered as long-run values. This is probably the case if the differences between
the figures in years 5 and 6 are small. For comparative reasons we will present the figures
for our model for the same years.
(1) Single-country fiscal shocks.
The results are shown in table 4.13. First, the four countries: Germany, France, Italy and
the United Kingdom are presented, as listed in Whitley's paper [83]. The outcomes of our
model are presented under the heading SLIM. At the end of table 4.13 we have listed the
simulated figures for the other countries of our model. In our model, expanding G raises
aggregate demand/output. This rise in output will raise prices, wages and employment.
In most countries, the long term interest rate depends on the consumer price inflation
which implies that the long term interest rate also increases for those countries (tightening
monetary policy).
There is one important major difference between the simulation exercise of the existing
multi-country models and our model. In our model we estimated the effect of the impact
of government expenditure on output, whereas in the multi-country models this effect is
simulated by raising the government expenditure component as part of the GDP identity
equation.  As a result, our model shows much more differentiation between the output
responses of the various countries than the output responses of the large scale models in
Whitley  [83].
In all simulations output increases and almost all figures show in year 6 an effect which
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is higher than 0.3. Exceptions are the OECD model of Germany, the GEM model in the
United Kingdom and Ireland in the SLIM model.  In our model the effect of a 1% increase
of government expenditure is highest in the three major economies, Germany, USA and
Japan. Weak responses are found for France, the United Kingdom and Italy. A negative
effect in year 5 and 6 is found for Ireland. This effect is easy to explain if we go back
to the estimation result of this equation.  It is the only country where we could not find
any evidence of a positive effect of the level variable G. This aspect clarifies that there is,
even, an undershooting effect of the baseline in year 5 and year 6. Simulation shows that
in the long-run this effect will peter out and become zero for GDP in Ireland. A possible
'explanation' for this result might be that the Irish economy has done relatively well in the
second half of the eighties in spite of considerable fiscal consolidation.  The zero effect in
year 1 of GDP in Denmark and Japan is explained by the fact that we could not find a
significant effect of AG in our estimated equation. In all countries, except Ireland, output
will be raised permanently, because the level variable G occurs in the GDP-equation.
The development of prices looks adequately and, more or less, coincides with the findings
of the large models.  If we compare for each country the ratio of GDP-price response and
GDP-response we find in our model relatively high figures for Italy and France.
(2) Single-country wage shocks.
In table 4.14 the results of this wage shock are presented. The only way by which wages
influence output in the GDP-equation is the term of the real exchange rate. The outcome
of this simulation exercise gives an indication of the effect of this variable on output for
each country. In the large multi-country models there are many more ways by which wages
affect output (i.e., wealth effects, consumption effects). The large models find, on average,
somewhat stronger quantitative effects than our model. Qualitatively, the effect of a rise in
wages on output is the same. We could not find any effects for Denmark, USA and Japan.
This is due to the fact that in our estimations there was no evidence of any significant
effect for the real exchange rate variable.
The effect of wages on prices is much stronger than the effect of wages on output.  The
results of our model coincide with the findings of the large models. The small change in
the price level between years 5 and 6 indicates that the price-level effects have settled down
sufficiently after year 6. This observation makes it possible to interpret the values of the
price level in year 6 as long-run responses. Our model finds strong long-run responses for
USA and Italy and low responses for Belgium and Japan.
(3) Single-country monetary shocks.
The results of this experiment are shown in table 4.15.  If we look at our estimation results,
we see that a rise in the nominal short term interest rate directly affects output in the
United Kingdom, Ireland and the USA. In the other countries the influence of short term
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Table 4.13: Fiscal shock-single country simulations. An increase of government expenditure
by 1% of GDP, with fixed real interest rates (percentage difference from base)
GDP GDP Prices
year 1   year 3  year 5  year 6 year 1  year 3  year 5 year 6
Germany
DIW/QUEST 1.61 0.83 0.63 0.75 0.03 1.17 1.83 1.98
GEM 0.87 0.62 0.57 0.56 0.06 0.35 0.52 0.58
OECD 0.60 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.55 1.37 2.00 2.17
OEF 0.77 0.80 0.77 0.72 0.34 0.92 1.06 1.07
MIMOSA 1.07 0.90 0.66 0.61 0.14 0.90 1.60 1.92
SLIM 1.82 1.44 1.36 1.43 -0.01 0.83 1.21 1.35
France
DIW/QUEST 1.50 1.74 1.48 1.40 -0.55 -0.58 -0.12 0.05
GEM 0.58 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.14 0.32 0.54 0.63
OECD 0.50 0.87 0.82 0.71 0.19 0.68 1.29 1.59
OEF 0.98 1.02 0.96 0.89 -0.24 0.25 0.86 1.20
MIMOSA 1.04 1.13 1.10 1.09 -0.13 -0.20 -0.02 0.14
SLIM 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.08 0.33 0.65 0.77
Italy
DIW/QUEST 1.20 1.11 0.86 0.85 -0.10 1.48 2.74 3.12
GEM 0.48 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.06 0.30 0.50 0.60
OECD 0.73 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.30 0.89 1.10 1.12
OEF 1.17 0.97 0.75 0.67 0.47 1.70 2.26 2.42
MIMOSA 1.07 1.41 1.34 1.28 0.03 0.39 1.49 2.22
SLIM 0.21 0.47 0.65 0.71 0.10 0.73 1.67 2.18
United Kingdom
DIW/QUEST 1.41 1.17 1.03 1.17 -0.08 1.03 1.58 1.61
GEM 0.50 0.34 0.27 0.29 0.09 0.68 0.89 0.88
OECD 0.55 0.73 0.47 0.45 0.16 1.04 1.94 2.21
OEF 0.98 1.50 1.24 1.18 0.29 1.72 3.01 3.10
MIMOSA 0.79 0.73 0.57 0.46 0.28 0.84 1.30 1.48
SLIM 0.18 0.29 0.31 0.31 -0.10 0.09 0.30 0.38
other countries in SLIM
Belgium 1.10 1.05 1.02 1.00 0.12 1.10 1.65 1.82
Denmark 0.00 0.77 1.02 1.03 0.00 0.02 0.78 1.35
Ireland 0.71 0.05 -0.21 -0.07 -0.22 -0.05 0.14 0.11
Netherlands 1.13 0.96 0.87 0.86 0.00 0.61 1.06 1.24
USA 1.23 1.89 1.35 1.27 0.00 0.51 1.13 1.38
Japan 0.00 0.94 1.59 1.88 0.00 0.35 1.13 1.51
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Table  4.14: Wage shock-single country simulations. Shock  of  1 %  to wage compensation,
with fixed real interest rates (percentage difference from base)
GDP GDP Prices
year 1   year 3   year 5   year 6 year 1   year 3  year 5  year 6
Germany
DIW/QUEST -0.13 -0.34 -0.23 -0.28 0.53 1.26 1.20 1.22
GEM 0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.12 0.10 0.35 0.47 0.51
OECD -0.50 -0.05 -0.30 -0.12 0.60 0.78 0.75 0.73
OEF 0.09 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.60 0.70 0.69 0.70
MIMOSA -0.12 -0.18 -0.12 -0.11 0.42 0.68 0.77 0.80
SLIM 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.45 0.63 0.67 0.68
France
DIW/QUEST -0.28 -0.19 -0.13 -0.13 0.83 0.98 0.99 1.01
GEM -0.11 -0.22 -0.17 -0.15 0.56 0.88 0.89 0.89
OECD -0.25 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.69 0.89 0.89 0.88
OEF -0.03 -0.13 -0.16 -0.17 0.47 0.73 0.79 0.81
MIMOSA 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.39 0.55 0.61 0.63
SLIM -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 0.57 0.83 0.85 0.86
Italy
DIW/QUEST -0.15 -0.18 -0.14 -0.15 0.86 1.00 0.97 0.98
GEM 0.00 -0.16 -0.29 -0.33 0.07 0.43 0.63 0.69
OECD -0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 0.70 0.62 0.55 0.52
OEF 0.03 -0.20 -0.24 -0.25 0.50 0.72 0.75 0.77
MIMOSA -0.04 -0.17 -0.14 -0.12 0.53 0.91 0.99 0.99
SLIM -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.54 0.86 0.93 0.94
United Kingdom
DIW/QUEST -0.46 -0.53 -0.08 0.05 0.86 1.25 1.15 1.09
GEM -0.01 -0.25 -0.20 -0.08 0.09 0.69 0.86 0.89
OECD -0.12 -0.17 -0.08 -0.09 0.65 0.83 0.83 0.82
OEF 0.11 0.11 -0.03 -0.06 0.36 0.94 0.88 0.86
MIMOSA -0.04 -0.19 -0.26 -0.29 0.66 0.90 0.94 0.93
SLIM 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.22 0.53 0.66
other countries in SLIM
Belgium -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.28 0.44 0.48 0.50
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.65 0.73 0.75
Ireland -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.71 0.91 0.87 0.86
Netherlands -0.18 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.66
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 1.08 1.20
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.51 0.47 0.47
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nominal interest rates on output is indirect. A rise in the nominal short interest rates
raises the long term interest rate and this affects output. In our model, as in most large
multi-country models, a rise in the nominal short term interest rates lowers output. If we
look at the responses on output we find, with the exception of France in year 6, figures
which are between zero and minus one. The differences between the countries are modest
and certainly not as large as in the government expenditure experiment. We find no effect
at all for Japan, because interest rates were not included in the GDP-equation for Japan.
In general the effect on prices is ambiguous in the first three years and negative in year five
and six. An outlier is (again) Ireland which has a positive price development. The reason
for this can be found in the GDP inflation equation for Ireland where we found a very strong
negative effect of the change in output minus output trend. The United Kingdom starts
initially with an overshooting effect, but in the long-run the effects on prices are negative.
The positive efTect in the short run can be traced back to the wage equation where we found
a strong negative effect of a change iii lagged labour productivity. Note, that in most cases
the values in year 6 cannot be interpreted as long-run values, because most effects have
not settled down after year 6. Remark, that also for the large multi-country models there
is no clear evidence that a rise in the nominal interest rate should lower prices. For all the
four major EU-economies, there is at least one model which predicts a rise in prices.
(4) Single-country exchange rate shocks.
The results of this simulation are shown in table 4.16. Through various channels, such as
the GDP equation, the price equations (domestic consumer prices and GDP prices) and
the employment equation, the exchange rate influences all the variables in our model. This
experiment therefore gives an idea of the impact of these variables in our model. The
output response for Germany and Denmark is low. We find strong effects for France and
the Netherlands. Qualitatively, the output responses are more or less comparable to the
large models (except for Germany).
The price responses between the countries in the model are quite different.  For the countries
France, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands we find strong price responses. Full
homogeneity of prices in the medium term is present in the countries France, Italy and
Ireland. For the large countries Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan we found very
small price responses contrary to the large multi-country models in the literature. There
are several reasons for these small responses. First of all, we must stress that the exchange
rate in our model appears only in differences, so that in the long-run there is a tendendency
that effects will return back to the baseline. Secondly, in some aggregate demand equations
we found only limited real exchange rate effects. Remark, however, that also for the multi-
country models, full homogeneity is present in only a small number of the country models.
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Table 4.15: Monetary shock single country simulations. Shock  of  1 %  rise  in the nominal
short term interest rate for 6 years (percentage difference from base)
GDP GDP Prices
year 1   year 3   year 5   year 6 year 1   year 3  year 5  year 6
Germany
DIW/QUEST -0.18 -0.92 -0.55 0.36 0.00 -0.19 -0.76 -0.93
GEM -0.24 -0.99 -1.37 -1.50 -0.01 -0.25 -0.65 -1.22
OECD -0.50 -0.42 -0.64 -0.53 -0.32 -1.59 -1.87 -1.83
OEF -0.28 -0.50 -0.64 -0.71 -0.08 -0.32 -0.05 0.16
MIMOSA -0.38 -0.71 -0.68 -0.65 0.07 0.18 0.36 0.51
SLIM 0.00 -0.44 -0.50 -0.48 0.00 -0.07 -0.27 -0.35
France
DIW/QUEST -0.19 -0.50 -0.52 -0.53 0.06 0.20 0.16 0.14
GEM -0.09 -0.36 -0.52 -0.58 -0.02 -0.14 -0.30 -0.40
OECD -0.31 -0.47 -0.58 -0.61 -0.04 -0.13 -0.12 -0.07
OEF -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07
MIMOSA -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 0.12 0.24 0.28 0.27
SLIM 0.00 -0.36 -0.81 -1.03 0.00 -0.11 -0.52 -0.88
Italy
DIW/QUEST -0.08 -0.29 -0.10 -0.12 0.00 -0.15 -0.44 -0.49
GEM -0.07 -0.54 -0.88 -0.99 0.00 -0.15 -0.46 -0.65
OECD -0.07 -0.48 -0.62 -0.73 0.06 0.08 0.17 0.23
OEF -0.12 -0.52 -0.66 -0.74 -0.02 -0.50 -0.67 -0.53
MIMOSA 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.07 0.56 1.30 1.70
SLIM 0.00 -0.20 -0.36 -0.23 0.00 -0.35 -1.04 -1.24
United Kingdom
DIW/QUEST -0.07 -0.41 -0.29 -0.25 0.00 -0.07 -0.37 -0.42
GEM -0.20 -0.77 -0.89 -0.87 -0.02 -0.60 -1.60 -2.00
OECD -0.20 -0.61 -0.56 -0.57 -0.05 -0.52 -0.84 -0.70
OEF -0.26 -1.17 -1.42 -1.36 -0.01 -0.34 -1.28 -1.69
MIMOSA -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 0.07 0.33 0.64 0.78
SLIM 0.00 -0.43 -0.53 -0.55 0.00 0.06 -0.31 -0.49
other countries in SLIM
Belgium 0.00 -0.25 -0.60 -0.73 0.00 -0.07 -0.41 -0.65
Denmark 0.00 -0.15 -0.24 -0.26 0.00 0.00 -0.15 -0.27
Ireland 0.00 -0.53 -0.65 -0.60 0.00 0.18 0.25 0.20
Netherlands 0.00 -0.10 -0.33 -0.45 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.18
USA 0.00 -0.99 -0.62 -0.46 0.00 -0.12 -0.44 -0.55
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 4.16: Exchange rate shock single country simulations. A 10% fall in the nominal
exchange rate, with fixed real interest rates (percentage difference from base)
GDP GDP Prices
year 1   year 3  year 5  year 6 year 1   year 3  year 5  year 6
Germany
DIW/QUEST 2.98 3.55 1.42 0.26 -0.23 5.12 9.93 11.23
GEM 1.56 1.45 1.15 1.01 -0.04 2.06 3.68 4.31
OECD 0.98 1.16 0.25 0.12 1.71 8.59 12.95 13.48
OEF 1.30 1.24 1.01 0.89 0.01 2.71 3.14 3.27
MIMOSA 1.62 2.53 1.99 1.62 -0.38 1.82 3.87 4.69
SLIM -0.37 0.10 -0.09 -0.12 0.27 0.64 0.53 0.38
France
DIW/QUEST 1.04 0.37 0.70 0.83 1.19 3.75 2.66 2.11
GEM 0.47 0.35 0.24 0.20 0.49 3.71 5.50 6.06
OECD -0.01 0.96 1.39 1.34 1.06 5.51 7.18 7.55
OEF 0.17 0.60 0.10 -0.07 0.79 4.39 6.72 7.53
MIMOSA 0.69 0.59 0.46 0.43 0.98 3.16 4.62 5.24
SLIM 2.52 2.35 2.16 2.08 1.23 4.81 8.30 9.51
Italy
DIW/QUEST 1.20 0.57 -0.30 -0.66 -0.10 6.54 9.50 9.94
GEM 1.78 1.74 1.69 1.59 1.01 3.19 4.89 5.68
OECD 0.39 0.10 0.08 0.37 2.74 9.52 8.45 7.45
OEF 0.53 1.32 0.02 -0.52 0.64 5.73 9.60 10.60
MIMOSA 1.52 1.12 0.75 0.57 -0.29 1.95 3.79 4.68
SLIM 2.11 0.86 -0.36 -0.58 3.11 9.11 10.72 10.22
United Kingdom
DIW/QUEST 1.34 0.06 -0.66 -0.68 1.41 6.67 9.60 10.27
GEM 0.80 0.63 -0.07 -0.11 0.66 8.42 11.58 11.63
OECD 0.30 1.60 1.00 0.62 1.36 5.08 8.11 8.78
OEF 0.40 0.81 0.82 0.51 -0.07 4.97 8.07 8.90
MIMOSA 0.28 1.37 1.25 1.04 0.57 3.00 4.76 5.54
SLIM 0.49 0.37 0.23 0.17 -0.28 0.46 0.92 1.04
other countries in SLIM
Belgium 1.62 1.28 1.06 0.82 2.90 6.28 7.50 7.68
Denmark 0.03 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.26 2.17 3.08 3.20
Ireland 1.51 2.24 0.20 -0.27 3.11 11.32 13.21 13.27
Netherlands 2.57 2.33 1.71 1.32 1.47 7.56 7.55 7.22
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.42 0.05 -0.31
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We have now examined the two key variables in the model, output and prices for each
country separately. To see whether the effects of the other key endogenous variables,
such as wages, employment and the unemployment rate are similar as in the large multi-
country models, we adopted an approach as developed by Hickman  [43]. This approach  is
also adopted by Whitley [83, 84]. They suggest to decompose price-output responses (the
inverse of the aggregate supply elasticity) into various ratios of key endogenous variables:
APIAY = AP/AW · AWf AU · AU/AN · ANIAY
The ratios of the key endogenous variables can be specified as follows (where 8 denotes
percentage deviation from the base simulation):
AP/AY: the inverse of the aggregate supply elasticity.
Ap/AW: the ratio of prices to wages.
AWBU: demand effect on wages.
AU/AN: labour force participation.
AN/AY: movements in productivity.
One would expect that a positive sign of AP/AY is determined by a positive sign of
AP jAW and AN AY  and anegative sign of JU AN and AWlAU. We calculated these
figures, just as Whitley [83, 84] did, for our first experiment (a rise in government ex-
penditure). The results are presented for year 6 (as percentage deviation from the base
simulation) in table 4.17. These figures show that the contributions of most endogenous
variables are qualitatively within range and coincide with the figures as presented in Whit-
ley's paper. As stressed in Whitley [83,84] the figures should be treated with care, but, as
he claims, it can be useful in some cases to highlight particular differences in structure of
certain models. Most figures seem quite acceptable with some outliers. In Ireland APIAY
is negative and this can be traced back to the fact that in Ireland there is no level variable
of G, government expenditure, in the equation. As can be seen from table 4.5, AY was
negative which indicates an undershooting effect. This effect influenced all other ratios of
Ireland in the table 4.17. For the other nine countries, table 4.17 shows some interesting
properties.  If we look at the averages of year 6 and compare them with the averages of
Whitley [83], we see that our country models exhibit weaker inflationary effects from a
demand expansion, implying a flatter aggregate supply schedule in the medium term. In
the long-run the aggregate supply elasticity is lower and equals the elasticity as given by
Whitley [83]. Furthermore, a striking difference with the multi-country models  is the lower
ratio of movements in productivity, implying that an aggregate demand shock has only
limited power to raise employment. This is more in line with the history of the past 40
years, where productivity has gone up more or less steadily, and employment has shown
little trend (see Blanchard [6]). In our model, a shock of government expenditure affects
employment mainly in the short term. A major reason for this finding is that we did not
impose any restriction in the employment equation. Strongly related with the ratio of
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Table 4.17: Contributions to the aggregate supply elasticity: year 6
APfAW AW/JU AU/AN AN/AY AP/AY AS
Belgium 0.65 -12.1              -1 0.23 1.83 0.55
Denmark 0.52 -18.6            -1 0.14 1.31 0.76
Ireland 2.40 0.9               -1 0.42 -1.49 -0.67
Netherlands 0.60 -12.4             -1 0.19 1.44 0.69
USA 0.74 -2.0             -1 0.74 1.09 0.92
Japan 0.47 -24.6        -1 0.07 0.81 1
.24
Germany 0.62 -6.1             -1 0.25 0.95 1.06
France 0.74 -5.8         -1 0.54 2.30 0.43
Italy 0.90 -10.1              -1 0.34 3.05 0.33
United Kingdom 0.71 -2.1             -1 0.82 1.23 0.81
Average of year 6
°
0.66 -10.4            -1 0.37 1.56 0.75
Average of year 29
6 0.80 -14.1        -1 0.39 2.81 0.47
Average in [83] c 0.85 -5.09 -0.74 0.73 2.15 0.47
a. Results are subject to rounding. The contribution of Ireland is excluded from the av-
erage. Furthermore, all variables are measured as percentage diference from base (except
unemployment rate,  absolute diference from base).   The value for the aggregate supply elas-
ticity is indicated by AS and is dejined as 1 (APjAY).
b.  These are the averages (excluded Ireland) of year 29, which give a good indication of the
long-run properties of the model.
c.  These are the averages of year 6 as published by Whitley /83,841.
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movement in productivity is the high (negative) elasticity of the demand effect on wages.
Remark also that in the medium term (year 6) the ratio of prices to wages is lower than
the average published by Whitley [83]. In the long term (year 28) the elasticity is higher
which is an indication that most effects have not settled down after 6 years.
4.5.2 International linkages
An important aspect of the model is that it is capable to show various external effects when
there is a change of a domestic macroeconomic policy. In this section we will concentrate
on these spillover effects. One of our goals was to construct a model that contains strong
international linkages.  To show this aspect of the model, various shocks will be applied.  To
save space we restrict ourselves to five shocks. With these shocks we analyse the spillover
effects to other EU-countries from a single country's expansion.
The five shocks we apply are the following:
(1) Fiscal shock USA:
2% GDP shock to government expenditure, throughout, in the USA is applied to the model.
Real interest rates are kept fixed for all the countries.
(2) Fiscal shock Germany:
1% GDP shock to government expenditure, throughout, in Germany is applied. We anal-
yse the effects of most of the endogenous variables of the model. In order to compare
certain effects with the shock in (1) we keep the real interest rates fixed.
(3) Fiscal shock France:
2% GDP shock to government expenditure, throughout, in France is applied. Real interest
rates are kept fixed.
(4) Monetary shock in Germany:
2% short-term nominal interest rate shock in Germany. The nominal short-term interest
rate of Germany is raised 2% point, throughout the period 1963-1991.
(5) Exchange rate shock to the US dollar vis-A-vis all other currencies: A depreciation of
the US dollar, throughout, by 10% vis-6-vis all other currencies. This experiment is done
in the same way as explained in the single country experiments but now we depreciate
the US dollar against all currencies  at  once.   As  in the Whitley experiment  [83],  we  keep
nominal interest rates fixed. Since Whitley reports no explicit numbers of the last four
shocks, we will present these simulation results in figures 4.19-4.20.
(1) Fiscal shock USA.
In table 4.18 we show the results of a fiscal shock in the USA and compare them with the
outcomes of the large scale models. The effect of the USA on other economies in our model
corresponds (roughly) during the first three years with the findings in Whitley [83]. Again
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we have to stress that in each country foreign influences are modelled as differences (and
not in levels), so, in the long-run the effect on foreign output will return to its baseline.
This model property corresponds to the output figures for our model in years five and
six. Remarkable is that seven countries in our model show cyclical behaviour in the GDP
figures, which is due to the cyclical output response of the USA. In our model, the first
year effect of an increase m government expenditure in the USA on the foreign countries
lies between 0.12 % and 0.46 % of USA GDP-output. The United Kingdom profits most,
and Italy least.
The development of the prices is qualitatively also comparable with the outcomes of the
other models. On average, quantitatively, the price responses are weaker than predicted by
the other multi-country models. Most price responses are lower  than  1 %  in  year 6 which
is explained by the low output response in the medium term, which surpresses the price
development.
(2) Fiscal shock Germany.
Considering the size of the effect (first year GDP output of Germany is higher than first
year GDP output in the USA; see our previous experiment) we find various interesting
results. First of all the first graph in figure 4.19 shows that small open economies like
the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium, are heavily affected by a German expenditure
shock. If we again compare the effect in the first year we find that the effect of a German
expenditure shock on the foreign economies lies between 0.07 % and 0.53 % of German
GDP-output in the first year. Remark that also in this experiment there is some cyclical
behaviour in the medium term and long term. In the long-run, most effects peter out to a
very small (positive) value.
As the second graph in figure 4.19 shows, the development of prices is quite strong in
most EU-economies. Only the prices in the USA, Japan, U.K., and Ireland seem to be
less affected by the German government expenditure shock. Note also that most countries
which are affected by the shock have their highest price response around year four and
five. Note that the output response in Italy in the first graph iii figure 4.19 was rather low
whereas the price response in the second graph of figure 4.19 is relatively strong, which is
due to the interaction terms ap/:Ge in the two price equations of Italy.
(3) Fiscal shock France.
The third graph in figure 4.19 shows the results of a fiscal shock originating in France.
Again we find pretty large effects, in the short run, in all the other countries. If we again
compare the effect in the first year we find effects between 0.03 % and 0.87 % of French
GDP-output in the first year. Belgium and the Netherlands profit most from an output
shock in France.
Concerning the other endogenous variables, which are not presented here, we can note that
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Table 4.18: USA fiscal shock government spending. Permanent shock of 2% of GDP rise
in government expenditure, fixed real interest rates (percentage difference from base).
year 1   year 3  year 5   year 6 year 1   year 3  year 5   year 6
Germany GDP GDP Prices
DIW/QUEST 0.42 0.62 0.37 0.47 0.01 0.40 0.99 1.18
GEM 0.42 0.26 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.28 0.58 0.73
OECD 0.31 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.34 1.13 2.34 3.06
OEF 0.21 0.63 0.77 0.80 0.01 0.31 0.70 0.92
MIMOSA 1.12 0.74 0.76 1.06 0.06 0.92 1.57 1.98
SLIM 0.87 0.42 -0.20 -0.14 0.00 0.45 0.44 0.36
France
DIW/QUEST 0.27 0.61 0.44 0.47 -0.10 -0.13 0.22 0.30
GEM 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.35 0.69 0.85
OECD 0.14 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.11 0.54 1.30 1.83
OEF 0.08 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.05 0.40 0.77 0.97
MIMOSA 0.88 0.75 0.91 1.17 -0.12 0.18 0.79 1.28
SLIM 0.42 0.19 -0.20 -0.20 0.07 0.40 0.77 0.82
Italy
DIW/QUEST 0.26 0.54 0.40 0.40 -0.01 0.42 1.23 1.51
GEM 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.07 0.35 0.62 0.77
OECD 0.24 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.78 1.65 2.22
OEF 0.09 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.02 0.40 0.94 1.23
MIMOSA 0.69 0.74 0.79 1.00 -0.34 0.05 0.95 1.46
SLIM 0.28 0.21 -0.02 -0.02 0.14 0.80 1.09 1.08
United Kingdom
DIW/QUEST 0.23 0.32 0.10 0.21 -0.04 0.33 0.85 0.95
GEM 0.17 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.79 1.32 1.47
OECD 0.24 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.08 0.67 1.46 1.92
OEF 0.11 0.48 0.66 0.71 -0.02 0.43 1.15 1.43
MIMOSA 0.38 0.54 0.79 0.94 -0.10 0.13 0.79 1.27
SLIM 1.18 0.62 -0.23 -0.18 -0.67 0.95 1.25 0.85
USA
DIW/QUEST 4.07 2.38 2.34 2.51 0.05 2.59 4.10 5.00
GEM 1.62 1.23 1.03 0.98 0.52 1.72 2.62 2.98
OECD 1.80 1.20 1.07 0.90 0.83 2.84 5.25 6.40
OEF 2.83 3.55 3.20 3.00 0.01 0.63 1.56 1.92
MIMOSA 4.97 4.58 4.99 5.35 0.22 3.57 9.23 12.94
SLIM 2.43 3.76 2.68 2.52 0.00 1.01 2.23 2.74
other countries in SLIM
Belgium 0.54 -0.17 -0.31 -0.12 0.06 0.44 0.19 0.10
Denmark 0.73 -0.13 -0.41 -0.20 -0.15 0.53 0.80 0.61
Ireland 0.51 0.39 -0.40 -0.30 -0.24 0.24 1.00 0.89
Netherlands 0.60 -0.13 -0.40 -0.19 -0.02 0.52 0.57 0.45
Japan 0.37 0.09 -0.17 -0.12 0.06 0.34 0.23 0.09
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Figure 4.19: Three fiscal shock experiments
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Figure 4.20: Three monetary shock experiments
Output responses after an increase in the Gennan short term interest
rate.
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employment increases for all countries. Because labour force is exogenous the unemploy-
ment rate falls with the same amount. We do not observe many movements in the long
term interest rates.
(4) Short term interest rate shock Germany.
Note, that in this experiment we do not have fixed real interest rates; so we have an addi-
tional feedback transmission mechanism in the aggregate demand equation through prices
in the real interest rate term. As a consequence, output responses peter out less quickly
than in the previous government expenditure experiments. We see in the first graph of
figure 4.20 that in year 2 output responses are negative in all countries and range from
0.06% till 0.55% of German GDP output in the second year.  If we exclude Ireland, we
see that this effect is still visible in year 5, where the output responses range from 0.09%
till 0.45% of German GDP output in year 6. It takes some time before prices respond. In
general countries with high output responses show high price responses.
(5) A depreciation of the US dollar by 10% against all other currencies.
By applying this external shock, we expected that an initial depreciation of the US dollar
would lower output in the EU-economies as a result of weakened trade competitiveness.
Some of this reductioned output might be weakened by the initial expected increase in US
demand. As a consequence, prices are expected to fall in the EU-economies. This pattern
is clearly visible iii the second and third graph of figure 4.20 in the short term. All EU-
economies show a negative output and price response. The size of the output responses
are moderate and are (in absolute size) never higher than 1%. A major reason for this
is the negative response of GDP output in the USA in the first three years, which is due
to the direct link in the aggregate demand equation of the USA with Germany. It takes
some time before this negative effect is offset and output becomes positive in the USA after
year 3. Because of this positive output response in the USA, almost all countries show an
output level rise after year 3 and some output responses even get strongly positive in the
long-run.  In the third graph of figure 4.20 we see that for all the EU-economies prices do
fall during the whole period, where Italy and France show the strongest price responses.
The direct price link between Japan and the USA in the model evokes the positive price
response in the medium terin in Japan.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented SLIM, a Small Linear Interdependent Model of eight EU-
economies, the USA and Japan. The model is of the Mundell-Fleming type and contains
six behavioural equations and is estimated with yearly data from 1960 to 1991. The main
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feature of the model is that direct linkages among countries are explicitly modelled. The
model contains international linkages in five of the six equations; namely the equation for
the long term interest rate, the two price equations, the GDP equation and the employ-
ment equation. The model is designed such that we adopted the same broad specification
for the different countries and that the estimation process decides about the strength of
certain structures in the model. The same approach is also used for the direct linkages; the
estimation process determines the strength of certain linkages. These linkages are modelled
such that more emphasis is put on short term effects than on long term effects. The results
of the historical tracking performance indicate that our model is capable of reproducing
the most important economic developments during the sample period.
Although no stock adjustment and, hence, no integration wealth effects are considered ab
initio, the starting point of our interdependent modelling exercise was, as already noted
above, a Mundell-Fleming model. The basic model is extended in various ways:
i) more than two countries were included (10 countries in our case), where the countries
with the largest trade shares determine the direct linkage specification;
ii) flexible prices, indicating imperfect competition on the goods, labour and capital mar-
kets, were incorporated in the equations for output prices, consumer prices, wage rates and
long term interest rates;
iii) a labour market part was supplemented, determining a labour demand function, an
unemployment function and corresponding prices for labour and output, where the under-
lying production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type; these equations form the supply
part of the model;
iv) finally, a dynamic formulation, allowing for a partial adjustment and an error correction
mechanism, was applied.
It is clear that using a Mundell-Fleming type of model as a starting point may be a more
appropriate description for some countries than for other countries. Our experience was
that the yearly data of small countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent
Denmark jit fairly well into this framework. Larger countries like Germany, France and to
a lesser extent Italy did also reasonably well. We found major problems for two countries:
the United Kingdom and Ireland. For the United Kingdom we had many problems finding
suitable aggregate demand, price and wage equations. Our simulation results for Ireland
bring on many opposite results as expected from the theoretical Mundell-Fleming model.
The models of two outside economies, the USA and Japan, should be treated with more
care because we ignored for these countries some important trading partners. Taking this
into account the outcomes for the USA were satisfactory whereas for Japan we had large
problems finding suitable aggregate demand, price and employment equations.
Through shock analysis our model is compared with five multi-country models as operating
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in 1992 at several EU-institutions. With our simple linear model, it is possible to generate
(more or less) the same outcomes of some of the main key macroeconomic variables as
modelled in large multi-country models. The main differences of our model with the large
multi-country models are as follows:
i) An output shock in a country has only little responses for employment in that country,
and this effect tends to zero in the long-run. One of the main reasons for finding this effect
is that we did not impose any restrictions in the employment equation.
ii) For most countries, we find less inflationary effects from a demand expansion which
implies a fairly flat aggregate supply schedule in the short and medium term.
iii) In the fiscal shock experiments we find more differentiation between countries, which is
due to the fact that we estimated the efTects of government expenditure in the aggregate
demand equation.
iv) A global fiscal shock in one of the major EU-economies has (more or less) the same
effect on other EU-economies as a fiscal shock originating in the USA. Furthermore, the
quantitative size of these shocks are in the short run more substantial than in the long
run and range (roughly) in the first year between 0.03%-0.87% GDP output of the country
originating the shock.
v) A depreciation of the US Dollar by 10% against all other currencies has only a modest
negative effect on output and prices for all EU countries in the short and medium term.
Some country-specific arguments, which appear to be striking in our model, are summarised
as follows:
i) An expansive domestic fiscal policy seems to be favourable for the larger economies, the
USA, Japan and Germany.
ii) There exist strong long-run price-responses, after applying a wage shock, in the USA
and Italy, and weak price-responses in Belgium and Japan.
iii) The effect of a monetary expansion on prices is negative in all countries, except for the
price responses in the United Kingdom and Ireland, which are slightly positive in the short
run.
iv) The effects of a domestic nominal exchange rate shock on output prices is rather low
in the three large economies Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan.
v) The small open economies Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands profit most from a
shock originating in Germany. Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom profit
most from a shock originating in France.
Vi) A fiscal expansion in the USA has a large effect on the British and German output and
a small effect on the Italian output, but a large effect on Italian prices.
It should be stressed that many of these findings are model dependent. The modelling
strategy used, concerning external effects, is that all external influences are measured by
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growth figures. This may be a somewhat broad measure and covers also external effects
which may be caused in the past by factors which are common to many EU-economies.
However, we believe that through the strong desaggregation of the large multi-country
models, important indirect external effects may disappear. In these models trade volumes
are linked through export and import volumes whereas in our model GDP volumes of the
various countries are linked. The first method has the disadvantage that it neglects certain
effects, such as foreign investments and knowledge. For instance, an invention which stim-
ulates growth in one country can be copied by another country which stimulates growth
in that country as well. Such indirect spillover effects are not necessarily captured if one
considers only trade volumes. Furthermore, the increasing integration process of the EU-
economies makes it likely that strong external effects will become more and more likely in
the (near) future which makes it necessary to study models which contain strong (direct)
linkages.
The model in its present form can be extended in various directions, such as the inclusion
of endogenous exchange rates and intertemporal eleinents like wealth effects, a government




Since the Maastricht Treaty (1991), there is a lot of debate on the agreed convergence
conditions. The Treaty sets out four quantified convergence criteria, (1) (low) inflation
performance, (2) fiscal consolidation, (3) interest rate stability, and (4) perfect exchange
rate stability. For each Member State of the European Union (EU) it is a necessary con-
dition to fulfil these four criteria in order to progress to Stage Three of the EMU by 1999.
In order to design a reliable macroeconomic policy for a 'home' country, this country has
to take into account influences of as well domestic as foreign economic activity. It is clear
that during Stage Two, countries will only consider policies which are sustainable through
time, i.e., Member States will only pursue policies which satisfy the four mentioned criteria
in nominal values, provided these policies also lead to a reasonable macroeconomic per-
formance in other real variables such as GDP growth, employment or unemployment (see,
e.g., Crockett [17]). Since all EU-economies can be considered as open economies, there
exist strong interdependent economic relationships among these economies. Furthermore,
the increasing integration process will strengthen even more the economic interdependence
between countries in the future, which will increase the importance of cross-border effects.
Since the criteria indicate that each Member State has to follow the interest rates and
the inflation rates set by other countries, it is likely that this 'convergence constraint'
also influences economic policymaking of the EU-economies. We want to study the im-
pact on EU-policymaking if Member States are constrained by conditions, in this case the
convergence conditions, set out by a supranational authority, in our case the European
Commission. We will investigate the economic consequences for the EU-Member States
for the short and medium term, i.e. for Stage Two of EMU. It is argued by many authors
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that in order to reach Stage Three, various costs are involved (see, e.g.,  Bean [41, Brandsma
and Italianer [9], Buiter [13] and Crockett [17}). For instance, the criteria emphasise a low
inflation rate and a sound public finance for the EU-Member States, but it may well be
that this hampers real welfare improvements like high GDP-growth or low unemployment
in the short and/or medium term. Furthermore there is the argument in the literature,
that the loss of freely using the exchange rate as a weapon of macroeconomic management
may be costly (see, e.g., Feldstein [28]).
We will study these aspects in a dynamic games context. For example, consider a EU
where the Member States fully cooperate. In that case any restriction, thus also the re-
striction implied by the convergence conditions, will decrease total welfare. In that case it
is, therefore, reasonable to search for a measure of the costs of convergence for each country
separately and for the EU as a whole. On the other hand, if we assume that within the
EU Member States do not fully cooperate, i.e., if we are willing to consider a situation
where EU-Member States agree on shared policy targets but do not necessarily cooperate
in order to achieve these targets, then it is not straightforward that the imposition of the
convergence conditions will always lead to a lower total welfare. In that case it may well
be possible that the direction of the spillover effects are influenced in such a way that,
through the imposition of the convergence conditions, the size of negative spillover effects
decreases. If that is the case, then the convergence restriction may not only be beneficial
for total welfare in the EU but it may also be less disadvantageous for each Member State
independently in the short to medium term.
In this thesis we model the impact of the convergence conditions as a restriction on each
country's policymaking. In a cooperative scenario we consider the full coordination out-
come and the outcome where the EU-Member States play cooperatively, but are restricted
by the convergence criteria. We will investigate how much convergence is possible/desirable
and what are the economic consequences for each Member State. For the noncooperative
case we will check whether the imposition of the convergence conditions are profitable or
not. As starting point we will return to the Maastricht Treaty (1991) and consider four
types of hypothetical scenarios:
(1) Despite of the Maastricht Treaty there is no agreement reached among the EU-Member
States: this is represented by a noncooperative scenario (feedback Nash solution).
(2) No agreement reached as in (1), but now each Member State is additionally constrained
by the convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty ('noncooperative convergence
solution').
(3) There is an agreement reached about full coordination: this is represented by a purely
cooperative scenario (Nash bargaining solution).
(4) An agreement reached as in (3), but there is an additional constraint imposed by the
convergence criteria ('cooperative convergence solution').
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In this chapter we compute these four (extreme) scenarios for the SLIM-model as described
in the previous chapter.
In the literature, there is a lot of intellectual debate about the consequences of the con-
vergence conditions (see, e.g., Bean [41, Crockett [17] and Eichengreen [25]). However, an
empirical dynamic game analysis of the consequences of the convergence conditions for
the EU-economies during Stage Two is not made before. We are aware of one simulation
study by Brandsma and Italianer [9] using the European Commission's Quest model. In
that study the convergence criteria are considered as an example of agreement on shared
policy targets in the sense that the desired paths of the individual economies are jointly
finetuned and determined. They argue (see page 12): 'Since it is difficult to shoot at a
moving target, the potentially best performers should make their targets explicit and also
make it clear that they will not try to push inflation much below that point of reference,
even when inflationary pressures are weakening abroad'. Therefore, the points of reference
for the inflation rate and the long term interest rate are fixed beforehand in their analysis.
It may be clear that, in a dynamic context, the reference points may change during Stage
Two. For instance, if there is an upward swing of GDP-growth in all EU-countries it is
likely that inflation rates, and, hence, also the reference points, will increase too. In that
respect, the empirical analyses iii this paper can be seen as an extension of the study of
Brandsma and Italianer [9], since, by constructing a convergence function, we take the
possibility of a moving target into account.  As we will show, the distinction between a
convergence function and individual welfare functions yields various additional advantages
since we are now able to study the following aspects:
(1) How will the reference points of the nominal long term interest rate and the consumer
price inflation evolve over time?
(2) How much convergence is possible/desirable and how will the convergence aspects af-
fect welfare in the short and medium run as well for real as for nominal variables in each
Member State?
(3) Which Member States are able to fulfil the criteria, and which not?
(4) Are the convergence criteria, as set out in the Maastricht Treaty, reasonably specified
or are (minor) revisions necessary? 1
In section 5.2 we will first recall some key properties of the SLIM-model. In section 5.3
we will present a description about the four possible game outcomes where we will put
most emphasis on the convergence solutions, since the ideas behind this concept are new
in the international policy coordination literature. In section 5.4 we will start our empirical
1The empirical results of Brandsma and Italianer [9] imply that if the Member States play a purely
cooperative strategy, almost all EU-countries will be able to fulfil the criteria. It is, however, important
to note that in this research the authors use the wage rate as instrumental variable and they allow for
dismissing (government) employees.
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work and present objective functions for each country and a convergence function. We will
specify desired paths and penalty weights for these functions. In section 5.5 we will present
and analyse the outcomes of our experiment and in section 5.6 we will conclude.
5.2 The SLIM-model revisited
As noted in the introduction we use the SLIM-model to perform our dynamic game anal-
yses.  For an extensive description of the model we refer to chapter four; here we will
briefly recall some key properties of the model. In the SLIM-model, each country is rep-
resented by six behavioural equations which contain strong interactions. In table 5.1 we
Ge Fr UK It Nl Be Dn Ir USA Japan
Ge      •  •                   •    •
R         •              •                                               •
UK  •  •                  •
I t• •         •
N l• • •   •   •
Be   •  •         •
Dn   •     •                  •
Ir
USA  •                              •
Japan  •                              •
Table 5.1: Direct Interdependencies among the countries in the SLIM-model
summarise how these interdependencies are modelled. For example the dot in the up-
per row of Germany belonging to the column of France indicates that Germany directly
depends on France. Hence, for the behavioural equations published in chapter four, this
means that for at least one equation of Germany a French economic variable enters directly
that equation. Comparing this table with table 4.4 in chapter four we see that almost all
countries considered as most important trading partners in table 4.4 also appear in this
table 5.1. In our estimation procedure we only did not find any direct impact for Italy on
Germany and France. Thus, in the SLIM-model the EU-countries such as France, Germany
and the United Kingdom are strongly mutually interdependent, whereas open economies
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as Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands are unilaterally affected by the
larger EU-economies (i.e., there is no feedback transmission from these EU-economies to
the larger three economies). The model is also designed such that all EU-economies are di-
rectly (or indirectly) interdependent with the USA and Japan. To illustrate the behaviour
of the model we briefly state in table 5.2 the general form of the six behavioural equations.
Equation (1) expresses that real output, Y, depends positively on the real exchange rate,
Table 5.2: Equations in the SLIM-model for one country°
Equation number Equation
(1)                                   Y =f(E + P; -Py, RL- APy, Y",G)
(2)                               Pv =f(W, Et P;,Y-Y)
(3)                            Pe = f(Py, Et Pi)
(4)                               N =f(W-Py, Y, Et P:-Py)
(5)                               W = f(Pc, 0(L - N), Y - N)
(6)                               RL = f(RL-, RS, AP«)
a.  All variables are in logaritmic form, except RS, RL and (L - N) which are in rates.  a
indicates 'first differences' and the superscript - denotes foreign variables.
Et p;-py, negatively on the real long term interest rate, RL - APy, positively on
foreign output, Y-, and real government expenditure G. In equation (2) the output price,
Py, depends positively on nominal wages, W, import prices, E + P;, and deviations from
trend output, Y - Y. In equation (3) consumer prices, Pc, depend positively on domestic
output prices and foreign output prices E + P;. Labour demand in equation (4) depends
negatively  upon real wages,  W - Py, Positively on real output  and  on  the gap between for-
eign and domestic output prices, Et P; - Py· The impact of the gap between foreign and
domestic output prices in this labour demand equation is ambiguous and depends upon
the country under consideration (see chapter four). Nominal wages in equation (5) depend
positively on consumer prices, negatively on the change in unemployment, &(L - N), and
positively on labour productivity, Y - N. The nominal long term interest rate, RL, in
equation (6) depends positively on the foreign nominal  long term interest  rate,  RL*,  and
the domestic nominal short term interest rate, RS, and consumer price inflation, APc.
Since unemployment is defined as the labour force minus employment, the model contains,
for each country, four exogenous variables, G, government expenditure, RS, the short term
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Figure 5.1: Eigenvalues of A in the imaginary plane.
After estimation the SLIM model can be described by the following set of equations:
14 = Aoth + Alyl-1 + A214-2 + Bout + Blut-1 + 182ut-2 + Doext + Diext-1 + Dyext-2 + Et
where  Ao, At, A2, Bo, Bl, 82, bo, bi  and  02  contain the estimated coefficients  and  y  rep-
resents the vector of endogenous variables, ut the vector of instrumental variables, ezt
the vector of exogenous variables and gt the vector of errors in the model. Next, these
equations are transformed into state-space form (see, e.g., de Zeeuw [85]). This yields the
following set of equations:
x1+1   =   Azt + Bot + zi
91    -     0 It·
In this standard discrete time state-space  form, 4, represents the vector of state variables
involving endogenous and instrumental variables, #t, represents the vector of objective
variables for all policymakers, ut, the vector of instrumental variables for all policymakers
and zt the vector of exogenous variables at time t, C is specified such that the objectives
in 91 are, for each country, GDP-growth, GDP-inflation, consumer price inflation, growth
in wages, growth in employment and the nominal long term interest rate. In this study
we  consider  two  sets of instrumental (policy) variables  for  ut.   In  our first dynamic  game
experiment we just consider the nominal short term interest rate and government expen-
diture as instrumental variables, whereas in the second experiment we also include the
exchange rate as instrumental (policy) variable. To get an idea of the size of the model,
A is a 180x 180 matrix, B is a 20x180 matrix or 30x180 matrix depending on the set of
instrumental variables used and C is a 60x180 matrix. In a discrete time-model, as used
here, the stability properties of the model can be easily checked by an eigenvalue plot.  This
plot is shown in figure 5.1, where the eigenvalues of A and the unit circle are plotted. If
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the eigenvalues of A lie inside the unit circle then the model is said to be stable. As we can
see, some of the eigenvalues fall on the unit circle in (1,0), and hence at least one equation
contains  a  unit root. These equations  are, e.g., price equations. These equations contain
a unit root in their level specifications but are stable in their first differences. This is,
however, not such a problem since in our dynamic game analyses we are mainly interested
in the first differences (growth values) of the various variables.
5.3   Description of the dynamic game
It is common use to compare noncooperative and cooperative outcomes when applying
dynamic game theory in econoniics. However, empirical studies with large scale mod-
els appear less often.  One of the first well-known empirical studies is the Oudiz and
Sachs paper  [61]; more recent studies are Ghosh and Masson [34], Hughes Hallett  [39]and
McKibbin and Sachs  [55].   In this paper we compare two generally known dynamic  game
equilibrium concepts, the noncooperative feedback Nash solution and a cooperative Pareto
solution, represented by the axiomatic Nash bargaining outcome, with two other new con-
cepts in which the players are restricted in their policy choice. This restriction is imposed
by the convergence conditions, which can be interpreted as a dynamic constraint on the
(non)cooperative game. We will now briefly explain the four solution concepts. Consider
again the Maastricht Treaty (1991). The scheme in figure 5.2 describes the situation of
countries' negotiation possible outcomes of
objectives process negotzat:on process
A                                                                               outcome, noncooperative
./2                  ' puztoc eperative
Maastricht Treaty
cooperative
1991 ' convergence outcome




Figure 5.2: Scheme of the negotiation process of the Maastricht Treaty.
the EU-Member States at the time of the Treaty. Each Member State enters the negoti-
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ation process  with a certain target or objective function, represented by  I, i  =  1,..., N.
As is common practice in dynamic game theory, we assume that this function can be
approximated well by a quadratic functiona12:
T
J, = Evi'(t)'Qi(t)yiA(t) + ui'(t)'R,(t)u (t), (5.1)
t=1
where VIA(t) := y, (t) - yt(t) are the deviations of the values of the target variables from
their desired values for each EU-Member State i at time t. Similarly, u (t) := u,(t) - u (t)
is the vector of deviations of country i's instruments from their trend (desired) values.  Fur-
thermore, the matrix Qi is assumed to be positive semi-definite and the matrix Ri positive
definite for i = l,..., N. Now, each country i,i = 1,...,N, enters the negotiation process
with its objective J, which has to be minimised subject to a set of linear(ised) dynamic
constraints, represented by the SLIM-model as explained in section two. Furthermore, we
assume that the European Commission enters the negotiation process with as objective
criterion a quadratic functional on the convergence conditions of the Maastricht Treaty. It
is clear that we are now entering the field of dynamic game theory since each country's
behaviour is dependent on the other countries' behaviour.  This can, of course, lead to
many possible outcomes; therefore, we will restrict ourselves to four (extreme) cases.
5.3.1  case 1: Noncooperative policy
Since there are no clearly established 'rules of the game', we assume an environment where
each Member State has complete information and acts individually rationally.  For an
appropriate description of a noncooperative game outcome we use the feedback Nash equi-
librium. The feedback Nash equilibrium has some more desirable properties than other
Nash equilibria, such as strong time consistency and stochastic robustness (see, e.g., Basar
and Olsder [3], de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg [86] and Holly and Hughes Hallett [441 for
a comparison of different Nash equilibria and for the mathematical expressions for com-
puting the unique feedback Nash outcome). Furthermore, the feedback Nash equilibrium
is generically unique in a linear quadratic framework with a finite planning horizon (see
Basar and Olsder [3]). We will follow a similar strategy here and use the feedback Nash
equilibrium as the threatpoint of the game. Thus, we assume that the EU-Member States
play a noncooperative game without taking the convergence conditions into consideration.
Remark that this is perfectly acceptable in the two player case, but, since in our case there
are more players, we additionally assume that there will be no coalitions among the players
2Advantages and limitations of quadratic loss functions are discussed, a.0., in Petit [66]
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3. So, here we assume that there is no cooperation among countries at all. In the sequel we
will denote this outcome by NC and the welfare outcome of this noncooperative solution
by JNC := (Jrc'...,JAcl, where N represents the number of players (countries).
5.3.2  case 2: Cooperative policy
For the purely cooperative case we assume that the countries agree on the Nash bargaining
outcome which is a Pareto optimal outcome (see, e.g., Nash [58]). It is well-known that
this solution can be obtained by ininimising the 'collective' loss function:
N                      N
J = E a,J„ with   aiko,   E a, = 1, (5.2)
i=1 :=1
subject to the linear constraints represented by the SLIM-model, and in which the set
{al,...'aN} is chosen as aNB := <a B,  -.' a B} which corresponds to the Nash bargaining
solution. This solution, which we will denote by NB, has some desirable properties. For
instance, there exists a unique relationship between the 'welfare weights' a B,   for  i   =
1,..., N, the disagreement point, represented by the noncooperative solution JNC in case 1
and the welfare outcome of the Nash bargaining solution, say JNB = iJNB'..., JNN814:
NB       43 (JNC - JNB 
a,    - Ill Il,#5(JiNC _ ..rNB 
This relationship implies that:
Q B J IC _ J IB  = a BiJ C - J2NB  -... -- QNNB<JNNC - JNNB . (5.3)
Since the deviations in the welfare functions are all described in percentage points, we may
assume that the welfare functions, 1, are (roughly) comparable among countries, i.e., if
J,  > Ji, then we can argue that policymaking for country i is more costly than for country
j. This observation makes it possible to interprete relationship (5.3) as follows (see also
chapter 3): a player who gains more from playing cooperatively is more willing to accept
a smaller 'welfare weight' than the player(s) who gain(s) less. Alternatively, a player who
gains less may demand a higher 'welfare weight' by threatening not to coordinate, knowing
that the potential loss from no agreement is larger for the other player(s). We will use this
argument for interpreting some of our results.
The two previous cases are standard in dynamic economic game theory. In the following
3Of course,  it is possible to take this coalition aspect into account. However, regarding the fact that the
number of coalitions between 8 EU-countries is already very large, we use here this simplifying assumption.
4For a proof of this relationship we refer to chapter  3.
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two subsections we will elaborate the concept which deals with the impact of the European
Commission. In this case we assume that the European Commission, as an independent
negotiation partner, is involved in the negotiation process as well. We assume that the
European Commission has its own objectives, i.e., the convergence criteria as specified
by the Maastricht Treaty, which can be quantified in a convergence function. We will
denote this convergence function by C and assume that C is quadratic (like the individual
objective functionals Ji, i = 1,..., N). The general form of this function is
N T
C = E C„   with  Ci = E yf(t)'QF(t)yf(t), (5.4)
i=1 t=l
where yic(t):= y,(t) - y (t) represents, for each country, the deviation of its target vector
from a reference vector at period t.  Note that this 'reference vector' yc(t) will not be
fixed beforehand for the complete planning period, but should at each time period t be
considered as a function of the target vectors yi (t), ..., YN(t) and will be determined within
the optimisation procedure itself; C is defined as the sum of the individual countries'
convergence functions G. In practice it is possible that each country has its own reference
vector in mind to which it wants to converge in order to reach the convergence criteria but,
for practical reasons, we assume that countries cooperatively agree on the same reference
vector y°(t). The time dependent weight matrices Qf(t) contain the relative priorities
which each individual country wants to assign to certain convergence aspects. We refer to
Section 4 for these subjects and for a precise formulation of the convergence function and
do not elaborate these subjects further here. In that section we will also discuss the fact
that there may be some overlap between the countries' own objectives and the convergence
objective. In the sequel we first discuss the two convergence game outcomes.
5.3.3   case 3: Cooperative convergence policy
The cooperative convergence outcome is modelled as a restricted cooperative outcome,
where the restriction is modelled with the convergence function C. Furthermore, we assume
that if one of the EU-Member States does not agree, none of the EU-Member States will
agree to play in a cooperative mode, in which case 1 is the appropriate model formulation,
i.e., we use NC of case 1 as the threatpoint of the game. Another way to look at the
cooperative convergence outcome is that we are dealing with a game between N +1  players,
where the N countries altogether agree with the convergence criteria as specified by the
(N + 1)st player. One could argue that this (N + 1)st player, represented here by the
European Commission, has the power to conduct the coordination process between the
N Member States and that a possible withdraw of one of the Member States from the
negotiation process would be the starting point of a breaking down of the European Union,
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i.e., willlead to case 1.  Now we argue that there are not many incentives for one of the EU-
Member States to disagree with this convergence condition as long as their corresponding
individual costs Ji, i = 1,..., N, will be lower than the costs which are represented by the
noncooperative solution. Since all the EU-Member States are interested in the convergence
aspect (in order to reach Stage Three which involves the creation of a full monetary union
by 1999) we assume that they will try to converge as much as possible as long as each
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Figure 5.3: The negotiation  area in  the  Ji, ./2-plane for the two player  case.
example consider the two player case. The picture in figure 5.3 represents the Ji,„/2 plane.
The convex Pareto curve represents all possible cooperative solutions. The Nash bargaining
solution is denoted by NB and represents case 2. The outcome denoted by NC is the
threatpoint and represents  case 1. Remark  now  that all possible game outcomes outside
the shaded 'negotiation area' are not interesting for at least one of the players since, then,
at  least  one is better off in  case  1.  In  case 3 the EU-Member States are restricted in their
policy choice by this 'negotiation area'. The maximum convergence that can be reached is
a cooperative policy which stays inside the 'negotiation area' and maximises convergence
(i.e., minimises C). We denoted this outcoine in the figure with CCO, which represents
case 3. From the results in chapter two, we have that, in the N-dimensional case, all




Jc =(1 -A) E ai.4 + AC,     with       E ai=  1,050„ Asl, (5.5)
i=l i=1
subject to a set of constraints represented by the SLIM-model in our case. Each cooperative
convergence outcome can be represented by a particular set of {al, ···,ON, A}.  In the sequel
we will represent the CCO outcome, which maximises convergence within the 'negotiation
area', by acco := {aico'...,apco, Acco .  In chapter two we also proved that this CCO
outcome is uniquely determined,  and  that this outcome coincides  in  the  Ji, ···, JN plane
with the noncooperative outcome NC. Therefore, the dot in figure 5.3, which lies on the
corner of the 'negotiation area', represents both; the NC and the CCO outcome. Note,
however, that the belonging policy choices of both outcomes generally differ. In Appendix
A we describe the formulae and the (constrained) numerical optimisation algorithm for
finding this cooperative convergence solution CCO.
5.3.4  case 4: Noncooperative convergence policy
In this subsection we assume that the EU-Member States pursue a noncooperative policy
which is restricted by the convergence criteria. We assume that each Member State i
minimises 1, with
i=(1- 1,)J,+A,C, with C, asin(5.4),05451
and where A, is the relative weight each player assigns to his own convergence. For sim-
plicity, we assume that all players choose the same value for A, := A and we assume that
there is an agreement that the Member States shoot on the same moving target y°(t). The
main difference with case 3 is that each individual country, say country i, tries to min-
imise its part, Ci, of the total convergence function C in a noncooperative game, instead
of minimising C cooperatively. Beforeliand, it is hard to say whether this 'cooperative
agreement' on yc(t) influences the individual welfare functions J„ in coinparison to the NC
outcome of case 1, positively or negatively. Furthermore,  it is interesting  to see whether
this  agreement  on  the same moving target y.(t) really  will  lead to convergence in  a  non-
cooperative world. In our empirical application we will actually investigate whether this
outcome falls inside or outside the negotiation area as specified in figure 3. In the sequel,
we will represent this noncooperative convergence outcome by NCO and we willl denote its
welfare costs by JNCO :-  JNCO,..., JI Col. Remark that we are interested in comparisons
of different outcomes in the ·4,·.., JN-plane  and we specify the NCO outcome accordingly
5. To understand the impact of a constraint on a dynamic game more in general we discuss
6Another viewpoint would be to scale everything into the A, ···, JN-plane, but this yields the additional
problem  of the determination  of Ai.
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Figure 5.4: Two examples of effects on individual welfare-loss originating from a restriction.
graphically, in the two player case, what kind of properties an 'ideal' constraint (imposed
by some kind of central authority) should posses. Remark, that in the following idea the
authority, which imposes the restriction, does not know beforehand what kind of game the
two players play. Consider again the Pareto curve P and the threatpoint NC in both dia-
grams of figure 5.4 and consider a possible restriction on the game. Since any restriction in
the cooperative game leads to welfare loss iii  the Ji, J2-plane, we observe that in  the coop-
erative restricted game the Pareto frontier  P (in  the Ji, ./2-plane) moves to the north-east
direction. In the noncooperative game it is, generally, unknown in which direction the NC
point moves. It could move in any direction. As an example consider the two diagrams in
figure 5.4. In general, the first diagram is an example of an 'ideal' restriction; the restricted
Pareto frontier,P', lies close to the Pareto frontier, P, and the restricted noncooperative
point, NC', moves to the south-west direction of the NCoutcome. An example of a 'bad'
restriction is visible in the second diagram of figure 5.4;  the NC threatpoint  and the Pareto
frontier move substantially to the north-west direction.
5.4   Specification of objectives and priorities
Since the dynamic game calculations with the SLIM-model are only relevant for the EU-
Member States, we exogenise USA and Japan in the model. In Appendix C.2 we will
describe the exogenous choices for these countries' exogenous variables and for the other
exogenous variables in the model, such as the labour force. We will use for each country
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the nominal short term interest rate and the level of government expenditure as policy
variables.  For the other exogenous variable, the nominal exchange rate, the Maastricht
Treaty imposes perfect exchange rate stability at Stage Three. Therefore, we adopt two
approaches in this chapter.
(1) Firstly, we fix the dollar exchange rate on the 1991 level for the complete planning
period 1992-1999; in this case we assume a fixed (dollar) exchange rate regime.
(2) Secondly, we use the exchange rate as a policy variable wich receives a very high weight
in the welfare function. In this case we allow for small movements of the exchange rate
around the desired paths. Since in the SLIM-model each exchange rate within the EMS is
modelled through the dollar we consider small movements around the ideal paths of their
currency against the dollar. Hence, we have also tight exchange rates within the EMS.
The motivation behind these two approaches is that we want to investigate the possible
gains from exchange rate management as well in a cooperative as in a noncooperative
world.
It is clear that in practice the monetary authorities do not have the power to 'fully' control
the exchange rate. Therefore, study (2) be interpreted as a sensitivity analysis to dynamic
game study (1) and should give more insight into a question like: Is it possible to improve
convergence considerably if we allow for small movements in the exchange rate?6  For
instance, the effect of exchange rate managenent in the noncooperative case is not clear,
since it may well be the case that a noncooperative use of exchange rate management may
lead to lower global and individual welfare for all Member States than in a situation where
exchange rates are fixed. Remark, that in this research, we do not consider the possibility
that monetary or fiscal policy could create tensions within the exchange rate system 7.
The choice of the desired paths *4(t) and ul(t) is mainly in line with previous studies (see,
e.g., Hughes Hallett [38,39]). We target growth values for Y, Py, Pc, W, N, nominal level
values for RL, RS and real level values for G. The ideal target values for the growth rates
are constructed such that we start for each variable with a desired growth rate for 1992.
These desired growth rates  for  1992 were chosen  such  that  they  are in accordance  with  the
actual growth rates of 1991. Then, we constructed linear growth paths towards the ideal
growth rates for  1999.   For the construction  of the ideal paths  of the level values  we used,  in
most cases, the true 1991 values (also representing the end of the estimation period in the
SLIM-model) as starting values and applied linear interpolation towards the 1999 desired
values. In subsection 5.4.1 we describe an individual objective function of each Member
State and in subsection 5.4.2 we specify our choice for the convergence function.
60ther arguments for using the exchange rate as instrumental variable are given by Petit [66]
7The case where the exchange rate is endogenous is a subject for future research.
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5.4.1 Individual objective functions and relative priorities
The (growth) values for the ideal paths and their relative priorities are given in table 5.3,
presenting each country's desired values for 1992 and 1999 respectively. The desired values
for the years inbetween are constructed by linear interpolation. Since we target level vari-
ables for real government expenditure, we specify for all countries the levels for the year
1991. We assume that each country, except Ireland, will aim for real output growth of 4%
Table 5.3: The objective function specification for the years 1992-1999. a
Countries
Belg. Denm. Germ. France Irel. Italy Netherl. U.K.
The desired values v  for 1992 and 1999.
AY 2.2-4.0 1.6-4.0 3.7-4.0 1.1-4.0 2.5-5.0 1.6-4.0 2.4-4.0 1.0-4.0
apy 2.5-2.0  2.4-2.0  3.8-2.0 2.8-2.0 1.5-2.0 6.6-3.0 2.8-2.0 5.8-2.0
2*pc 2.6-2.0  2.4-2.0  3.5-2.0  2.9-2.0 3.0-2.0 6.1-3.0 3.2-2.0 6.3-2.0
aw 6.0-5.0 3.9-5.0 4.6-5.0 4.5-5.0 5.7-6.0 8.2-7.0 4.4-5.0 7.9-7.0
AN 0.3-1.5 0.0-1.5 2.4-1.5 0.3-1.5 0.0-1.5 0.9-1.5 1.3-1.5 0.0-1.5
RL 9.0-7.0 9.1-7.5 8.2-6.0 9.2-7.5 8.9-7.0 12.6-8.0 8.4-6.0 9.8-7.5
The desired values u, for 1992 and 1999.
RS 8.9-6.0 9.5-7.0 8.7-5.0 9.3-7.0 9.5-7.0 11.4-7.0 8.8-5.0 10.9-8.0
AE 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0
AG 1.6-0.0 2.1-1.0 2.4-1.0 2.2-1.0 1.6-1.0 1.4-0.0 3.7-1.0 1.7-1.0
61991 15.073 14.076 13.073 15.043 12.360 9.340 13.545 12.611
The relative priorities (equal for each country)
Matrix Q Matrix R
ay apy APc AW AN RL RS     G      E (if included)
2.0 0.5 1.0    0.5 2.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 10.0
: All units in percentage changes per annum, except 61991 in logarithms.
and that Ireland aims for 5% by 1999. Each country strives for a low GDP- and consumer
price inflation rate for which we assume 2% as ideal in most countries in 1999 (only Italy
3%). Due to the trade off between, on the one hand the inflation cost component and
on the other hand the income component for the improvement/preservation of purchasing
power we target growth in nominal wages around 5-7% for the year 1999. the year 1999.
Due to the above mentioned trade off the relative priority of nominal wages is assumed to
be low (Q value of 0.5). Growth in employment, one of the main concerns of policymakers
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today, is given a relatively high priority  of 2  and a desired growth  path  of  1.5%  in  1999.
Since at the time of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 the nominal long term interest rates
were rather high in each country, we considered a decline of at least 2% during the period
1992-1999 for tliis variable. Note that at the Maastricht Treaty it is imposed that each
Member State should strive for fiscal consolidation (before the end of this century, each
country should have a public budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP and its governmental
debt should not exceed 60 % of GDP). Therefore, we assume that some countries restrict
their level of government expenditure substantially,  e.g., for Belgium and Italy we assume
a zero percentage growth of the desired government expenditure in 1999.  For the other
countries we assume an ideal growth path of 1% in 1999.
The priorities policymakers attach to the different variables are reflected in the weights Q
and R of the individual objective functions. They are presented at the bottom of table
5.3. We assume that these weights are the same for each Member State and are constant
over times. For the desired paths yl we give a relatively high priority to GDP growth and
employment growth and relatively low priorities for the growth of nominal wages and the
level of the long term interest rate. Concerning the inflation rates, we give a higher priority
to the consumer price deflator than to the GDP-price deflator. For the desired paths ui
we choose a priority of 2, except for the case where the exchange rate is used as a policy
variable.  In that situation we give a very high priority of 10 to the exchange rate (and
the other policy variables a value  of 2), indicating that strong movements  in the dollar
exchange rates are heavily penalised.
One can decompose the convergence criteria in two types of conditions (see Siebrand [711).
On the one hand conditions which are conducted by the European Commission called
central conditions and on the other hand decentral conditions which are executed by each
Member State individually. Examples of centralised policy behaviour are price stabilisation
and interest rate stabilisation; budgetary policy is an example of decentralised behaviour.
Since a restrictive budgetary policy seems to be sensible anyway, Maastricht Treaty or not,
we decided to put this decentral criterion in the individual objective functions and the cen-
tral criteria in the convergence function. The other distinction which can be made here is
that the central conditions are an example of shared ,#exible policy targets, whereas the de-
central conditions are an example of fzed policy targets.  For instance, the reference values
for the individual budgets are fixed beforehand, whereas the reference points for the long
term interest rates and the inflation rates may fluctuate over time. This decision implies
that we are comparing four dynamic game outcomes, all with a 'cooperative agreement' on
fixed shared targets, which can be divided in two game outcomes (a noncooperative and a
cooperative one) and two other game outcomes (a noncooperative and a cooperative one),
8This is a simplifcation. In practice the relative priorities (and also the desired paths) are (frequently)
adjusted by the government.
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where the Member States additionally give some priority to the two central criteria which
are modelled as flexible shared targets.
5.4.2 The convergence function
As convergence function we propose the following specification:
8                    t=1999
C =  Ci,  with C, :=  E 82{(RL'(t)- RL(t))2 + (Apj(t)- Aft(t))2}, (5.6)
i=1 t=1992
where RL,(t) and AP; (t) are the long term interest rate and the consumer price deflator,
in year t for country z, respectively, the bar values represent averages of that year. We
make the following choice for these averages:
R-L(t) =  {RLGe(t) + RLF,(1) + RLUK(t)},
alt(1) =  {APGe(t) + APFr(t) + apUK(t)},
for each year t =1992,...,1999. By taking this particular choice we assume that during the
planning period all EU-Member States follow the average level of the nominal long term
interest rates and the average consumer price inflation values of the three largest Member
States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Since the European Commission, (the
(N + 1)st player) acts as a representative of the N-players, we assume that the choice of
this particular convergence towards the average of the 'large 3' represents the agreement
between all EU-Member States about convergence in consumer price inflation and nomi-
nal long term interest ratesg. The parameter 6, represents the time preference and/or a
convergence weight for each country i. It seems reasonable to assume that convergence
becomes more desirable at the end of the planning period; therefore countries will put a
higher weight on convergence towards the end of the planning period. We simplicity we
assume a constant 6 = 1.2 which reflects the fact that the priority for convergence increases
by 20% for each country each following year. Remark that the final policy choices will be
sensitive for the chosen convergence function and note, furthermore, that the desired values
RL(t) and AP-.(t) for each year t, 1 =1992,...,1999, are not specified beforehand but will be
determined by the optimization procedure, and, hence, by the convergence function itself.
'Remark that we have to make this simplifying assumption, since constructing a convergence function
which accurately represents the convergence conditions of the Maastricht Treaty is very difficult.  This
aspect, however, makes the dynamic game analyses not less interesting, since, in this case, it is possible to
look for various convergence functions, which in fact could yield conditions which would be quite different
from those specified at the Maastricht Tteaty.  To go even a step further, one could think of the possibility




In this section we will describe the empirical results. In the first subsection we will show
the results for the fixed echange rate regime. In the next subsection we perform the same
experiment but consider the case where (slight) adjustments in the dollar exchange rate
are possible. Exchange rates are kept very tight which is modelled through the high weight
in the R-matrix. Therefore, if a particular country tries to adjust its dollar exchange
rate it will be heavily penalised. In both dynamic game experiments we assume for the
NCO-outcome A = 0.2, indicating that each country gives a weight of 20% to minimise C,
and a weight of 80% to minimise I. We will study for this noncooperative outcome the
sensitivity of our results related to the choice of A and report some results we obtained
with different choices for A.
5.5.1 Empirical results in a lixed exchange rate regime
Table 5.4 contains, for each country, the objective function values and the convergence
values for each game outcome. Since in our dynamic game analyses we minimise costs
(convergence), we have that a low value for the objective function (convergence function)
indicates there is much welfare (convergence). As explained in section 5.3.3, we observe
that the objective function values Ji, i = 1,...,8 are the same for the NCand the CCO
case.  Furthermore, we observe that in the MB-solution each Member State has substantially
Table 5.4: The objective function values, convergence value and weights in a fixed exchange
rate regime
Countries
Belgium Denmark Germ. France Ireland Italy Netherl. U.K. Conv.
NC 0.73 1.24 1.57 2.78 1.50 2.32 0.97 1.57 9.10
NCO 0.41 1.75 1.05 2.79 1.98 3.70 0.70 1.76 8.46
NB 0.36 0.91 0.63 1.60 1.28 1.40 0.74 1.28 6.71
CCO 0.73 1.24 1.57 2.78 1.50 2.32 1.97 1.57 3.24
Weights
Belgium Denmark Germ. France Ireland Italy Netherl. U.K. Conv.
aNB 0.13 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.16         -
OCCO 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.19 0.31 0.14 0.42
more welfare than in both noncooperative solutions, NC and NCO. Also the NB-solution
yields a substantially higher degree of convergence. This last aspect is remarkable since, in
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the NCO-outcome, each individual Member State additionally attributes some additional
weight to minimise convergence, in contrary to the NB-solution. The experiments, where
we tried different values for A in the NCO game, did not change this result very much. In
general, a higher A, and hence a higher weight on convergence in the NCO-solution yielded
more or less the same results with respect to the degree of convergencelo. Furthermore,
in comparison to the NB-solution, the CCO-solution yields an additional degree of con-
vergence. These observations give already some evidence to the fact that coordination is
a necessary requirement for convergence, or as stated by Brandsma and Italianer [9, page
11]:'...in the absence of proper coordination, a majority of the Member States would fail
to meet the convergence criteria, no matter how seriously they tried to converge'.
The next interesting question is whether the convergence conditions diminish negative
spillovers in the noncooperative case. If we compare the two noncooperative outcomes, we
observe that welfare is higher in the NCO outcome for three countries (Belgium, Germany
and the Netherlands) and lower for the other five countries (Denmark, France, Ireland,
Italy and the U.K.). These results suggest that the convergence criteria in a noncoop-
erative game increase total welfare for the three traditionally low inflationary countries
and decrease total welfare for the fve traditionally higher inflationary countries.  If we
again consider figure 5.4 and translate the problem to the eight dimensional case, then we
observe that the convergence constraint moves the NC' = NCO in the 'right' direction
for the above mentioned three countries and in the 'wrong' direction for the other five
countries.
If we recall the interpretation of the aNB-weights in the NB-solution (see section 5.3.2), we
see that Germany, France and Italy have a rather low weight. Hence, these countries gain
most if a purely cooperative strategy is adopted. The relatively higher aNB-weights for Bel-
gium, Denmark, Ireland, the U.K. and the Netherlands may imply that these countries can
put heavy pressure oll EU-negotiations, since their welfare gains from playing cooperatively
are less than those for the other three economies. These outcomes suggest that most gains
come from cooperation between Germany and France. Internalising the spillover effects in
a positive way seems therefore most profitable for these two interdependent countries. The
dependent country Italy profits most from this cooperation between Germany and France,
whereas all the other countries show only a slight increase in welfare. The explanation
of the result that Germany and France profit most is that in a noncooperative world the
additional costs Germany and France have to pay are for the greater part costs in terms of
instruments and for a lesser part costs in terms of targets. The externalities are, however,
only generated by the target variables and, therefore, the differences between the quanti-
tative effects in the cooperative NB-solution or noncooperative solutions generated by the
10Changing A from 0.2 to 0.6 yielded convergence values still higher than 8.0
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larger countries are relatively small for the dependent countries. This observation explains
also why small dependent countries like Belgium Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands
do  not  gain  so  much from a cooperative strategy  11. The intuition behind this result  for
the third interdependent country, the U.K., is that, in the SLIM-model, this country is
more dependent on the USA than on Germany and France. Traditionally the U.K. is more
isolated than most other countries in the EU which is reflected by the rather weak inter-
dependencies with the other countries in the SLIM-model.
We now turn to the CCO-outcome. The results with respect to the chosen convergence
function seem quite good. First, this result suggests that if countries are willing to coor-
dinate their policies, then a lot of convergence is possible. This observation follows from
the low convergence value and the high weight on convergence in the CCO solution. This
result suggests also that in figure 5.4, if we again translate the problem to the eight dimen-
sional case, that the Pareto curve P' tends to move slowly to the right if we increase A.  It
is possible to compare the 'welfare weights' a and a . The rule of thumb one canCCO NB
apply here is: The Member States whose weights increase, from the NB to the CCO case,
contribute more to the minimisation of the convergence function than the Member States
whose weights decrease. If we apply this rule of thumb, then we see that Italy contributes
very much to the minimisation of the convergence function. This result is not surprising
since Italy is the country with the highest inflation rates and long term interest rates and,
thus, the Ci, i =Italy, term contributes a lot to the convergence function C. Applying again
the rule of thumb, we observe that Denmark, Ireland and the UK do not contribute very
much to the minimisation of the convergence function. This result may imply that these
three countries face more welfare loss when trying to converge since their problems are
more structural, whereas the other five countries can already create a lot of convergence
by 'simply' internalising their externalities.
In order to discuss more country specific results we present in table 5.5, for each country,
the (average) target values and policy choices for the four different game outcomes over
the planning period. The first observation is that optimal growth is found to be moderate
and that, except for Ireland, average growth is comparable to the average growth values
during the eighties. These results are obtained with, on average, lower levels of government
expenditure and lower levels of the short (and long term) interest rates than during the
period 1981-1990. The results are in accordance with the broad economic policy guidelines
of the EU in which a reduction of short and long term interest rates is proposed in the short
to medium term and budgetary consolidation should be achieved by reducing government
11This result depends, of course, strongly on the simplifying assumption of the interdependencies in the
SLIM-model in which Belgium and the Netherlands are modelled as dependent economies. If we would,
for instance, consider the total Benelux-economy, then the impact of this economy on France and Germany
might be substantial.
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Table 5.5: The average target- and instrumental values (1992-1999).
Target values
Bel. Germ. Denm. France U.K. Irel. Italy Neth.
AY NC 1.86 2.51 1.40 2.26 2.64 4.60 2.34 1.47
NCO 1.94 2.56 1.50 2.61 2.70 4.69 2.40 1.67
NB 1.85 2.46 1.53 2.12 2.58 4.55 2.43 1.48
CCO 1.66 2.20 1.44 1.76 2.55 4.62 2.22 1.22
App NC 3.52 4.15 5.26 5.67 4.92 5.97 8.36 3.80
NCO 3.78 4.14 5.40 6.15 5.00 6.02 9.10 4.09
NB 3.01 3.76 4.94 4.28 4.55 5.74 7.32 3.37
CCO 2.92 3.70 4.70 3.92 4.37 5.62 6.08 3.30
APc NC 3.67 3.71 5.41 5.66 4.77 5.10 8.90 3.76
NCO 3.98 3.71 5.54 6.12 4.86 5.15 9.72 4.05
NB 2.90 3.40 5.06 4.30 4.40 4.82 7.71 3.21
CCO 2.75 3.32 4.82 3.95 4.23 4.70 6.38 3.11
AW NC 5.50 5.43 6.82 7.14 7.48 9.10 9.89 4.84
NCO 5.91 5.46 7.06 7.82 7.60 9.18 10.74 5.32
NB 4.68 4.91 6.45 5.50 7.02 8.85 8.77 4.27
CCO 4.50 4.66 6.09 4.97 6.79 8.77 7.31 4.08
AN NC 0.01 0.35 0.36 0.33 -0.34 0.68 0.76 0.01
NCO 0.02 0.39 0.38 0.50 -0.30 0.73 0.79 0.07
NB 0.03 0.52 0.44 0.24 -0.43 0.64 0.77 0.08
CCO -0.06 0.47 0.43 0.08 -0.52 0.64 0.69 -0.06
RL NC 7.92 6.97 9.60 10.34 8.72 8.93 11.80 8.02
NCO 8.36 7.10 8.00 9.22 8.42 8.03 10.23 7.45
NB 8.49 8.16 9.42 10.34 9.52 8.95 11.49 8.18
CCO 8.85 8.91 9.54 9.96 9.66 9.48 10.86 8.71
Instrumental values
Bel. Germ. Denm. France U.K. Irel. Italy Neth.
RS NC 6.59 4.71 8.39 9.71 8.27 8.95 11.27 6.78
NCO 7.33 4.91 6.44 8.03 7.66 7.51 9.42 5.89
NB 7.47 7.08 8.40 9.95 10.00 8.96 10.89 6.89
CCO 8.17 8.67 8.66 9.31 10.30 9.67 10.08 7.89
G NC 15.099 14.149 13.135 15.124 12.410 9.389 13.620 12.655
NCO 15.108 14.146 13.134 15.117 12.414 9.389 13.610 12.663
NB 15.112 14.132 13.136 15.095 12.412 9.389 13.623 12.669
CCO 15.121 14.129 13.124 15.078 12.410 9.389 13.594 12.674
a           AY, Apy, APo, AW, AN  in % growth per annum.    RL  and  RS  in  %  and  G  in
logaritmic of the real level government expenditure values.
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expenditure and by an improvement of the efficiency of the fiscal system (see, e.g., the
1994 broad economic guidelines [16]).
Studying some results more specifically we observe that for all countries the cooperative             I
outcomes show lower inflation rates than the noncooperative outcomes. These outcomes
are generated, on average, by reductions in government expenditure and an increase in the
long term interest rates. As can be seen in table 5.5, both policies hamper growth in the
SLIM-model. This property suggests that countries should use a higher interest rate policy
in order to prevent inflationary growth 12,
For Germany we observe that in the cooperative setting it has to reduce domestic inflation
in order to reduce foreign inflation. Because GDP-growth is strongly inflationary in the
SLIM-model, this policy leads to lower GDP growth rates. Since Germany plays a leading
role due to its large spillovers, we find in the cooperative game that Germany likes to pre-
vent negative effects for other EU-economies, which is ultimately profitable for Germany
itself. Important to note is the accumulation of inflation over time in the SLIM-model. A
relatively high inflationary policy iii Germany generates higher inflations abroad. In the
next period this high inflation is transported back to Germany which, in the next period
again, is transported back abroad and so on. The longer the planning period the more
important this inflationary accumulation effect drives the final results. Remarkable is the
policy change that occurs in Germany if the cooperative setting is replaced by a nonco-
operative one. In the cooperative solution Germany increases the short term interest rate
and uses a contractionary fiscal policy in order to reduce inflation (and, thus, also inflation
abroad) whereas in the noncooperative setting it does not care about the foreign effects
and chooses a contractionary monetary and expansionary fiscal policy. This noncoopera-
tive behaviour leads to more growth in Germany but also to higher domestic and foreign
inflation and lower domestic employment.
To understand most of the results we have to discuss the impact of the two policy instru-
ments in the SLIM-model, the short term interest rate and government expenditure. We
take Germany as an example. An increase in the German short term interest rate leads in
general to an increase in the domestic long term interest rate. This results in a decline in
domestic output, inflation and wages. There is, however, through the channel of the long
term interest rate a stabilising effect, since the decline of inflation leads to lower interest
rates. The initial increase in the long term interest rate in Germany has, furthermore, an
increasing effect on the foreign long term interest rates and, hence, a negative effect on
foreign growth. This effect can be valuable for these countries in order to fight against
12The same assesment was made by the monetary authorities in 1989: in a period of inflationary pres-
sures, where the rate of growth exceded the level required to stabilize employment, nominal short-term
interest rates increased in every EU-country (see DrEze en Malinvaud [23]).
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inflation.  On the other hand, a contractionary fiscal policy in Germany leads also to a
decline in growth and inflation as well in Germany as in the foreign countries; but this
decrease in inflation leads, through the interest rate channel, to a decline of the long term
interest rate in Germany and also abroad. This last effect has again some increasing im-
pact on growth and inflation. It is exactly this opposite functioning in policy behaviour
between the short term interest rate and government expenditure which should be kept in
mind when interpreting the results.
If we again compare the noncooperative and cooperative outcomes we see, on average,
that the noncooperative outcomes yield higher growth rates and to a lesser extent higher
employment rates but also to higher inflation and wage rates. This effect is mainly cre-
ated by the four larger economies, in particular we see a substantial reduction in the short
term interest rate in Germany and the UK and a substantial expansionary fiscal policy in
Germany and France.
Another interesting aspect is that the CCO-outcome suggests that countries with tradition-
ally low interest rates, such as Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands should adjust their
interest rates to higher levels in order to achieve global convergence. Our model suggests
that it is less costly for the EU as a whole to reach convergence if these three countries
adjust their interest rate levels upwards, since this would make it easier for the other five
countries, which have traditionally higher interest rates, to achieve these lowest three rates.
The noncooperative outcome, however, suggests that Germany, the Netherlands, and to a
lesser extent Belgium, should follow more the policy they advocated during the eighties
where the interest rates were, for at least Germany and the Netherlands, substantially
lower than for the other five countries. This raises the important question: 'who should
converge to who?'. It is clear that in a Treaty with fxed policy targets this question would
not exist but in this case, where we have,Rezible policy targets, this is a serious issue.  One
could argue that this is one of the reasons why Germany is such an advocate of a more
speed EU, since, in that case, they could follow, more or less, their noncooperative strategy
with low interest rates and, hence, leaving the other countries the option to follow or not.
It is clear that such a noncooperative strategy of Germany saddles up most other countries
with more costs than if a cooperative strategy was adopted by Germany. These increasing
costs in the foreign countries are, partly, transferred back to Germany which in the end
yields higher costs for Germany as well in the noncooperative case. This argument may
also explain why Germany uses this threat-argument of a two speed Europe in its negoti-
ations with the other EU-economies. On the other hand, the low gains the model predicts
for the UK, if they play cooperatively, suggests that the UK can put heavy pressure on the
negotiations since they can not gain much during Stage Two. This may be an explanation
why it threatens, once in a while, with leaving the EU. Remark, that we disregard the
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possible profits for each country which it expects to gain in Stage Three of EMU 13. Before
proceeding with our analyses we first give the dynamic game results in the tight exchange
rate regime.
5.5.2 Empirical results in a tight exchange rate regime
We present for this regime the same tables as shown in the previous subsection. In table
5.6 we present the implications for welfare for the four game outcomes. The figures can be
Table 5.6: The objective function values, convergence values and weights in a tight ex-
change rate regime
Countries
Belgium Denmark Germ. France Ireland Italy Netherl. U.K. Conv.
NC 1.05 1.01 2.96 1.93 1.12 2.34 1.08 1.27 8.76
NCO 0.88 1.15 1.99 1.63 1.18 2.82 0.94 1.27 8.32
NB 0.34 0.73 1.19 1.21 0.92 1.48 0.72 1.01 6.63
CCO 1.05 1.01 2.96 1.93 1.12 2.34 1.08 1.27 2.53
Weights
Belgium Denmark Germ. France Ireland Italy Netherl. U.K. Conv.
aNB 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.14 0.20         -
OCCO 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.44
compared to the outcomes presented in table 5.4. If in the tight exchange rate regime it
would be optimal that no country uses the possibility of managing its exchange rate with
the dollar, i.e. AE = 0 for the whole planning period, then we would obtain exactly the
same outcomes as in the fixed exchange rate regime which we considered in the previous
subsection.
If we compare the two noncooperative outcomes we see that in a tight exchange rate regime
the NCO outcome is profitable for four countries (Belgium, Germany, France, the Nether-
lands), malicious for three countries (Denmark, Ireland, Italy) and makes no difference for
the UK. Furthermore, these results suggest a small increase in global welfare since the total
gains of the four countries seem to be higher than the total losses of the three countries.
13If the Member States would consider the possible positive gains of Stage Three, then it is likely that
each Member State is willing to accept more costs during Stage Two.  In our context, this means that
Member States are willing to consider outcomes outside the negotiation area where even more convergence
would be possible.
5.5 Empirical Results 125
Concerning individual welfare in the NCO-solution we noticed that increasing A yielded
substantial gains for the four mentioned countries and the UK, whereas for the other three
countries we found that the objective function values remained almost the same as shown
in table 5.6, with A = 0.2. The implications for total welfare depend, of course, on the
weights one assigns to the individual welfare functions, but with equal weights we found
that total welfare substantially increased when increasing A. These experiments suggest
that the outcomes severely depend on the specification of the convergence conditions in a
noncooperative world and that it even may be possible that a particular convergence func-
tion could be constructed in which each individual Member State would be better off than
in the NC-solution. Comparing tables 5.5 and 5.7, we observe that managing the exchange
rate in the SLIM-model is profitable for the five traditionally higher inflationary countries
but malicious for Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. This observation holds for any
of the four game outcomes.
Remarkable are the differences iii welfare outcomes in the noncooperative case for Germany
and France between the tight and the fixed exchange rate regime. A great deal of burden,
associated with the various exchange rate policies in the tight exchange rate regime, is
covered by Germany. This observation follows from the fact that Germany has a substan-
tially lower welfare value in the fixed exchange rate regime than in the tight exchange rate
regime, whereas for France it is the other way around. The reason for this finding is that
in the SLIM-model, French output is strongly positively affected by an appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate between the French Franc against the Dollar and a depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate between the German mark against the Dollar.
The overall results of table 5.6 are in line with those of table 5.4. We observe also that
the weights crivB and aNC are (very) similar in both dynamic games experiments. Again
Germany, France and Italy have the lowest weight values in the NB-solution.  The four
smaller dependent countries and the more isolated country UK gain less in a cooperative
strategy. In the cooperative solutions, the fixed exchange rate regime can be seen as a
restricted form of the tight exchange rate regime and should therefore by definition lead
to lower total welfare values.  If we, as an example, multiply all individual weights with
the corresponding individual welfares then we find that total welfare increases from 0.89
in the tight exchange rate regime to 0.98 in the fixed exchange rate regime. If we use the
same aNB-weights then we find that in the NC case (and, thus, also in the CCO case)
that total welfare is  1.30  in the tight exchange rate regime and  1.36  in the fixed exchange
rate regime. For the CCO-solution this observation implies that in the tight exchange rate
regime 1.30-0.89=0.41 of total welfare is  used for minimizing convergence and  in the fixed
exchange rate regime 1.36-0.98=0.38 of total welfare.   It is clear  that the CCO-solution
chosen in this example does not guarantee that the convergence criteria are reached. It
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is, however, possible to search for strategies which satisfy the convergence criteria and a
'rough measure' of convergence costs, in terms of welfare, could then be constructed as
shown by the example above.
In table 5.7 we present the averages of the target and instrumental values for each country
seperately. A first glance shows that the qualitative outcomes of the fixed exchange rate
regime are similar to the tight exchange rate regime. For all countries we see again that
inflation is reduced in the cooperative case. We observe the strongest adjustments in the
exchange rates in the CCO outcome. For this outcome, we observe that the traditionally
higher inflationary countries, such as France, Ireland and Italy, appreciate their currency
against the dollar and that the traditionally low inflationary countries, such as Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands depreciate their currency, in order to fulfil the convergence
requirements (of especially convergence in consumer price inflation).
Now let us take a closer look at the four convergence criteria. Since we have only one fiscal
policy instrument, government expenditure, the experiments are less useful for checking
the budget criteria. We did, however, construct the desired government expenditure paths
such that all Member States substantially reduced government expenditure in order to be
able to restore their budget. In comparison with the other game outcomes, for most coun-
tries the CCO-outcome yielded lower levels of government expenditure. This was not the
case for Belgium and the Netherlands. Comparing the noncooperative and the cooperative
outcomes we see that both countries changed their policy behaviour in both experiments.
In the noncooperative game they follow a contractionary fiscal policy and a low interest
rate policy. However, in especially the CCO-case, they have to follow the higher interest
rates of the other countries and, therefore, both countries have to increase interest rates.
This policy has, however, a negative impact on output growth and in order to offset some
of this negative impact both countries react with an increase in government expenditure.
Through the high priority of 10 on the exchange rates we obviously find that the exchange
rates are kept very tight around the 1991 values. In table 5.7 one observes that most values
of AE are close to zero; we only find a substantial depreciation of the German mark against
the Dollar in the case of the CCO-outcome. It is clear that such a policy is very unlikely
in reality. However, in the cooperative CCO-outcome studied here, Germany is very much
concerned about convergence of all the EU-Member States and, therefore, reacts with a
depreciation policy.
In order to check the two central criteria of convergence in consumer price inflation and
nominal long term interest rates we will present some graphs. In figure 5.5, we present the
consumer price dellator responses for three different game outcomes in the tight exchange
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Table 5.7: The average target- and instrumental values (1992-1999)°
Target values
Bel. Germ. Denm. France U.K. Irel. Italy Neth.
AY NC 1.86 2.52 1.41 2.35 2.65 4.64 2.46 1.49
NCO 1.97 2.58 1.48 2.59 2.68 4.69 2.51 1.50
NB 1.87 2.47 1.57 2.20 2.56 4.59 2.48 1.63
CCO 1.74 2.20 1.43 1.90 2.52 4.49 2.23 1.17
APY NC 3.33 4.11 5.25 5.56 4.92 5.91 8.25 3.64
NCO 3.54 4.09 5.32 5.76 4.94 5.92 8.61 3.80
NB 3.08 3.68 4.92 4.52 4.63 5.71 7.48 3.39
CCO 3.09 3.75 4.76 4.11 4.45 5.54 5.96 3.45
APc NC 3.48 3.66 5.39 5.54 4.78 5.03 8.75 3.60
NCO 3.69 3.65 5.45 5.74 4.81 5.04 9.15 3.75
NB 2.99 3.36 5.04 4.52 4.48 4.77 7.89 3.22
CCO 2.96 3.39 4.88 4.12 4.31 4.57 6.25 3.28
AW NC 5.23 5.37 6.82 7.06 7.50 9.06 9.85 4.65
NCO 5.54 5.41 6.96 7.39 7.54 9.08 10.26 4.92
NB 4.79 4.82 6.44 5.81 7.11 8.82 8.98 4.28
CCO 4.76 4.72 6.18 5.22 6.86 8.61 7.23 4.25
AN NC 0.03 0.39 0.36 0.38 -0.32 0.70 0.81 0.09
NCO 0.07 0.43 0.37 0.50 -0.29 0.72 0.83 0.16
NB 0.04 0.56 0.45 0.30 -0.41 0.66 0.79 0.10
CCO -0.03 0.46 0.42 0.15 -0.49 0.60 0.70 -0.07
RL NC 8.07 7.07 9.56 10.05 8.72 8.69 11.30 8.03
NCO 8.11 7.07 8.66 9.28 8.59 8.25 10.49 7.74
NB 8.46 8.34 9.39 10.09 9.42 8.71 11.09 8.17
CCO 8.93 8.91 9.50 9.91 9.60 9.33 10.69 8.78
Instrumental values
Bel.     C',erm Denm. France U.K. Irel. Italy Neth.
RS NC 6.84 4.92 8.36 9.36 8.29 8.48 10.62 6.82
NCO 6.96 4.89 7.27 8.25 8.09 7.78 9.68 6.40
NB 7.44 7.43 8.38 9.59 9.77 8.49 10.36 6.89
CCO 8.28 8.67 8.58 9.23 10.13 9.51 9.88 8.00
G NC 15.091 14.147 13.136 15.119 12.410 9.389 13.620 12.655
NCO 15.095 14.144 13.135 15.110 12.412 9.389 13.615 12.658
NB 15.112 14.125 13.136 15.099 12.414 9.389 13.623 12.669
CCO 15.126 14.128 13.128 15.086 12.411 9.388 13.598 12.675
AE NC -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 0.00
NCO 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.09 0.00
NB -0.02 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 0.00
CCO 0.15 0.54 0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.14 -0.20 0.02
°           AY, APv, APc, AW, AN, AE in % growth per annum.   RL  and  RS in  %  and  G
in logaritmic of the real level government expenditure values.
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Consumer price inflation responses in NC-outcome
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Figure 5.5: Consumer price inflation responses in various game outcomes
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rate regime14 In figure 5.6 we present the long term interest rates for the same game
outcomes. The graphs show some interesting facts. First of all, the graphs suggest that it
seems to be much harder to converge for consumer price inflation than for the long term
interest rates. This fact is, however, more a property of the model and is related to the fact
that long term interest rates in the SLIM-model can directly be manipulated by the short
term interest rates, whereas the consumer price deflator can only indirectly be influenced
15I AS already indicated by the convergence values of table 5.6, we see in all figures that
the degree of convergence increases from the NC, NB to the CCO-outcome.  The long term
interest rate criterion is fulfilled by all the Member States in the CCO-outcome with an av-
erage long term interest of 8.5%.  For the consumer price deflator we find less convergence.
If we consider the three Member States with the lowest inflation (Belgium, Germany and
the Netherlands), then we find a consumer price deflator of around 4%. Since, the Maas-
tricht Treaty allows  only for consumer price inflation rates which  are  no  more than  1.5%
points above the average for the three countries with the lowest inflation rates we see that
three of the other five Meinber States fulfil this rule and that Italy and France come very
close to the 5.5% norm. The results of the graphs are in accordance with the empirical
results of Brandsma and Italianer [91 who state that, with appropriate coordination, all
the eight Member State should be able to fulfil the convergence criteria. In that study the
authors used the European Comniission's Quest model, which contains all the EU-Member
States and they allowed sometimes, in order to fulfil the criteria, for drastic measures such
as dismissing government employees or using the wage rate of the government employees as
a policy variable. Remark, however, that in that research the broad economic policy guide-
lines [16] were followed which propose inflation rates of 2-3%.  It is important to stress that
these inflation rates are low if one compares them with the average inflation rates during
the eighties. Therefore, it is important to realise that during the 1990-1994 period average
output was rather low in the EU, so that several countries flghted successfully against infla-
tion. A property of the SLIM-model, and also of most other EU-models (see, e.g. Douven
and Plasmans [191), is that growth is strongly inflationary (in the long run on average 1%
GDP-growth yields about 2% inflation). This relationship between growth and inflation in
most models may be somewhat exaggerated, but also may suggest that countries will get
a hard time if overall growth in the EU substantially increases. Concerning employment,
tables 5.5 and 5.7 suggest also that in order to reach the convergence criteria employment
will decline in most countries, except for Denmark and Germany. For these two countries
the decline in wages, which stimulates employment, was large enough to offset the decrease
14The similarity between the graphs of the NC and NCO outcome was large, so we decided to include
the graph of the NC outcome only
15For  instance,  if  we  would  follow  the  same  strategy  as  used  in  Brandsa  and  Italianer  [9],  who  consider
wages as an instrumental variable, then it would be much easier to obtain convergence in (lower) consumer
price inflation rates.
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in output, which hampers employment. In all experiments the impact on employment is
rather low which suggests that the policy measures used in the SLIM-model are not ad-
equate enough to fight for substantial increases in employment. It suggests that more
structural changes are needed in order to promote employment in several EU-economies.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we carried out a dynamic game analysis with the SLIM-model. In the
dynamic game we compare four (hypothetical) scenarios. First, a noncooperative scenario
which is represented by the feedback Nash solution (NC) in which each country min-
imises its own welfare and, second, a feedback Nash solution (NCO) in which each country
minimises its own welfare, but additionally tries to fullil the two convergence criteria of
convergence in the long term interest rates and convergence in consumer price inflation
rates. Third, a purely cooperative scenario, which is represented by the Nash bargaining
solution (N B) and, fourth, a cooperative convergence scenario (CCO). In this last sce-
nario the EU-Meniber States play in a cooperative mode, but face a dynamic constraint
of convergence iii consumer price inflation and long term interest rates. These two con-
vergence conditions are elaborated at the Maastricht Treaty (1991). The third condition
in this Treaty is that each Member State should strive for a sustainable government fi-
nancial position. This aspect is modelled by means of the individual welfare functions of
each country. In our experiments we assumed that each country substantially lowers its
government expenditure, in order to restore its government deficit. The fourth Maastricht
convergence condition, no exchange rate realignments for at least two years, is modelled by
keeping in one experiment the (dollar) exchange rate fixed at the initial 1991 levels and in
a second experiment by allowing only for very small movements around these 1991 levels.
For the CCO-solution we assume that countries do not accept 'welfare losses' which are
higher than the 'welfare costs' obtained in the noncooperative solution. This assumption
makes it possible to prove that the maximum convergence that can be reached is limited.
Furthermore, one can obtain a unique cooperative convergence solution in this case.
The first important observation is that we found some evidence that convergence does not
occur if the EU-Member States do not coordinate their policies (see also Brandsma and
Italianer [9]).
Furthermore, our theoretical study suggests that one should design (optimal) convergence
criteria in the sense that the impact of the convergence criteria is profitable in the nonco-
operative case and remains close to Pareto optimal solutions in the cooperative case. Since,
in reality, we observe a mix of cooperative and noncooperative policy behaviour this study
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suggests that the European Commission should strive for restrictions on national policies
in which negative spillovers diminish in the noncooperative game but still keep almost all
the gains in the cooperative game. Our first empirical results give some evidence to the
fact that the Maastricht criteria at least do not harm much in a noncooperative setting
and are indeed close to Pareto optimal solutions in the cooperative setting.
The model 'predicts' a nominal long term interest rate of around 8.5% and a consumer
price deflator of around 4% as optimal in 1999. Optimal growth will in all countries be
moderate.
Country specific remarks are that the SLIM-model predicts that the two largest EU-
Member States, Germany and France gain most when comparing the noncooperative out-
come with the purely cooperative outcome. This gives some evidence to the fact that strong
(more independent) countries gain more, by playing cooperatively, than small (more de-
pendent) countries. The main intuition behind this result is that the gains of the strongly
interdependent countries are mainly due to a more effective use of their instrumental vari-
ables in order to produce, more or less, the same target variables, whereas the generated
spillovers to the dependent countries are only produced by the target variables.
The two convergence conditions of the long term interest rate and the consumer price in-
Bation are examples of flexible shared targets, since it is beforehand not clear what the
ideal target values in 1999 will be. This raises an important question: Who converges to
who? Should countries strive for the low targets advocated by Germany or should Ger-
many adjust its interest rate and inflation targets to higher values and, thus, giving the
other countries more room (and, hence, less welfare loss) for achieving the criteria. Our
model predicts that it would be less costly for the EU as a whole if the traditionally low
interest rate countries Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands converge towards the higher
interest rates of the five other EU-economies, instead of using as convergence target a fixed
low nominal interest rate level. Inflation targets can, more or less, be fixed on the initial
1991 values of around 2-4%. We have to emphasize that this result hinges decisively on
the assumption that all countries (including Italy) should converge. Excluding, e.g., an
inflationary country like Italy from a cooperative dynaniic game experiment would lead to
lower inflation target rates for the other players in that game.
It is important to stress that the results obtained in this chapter are, of course, model
dependent. Further research, such as robustness and sensitivity analyses, is desirable in
order to obtain a better understanding of the different game outcomes. In particular the
following aspects should be elaborated:
(1) In our research we assumed exogenous behaviour of the two foreign countries, USA and
Japan. How will the dynamic game outcomes change if we endogenise their behaviour?
(2) Since it is extremely difficult to model the exact specifications of the convergence con-
ditions of the Maastricht Treaty we modelled convergence in this chapter by assuming that
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the EU-Member States converge to the average long term interest rate level and average
consumer price inflation of the larger three EU-Member States, Germany, France and U.K.
This aspect of the model should be elaborated more and it may be interesting to look for
'optimal' convergence functions.
Appendix A
Appendices of chapter 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2.1
Consider N strictly concave and twice differentiable functions J,(u),i=1 , ·'·, N, for u EU.
Now the Pareto curve is determined by a set a, > 0, i = l,..., N, and the following problem:
maxalJi(u) t· · · + aiA(u). (A.1)U€U
Without loss of generality we assume in the sequel that a,  > 0, i =  1,..., N and Ell a, = l.
Now every element, say (a;,..., all ' determines a unique strategy u* and a unique point
J- = J(u-) on the Pareto curve. Thus
  ai   {„ }
Q i: =1      E         -
\ aN-1 11 J·Nig, /
Thus we can write:
{     '1   -   1.  .        , or {
=1 - J;(9) = O
Z N = rN(QJ :EN - .%(9)= 0
The next step is to write zN as a function of xi,..., ZN-1· Therefore, we use the previous
first N-1 equations and write implicitly 9= 62(xi,..., ZN-1)· Using, now the implicit
function theorem, we have that: li = -3&1 where
i _al aJ, \
aa1
aaN-1   
36=   E    w.. 1
BJN-1  ...
Bal BQN-1 1
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Thus,
:EN = J (£(Zl,···,XN-t  
= ··41,(p (zl,···,LN-1 ,···,C,ON-1(Zl,··•,TN-1  ·
Using the chain rule we have that:
BXN  = 8JN 891  +...+   8JN   89N-1
OX: awl Ox; BWN-1 axi
Now, since u' is a solution of (A.1) we have that (envelop theorem):
8Jl          BJN
al + +aN.34-=0,
for i = 1,..., N - 1. Therefore,
BXN 1    N-1     8.4 . 0901 1 N-1  8Ji .8,PN-1- = --(E a,301j Zi   - - ' -  aN(   0,3ON-IJ -3Xi8=,    aN i=1
1 -ali. ... 4     I   i    _2£1.    \
aa/ aaN-1
ar. 11__(al, -''aN-1)
 a.      2.-1 j 1  8.z-1 jaN \ - BOIN-1
/0\






which yields the proof.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3.2
Since we assumed that Ji, i = 1,..., N are strictly concave and twice differentiable and that
Up lies in the interior of U we have that for each a a strategy is uniquely determined by
the following first order conditions:
aiJ11 + a2J21 + · · · + aNJNi   =   0,
01.42 + a2.122 + - ' aNJN2 = 0, (A.2)
aiJiN + a2JyN + - ' + aNJNN
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where J,·j = 8.4/Qui. Solving these equations yields u*(a). Using the simplifying notation:
jii = Jiluli + J 52112i +...+JiNUNE
for i, j € 1,...N, with ue = Ou,/Baj and rearranging (A.2) we see that:
alj , + a2 2, t' - + aN·IN, =0 (A.3)
for  i E   1,...N.     This  is an important relationship which holds  for all Pareto optimal
solutions. Next we consider the first order conditions from maximizing the Nash-product
(3.4). They are (with the simplifying notation 3,- J, - di):
.4is26···SN+  20183 • • •S N + · · · + ivislt "'SN-1 = (A.4)
for i = 1,..., N. Now comparing the two systems of N equations (A.3) and (A.4) we see
that:
cal -    8283 ···SN
ca2 =   3183···SN
Ca N = 8182···SN-1,
where c is some constant, satisfies both systems of equations. Taking now into consideration
that E11 ai = 1 we see that
Ili j 4
(A.5)
ai = ENt Il,01 4
satisfies both systems of equations. The Pareto strategy wich belongs to this a maximizes
(3.2) and maximizes (3.4). Since the Nash bargaining solution determines a unique outcome
J € P (see Nash [58]) and the fact that every strategy u € Up is uniquely determined by
an a € [0,1] we have that o is uniquely determined by this relationship. 0
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4.1
In the first subsection we will first illustrate the proof for the 3-player case. The same
arguments we use in the 3-player case will be used in the next subsection for the N-player
case. An advantage of presenting the proof in this way is that the reader gets a better
understanding of the proof and in particular of the truncated cube C\{UNt Ai }.
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A.3.1 The 3-player case
Without loss of generality, we take for the disagreement point d, the origin. Thus, assume
d =(0,0,0). Then cube C is determined by the convex polytoop with 23 angular points
 (Zl,X2, 1:3)| Xi E {0, J/},   i= 1,2,3},
and the three convex polytopes A„ are described by the set of angular points a„ i =  1,2,3:
al    =     (09 0, 23J31), (09  4,0),(0,0,0), (11/,0,  Ji),(Jl,  Ji, 0), (.4,0,0)},
al = {(O,O,  .4), ( Jl, O, O), (O, O,0),(O, JI,  Jt),( Jl,Jyi, O),(O, ·/1,0)},
a3 =
{( Jj,  0,0) , (0,     Jpl,  0) , (0,0,0) ,  (   JiI,  0,   131),(0,     ./21,   Jf ) , (0,0,   J:1)}.
First, consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Remark that each convex polytope Ai
contains   JI as an edge point. Furthermore, observe that the line through the origin and
the ideal point  A J'  lies in the interior of each convex polytope A, for 0  <  A<  and outside
each  A,  for  i  <  Asl. Next, consider the convex polytoop D, determined  by the angular
points:
{(JA, 0,0),(0, 4,0),(0,0, Jd)}
Now, it is easy to show, that the intersection of the line AJ1 and D occurs for A =  . Since,
the set of Pareto optimal solutions is concave and the fact that the edges of P lie in D, we
have that the KS-solution is given by AJI, for some   < AS 1. Combining the two results,
we have in particular that the KS-solution lies inside cube C, but outside A = U =1Ai.
Secondly, consider the Nash bargaining solution. This solution is determined by maximiz-
ing the Nash-product J1JlJ3, with J CS. Since, P is strictly concave we can write each
Ji, i = 1,2,3, as a function of the other two components. First we consider the case where
6 is written as a function of Ji, ./2, thus 6 = P(Jl,J2) Now, consider the function:
f(Ji,JV) = .4.129'(Ji,·/2)
with J, € [O, J/] for i  =  1,2.   Note  that the domain of p is a convex set which  can  be
parametrized using spherical coordinates. See figure  A.1.   That is, every (·4, 12)  E  H  can
be written as
Jl  = rul, J2  =  TW2,
where w= (wi,wi) is an element of the unit sphere fl = {(Ji, J2) 1 Jii +J& = 1}. Using
this transformation, f reduces to
f(r, w) = r'wiw,F(r, w)
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J2
- 0
/r<   Ht , 3
Figure A.1: The domain of p in the 3-player case.
Now, for a fixed w€f l w e look for the r€H that maximizes the Nash-product Jl J1Js·
Assume that for this fixed w the maximal possible r  is rl. So, assume r  €  [0, ri].  Then  we
can  derive  f'T:
f: (r, w)   =   {2rf(r, w) + r'F'r(r, w)}wiw2.
Now, we are interested in points where f'r(r, w) = 0 for r  > 0. Since, w is fixed the problem
is equivalent with:
g(r) := 249(r,w) trf'.(r,w)= 0.
Now, first observe that since F is strictly concave we have that
g',(,·) = 3p' (r,w) + ry,"rr(r,w) < 0.
Now, since gr is monotone descending with g(0) > 0 and 9(ri )   <  0  we  have that g(r)
obtains a unique maximum between [0, rl]· Using now the mean value theorem we have
that for a C E [lri, ril:
2   .2
42n) = 29 ( rl,w) + srip'r(irl,w)
=    2y,(23rl, w) - 2g,(rl, w) +   '.1 p'.( rl, w)
= _ rl<4''rCE, W)- p'r( rl,W) >0.
This implies that g(r) has a zero in the interval [Mrl,rl]·
Now, observe that this result can be obtained for every w E fl. Since P is strictly concave
we have that (r, w) covers at least the area of the convex surface determined by the angular
points {(0,0), (Jii, 0), (0,121)}.  Thus wehave that the maximum must be obtained for values
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(r, w) which lie outside the convex polytope determined by {(0,0), ( 4,0), (0,  JA)}.  Thus,
this implies that there are no values of (r, w, 4'(r, w)) E A), with A3 is the convex polytope
determined by the set of angular points:
2
a3 = {( 111,0,0),(03  JI, 0), (0,0,0), ( Jl, O, ..4), (O, 5Jj, Ji), (0,0, Ji)},
which maximize the Nash-product.
This  proof  can be repeated  for  the case where  .6  is a function  of  Ji, J3 which yields  that
there  are no solutions possible inside  A2·    In a similar  way  we  get  Al ·   Thus the values
 JINB,J B,J 'B'1 which are determined by maximizing the Nash-product must lie inside
cube C, but outside ULi Ai·
To illustrate the truncated cube in the 3-player case we give in figure A.2 a representation
7JI
4           i.<:\:
\  i
1.4   ..:1                        > .i--
1\     /--
,it -*• 2-_
./. -F-----Jll----0-*-----------------. .
-21,   /       4
\
3 2 --.-
...                                                            I
....
U. .              .
d = (0,0,0)                                                4 .11'                           •14
Figure  A.2: A 3-dimensional representation  of cube  C,  and the polytopes  Al, A2  and  A3·
of this cube. The solid lines indicate cube C. The dotted lines inside the cube represent
the convex polytopes Al, A2 and A3. The three dashed lines inside the cube are the inter-
section lines of two of the three polytopes  Al, A2  or A3· Those three lines determine the
point 13JI The truncated cube C \Uli A. can now be determined by cutting the convex
polytopes  Al, A2 and A3 from the cube C. This is done in figure A.3. In figure A.3 the
truncated cube is determined by the solid- and dashed lines. The dotted lines represent
the original cube. We see that the point JI is a spearpoint of the truncated cube. Fur-
thermore, we have that the truncated cube touches the polytope D, determined by the set
{(J<,0,0),(0, 4,0),(0,0, 4 1 },in  J'. Now, since the Pareto curve has to fall to the right
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Figure A.3: The truncated cube in the 3-player case.
of this polytope D, we have that if the Pareto curve is relatively flat then the intersection
of the Pareto curve and the truncated cube lies in the neighborhood of JI. Thus in that
case the KS-solution and NB-solution will always lie 'fairly close'.
A.3.2 The N-player case
The proof for the N-player case is similar to the three player case. First, consider the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. This solution is determined by the intersection between the
line through the origin and the ideal point, AJI, and the convex polytope described by N
angular points:
{(JA, 0,...,0),·.,(0,···,0,·4)}
Now, the intersection occurs for A = 7 7 and, again observe that the KS-solution can now
be written as AJI with * < Asl. Observe, furthermore, that the KS-solution lies outside
A = Uti Ae
Secondly, consider the Nash bargaining solution. Write JN = 9'(Jl'...,JN-i)· Now con-
sider:
f(Ji,...,JN-i) =J i· · · JN-199(Jl,...,JN-1)·
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Transform the problem using spherical-coordinates.  Let w =  (Wi, ..., WN-1)· This yields:
Ji = TWi,
for i -1,...,N- 1. Define prod:=wl• • •wN-1, then we can rewrite f:
f(r, w)  = rN-1W(r, w)prod.
Now, fix w. Then
f'r(r, w) = {(N - 1)rN-2W(r,w) + rN-1    (r, w)}prod.
Now, we are interested in points for which f'r = 0, for r > 0. Again define g:
9(r):= (N - 1)99(r,w) + rp'r(r,w)
Observe now that g(r) is monotone descending with 0(0) > 0 and that 9(rl)<0.  Thus
9(r) has a maximum between [0, rl]. Follow now the derivation of the proof in the 3-player
case and remark  that the maximum should be attained  for  r  €  [91'.1, ril· After this
observation the remaining part of the proof is straightforward.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.5.1
In this appendix we derive in the first subsection the strong d-monotonicity result for the
KS-solution for the 3-player case. The argumentation of the proof for the N-player is the
same. This will be done in the next subsection. In the third subsection we consider the
NB-solution. We consider only the 3-player case and give a condition for which strong
d-monotonicity holds in the 3-player case.
A.4.1 The KS-solution: 3-player case
First we consider the 3-player case for the KS-solution. Since, P can be represented by
a strictly concave and differentiable function can write for every  pair  (Ji, ·/2, ,/3) E pi
.4 =  (Ji, •12)· The KS-solution can now be determined by the equations:
1 "         < 'l -,< '1     <       'ts,       j .d2    t x d 2-J i l=I
TKS
(A.6)
d,            < d, - .4  |        F(Jl  , 12KS) il
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where the ideal point Jl = (J<, JI,Ji) is determined by:
13    =    92(Jj, di),        or         - da + P(Jii, 4) = 0,
d3 = 92(di, 34), or - 13 + 9'(di,JJ) = 0,
Ji         =         92 (dl,  d2).
This implies that Jj and 4 are implicitly determined by a function of (di,d2, (13). Suppose
now that
JA       /1(di,C|2,(6)     :4       12( i,4,13)' - J (di,d2, C/3),
then the implicit function theorem states that
21(4, 4 )       =               af               =   C        o           _12:2      4      \
11     401
1 (A.7)
8(di,d2,(13) 8(dl,d2,d3) -6 0 1 1
/ W/2 42 1
Remark that, here and in the sequel, we will use the notation W'i to denote the partial
derivative of W to the i'th component. From (A.6) follows now that:
TA'S 1
J3   - U3
66 + A((13 - Ji'j= Ft.IrS,J:Sl Or A- d3 - JA '
Therefore, J7Ks, Jfs are implicitly determined by:




./7Ks - 4  -4-33(d2 - •14) = 
or, substituting
t
61 = JfS _ di + *I:f  ds: s)(di - fl(di, di, da)) = 0
(A.8)
92 = ./2Ks - 4 + d'I,tf ls: S)(di - A(di,di,d3)) = 0
Thus g = (91,92) determines implicitly (JiKS, # S) as a function of (di, 06, 06).  Now let
(      at91, 921 Q 91, 92      
J,= (8(Jfs, Jfs)' 8(di, (12,(13))
We will now explicitly derive Jg, but in order to save space we, first, introduce the following
notation:
di - Jl di -JKSIi =
d TI, d3 -JA3-33
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for i = 1,2,3. Then, computing the derivatives from (A.8) yields
ag
8(Jfs, JKS) =  <  1- 4P,1      - 499,2 i
(A.9)
-I p' 1        1  -   12'P' 2
and
ag           IG -lt M'iI,IG   ICaf'2Ctrl + 37)   Ii(1 - IG) - ;1-IG )
8(di,(12,13) = < IG41(12 +3-)  AG-lt 9'241(3 4(1 -IG)- 1-IG j
Now, since the matrix in (A.9) is always non-singular, the implicit function theorem states
that
8<Jrs,J Sj         89            89
= -{ }-'{          }             (A.10)8(di, d2,d3) 8(JKS,J Sj 8(di,d„d3)
where the inverse of the matrix in (A.9):
taU S,J Sj
499'1 1 - Itf'i
ag       -1 -1- {449' 1 + I29"23  
1 - IVY"V     I19' 2
Now we are able to derive explicitly the elements of the matrix in (A.10). Now, we first
compute the upper-left element:
fJ1KS _ IG-1+ 2IlK39'1 + 2Il<29'2 - I,K39,2
Bdi
-
1 - {Ii#1 + 442'2 
Now, remark that AS -1<0 and K, <0,4 <0 for i=1,2,3, and that, since 99 is concave,
BJKSF'i < 0, for i =  1,2. This implies that -at  , 0. This result is in line with the result of
Thomson, i.e., the Kalai Smorodinsky solution satisfies d-monotonicity. Now, after some
extensive calculation we can derive:
eff _ _21tf.1 I<3 -  11139'1 + 211 K39'1 -  IiI<39' 2
ad2         -             7                          1   -  {I   p'i  +  4 '2}
BJrS    -   .1   1(3 - IlI3<41+2Ill<341 - IYIC,lp'i
ad3    - p' 1 - {Iif'i + I292'2 
Remark now, that since the sign of - and * are both negative we have that the sign
BJKS BJKS
of both -542- and -ati/ must  be  the same.   Since,  the  problem  is  symmetric in {.4, ./2, ·/3 }
and symmetric in {di, d2,(13} we have that the sign of every for i,j = 1,2,3, i 0 j
must be the same. Now, observe that if this sign would be positive, each player would
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gain by a small positive perturbation of dl; this is, due to the Pareto optimality condition,
impossible. Thus, we can now construct the sign-matrix for the derivative:
8(JfS, J2KS,J3KS) =  1 1   I   2 j .
0(di, d2,(13) \--+,
This observation indicates that player 2 and 3 do not gain if we give a small positive
perturbation to di, i.e., the Kalai Smorodinsky solution satisfies strong d-monotonicity.
A.4.2 The KS-solution: N-player case
The derivation of the proof of strong d-monotonicity in the N-player case is in its essence
the same. First, write for every Ji,..·, JN  C  P' JN  =  P(Jl'..., JN-1)· Follow now the
previous proof, and remark that
c     0       -2   . . .   -»   * \
6           0        . . .     _4=i     1
(0Jh-.JN-1) =     41               W,   M
8(di,··.,dN)
Mi    . , .
< 4"N-, 'P' 2   /
Now, observe that
"     I t,7KS 7 =I-  4b'',P N-1) ,8(JrS'...1JN-13 IN-1 1
where I is the identity matrix. Due to this special form it is possible to calculate the
inverse of this matrix explicitly:
1 1
: 1 (p,1,= -, ,N-,) 1
89 IN-1/ (A.11)
<:.
{                        .   } -1 =I+8(JrS'...,Jlit') /4 j
1 - (F'1,'  'M N-1    I -1  
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After some extensive calculation it is possible to derive . For the proof, however, we are
just interested in the second and third column of this matrix. These are given by
i         K Nlp, 11Il + *21 KNP'3(4 + *)    \
KN  -  IN  + 'P'lI,KN KN'P' 3(Il +  ->D8g
=       KNF'2(4 + 3-) KN - IN t'P'3I3KN8(dy,ds)
\ KN,p'7(IN-1 + 'WNI-11   KN,p 3(IN-1 + 'WN it)  1
BJKS BJKSWe can calculate and compare -ad,- and -54. Remark, that we only need the first row of
the matrix in (A.11) for deriving these expressions. This yields that
J s OJKS
 3  2     =  9' 2 -BIir.
This observation implies that signs of both terms, and 25-, are the same. Now, we
BJKS  .     ..use the symmetry argument to derive that all terms -5 r,1 96 1, 2,1 =  1, ..., N must have
the same sign. Since we are looking after Pareto optimal outcomes, it is impossible that
the signs are all positive; thus we, finally, have that
BJES 8JKS- >0 and ,<0
ad, ad)   '
for i = l,...,N, and j # i, which yields that the Kalai Smorodinsky satisfies strong d-
monotonicity in the N-player case.
A.4.3  The Nash bargaining solution
Consider the 3-player case. Since P is concave, there is a function F such that  (.4, 12, 6)  =
(Jl, ./2,4'(/1, ·12)    . The Nash bargaining solution is determined by
91 (·4 - di)(•/2 - 66)(p(Ji, JG) - 06)
This maximization problem contains, according to Nash, exactly one global maximum.
Furthermore, it is clear that the solution of this problem, say JNB = iJNB,J2NB,J Bl,
lies not on the edge of P, i.e., it is an internal element of P. Thus the Nash bargaining
solution is uniquely determined by:
(J:B- 16){10(JNB,JPNB)- da +1,9'1(JNB-dl)}  =  0
(J 'B - dl ) 2(J B, J Bj - d.3 + lp'2('1 'B - d·zll = 0.
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Now, we follow the same procedure as in the proof of the Kalai Smorodinsky solution. This
yields that there is a function g for which 61 (./ B, ./ VB, di , (l2, (13) = 0 for 2 - 1,2, with
{
91 = le(J B,J B') - (13 + r'P, 1(J 'B - dl) = 0
92 = lp('J B, J B.j - d3 + 9,1 J B - (12') = 0
Thus
ag           f 29,1 + F"11(Jf'B - (11)   MI2 t F"12( JlNB - dl)    .        (A.12)
8(JfB, J2NB   -      92'1 + W"21(JYNB-d2)    292,2 + 9"22 ·  8 - 12)     '
and
ag    =
c
-F'i  O  -1 )
a(di,(6, d)) 0              -9'2        -1    j
Now, suppose that 8(J 2.,  8 is invertible, then
its inverse is given by
Bg         -t      1   C 29'2 t M"22(Jf B - d2)   -4"2 + 4'"12(JAB - dl) )
 8(Jp'B, JfB)}  =Zi  -9''l 9'I 21(JP- d2)  292'1+9'"11(J 'B-dl) ,|'
where det is the determinant of the matrix in (A.12). Now, we are ready to calculate the
behaviour of the Nash bargaining solution  if we perturbate (di, (12, 06).  This is determined
by
8(J B,J.7Bj -      ag          ag
8(di.612, 06)  -    ca(JAB, JA )  -    8(dl,d2,06)
1  1[               1                   (A.13)
Now, observe that > O and 55 > O which is in line with the d-monotonicity result
of Thomson [781. However, observe also if
-9'2 + 4"12(J1NB -d l) >0
BJNB
then -84,   > 0. This indicates that player two gains if we give small positive
perturbation
to (6· From this result we can derive, for the 3-player case, a necessary condition for strong
d-monotonicity which  is  that  M"··  > 0. Furthermore, remark  that  for the general N-player:j




Appendices of chapter 4
B.1   Description of data and data source
Our data source contains yearly data from 1960 till 1991.  Most of the data are taken from
the OECD: OECD Economic Outlook 53, Statistics on microcomputer diskette nr.  53, with
the exception of government expenditure and real taxes (or receipts government), which
we took from the European Economy 51 (EE 51), May 1992. The data for the short term
interest rate are taken from the IFS 92 (International Financial Statistics 1992). The short
term interest rate data are not very reliable for the period 1960-1970 where we sometimes
had to rely on the discount rates. Below we will give an exact description of the data for
each variable separately, and, subsequently, we will give for each country separately the
way how we constructed the missing data.
Y: Gross national/domestic product, volume (OECD: GDPV)
G: Total expenditure General Government (EE 51, given as percentage of Y)
T : Current receipts General government (EE 51, given as percentage of Y)
RS : Nominal short term interest rate (OECD: IRS, if missing: IFS 92)
RL : Nominal long term interest rate (OECD: IRL)
E : Exchange rate (OECD: EXCH)
Py : Deflator for GDP at market prices (OECD: PGDP)
Pc : Deflator for consumer expenditure (OECD: PCP)
W: Wage compensation per employee, private sector (OECD: WSSE)
L : Labour force (OECD: LF)
N: Total employment (OECD: ET)
U : Unemployment rate (OECD: UNR)
Most data are available, however there were some specific problems for W and RS. For
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W we followed the approach of Heylen [411. If W was missing, we used as representative
growth rate for W the growth rate of compensation per employee in the total economy
which are listed in the European Economy. The assumption made is that during that
period the growth rate of both variables is identical. For the RS we relied on IFS data,
where we took the discount rate or money market rate. Finally, the trend output was
constructed from the gross GDP variable, trend output was calculated with the following
regression:  Y = 00 + altime + a2 DUM7475+4 , where DUM7475 is one during the years
1960- 1973 and zero during the years 1974-1991 (see, e.g., Perron [64]). The explanation
for the dummy DUM65 in the employment equation in Italy is explained by Heylen [41]:
" Dummy for the extensive government program to fight the recession of 1963-64 (OCDE,
April 1966, pp. 11-14.)." Heylen [41] also explains the dummy DUM70 in the wage equation
of Germany: 'Dummy variable captures the effects of the deteriotion of the social climate
(e.g. wildcat strikes  in the autumn  of  1969) and growing union militancy (to reverse  the
trend of declining labour shares) (OECD , Perspectives Economiques, Paris, OCDE, June
1971, pp. 13-14).'
Country specific remarks:
Belgium: Data on W were only available since 1970. For the 1960s we used the approach
as given above. The exchange rate E was also only available since 1970, for the 1960s we
used IFS data (market rate, wf).
France: Data on W for 1960-1962 is based on the European Economy and for RS, from
1960-1969, we used IFS data (money market rate, 6Ob).
Denmark  OECD Data for RS was only available from 1979, so before that period we used
IFS data (discount rate, 60).
Germany: All data, as indicated above, available.
United Kingdom:    Data  on   W was missing  for the period 1960-1961; for these two years
we used the the approach as stated above. For the RS we used from 1960-1969 IFS data
(Eurodollar rate, 6Od).
Ireland: IFS data for the RS was used from 1960-1969 (discount rate, 60).
Italy: For the RS we used from 1960-1968 the discount rate (60) and for the period 1969-
1970 the money market rate (6Ob) of the IFS data.
Netherlands:  For the period 1960-1969, W was calculated as stated above.
USA: All data as given above available.
Japan: For the period 1960-1964, W was calculated as stated above. For 1960-1968, RS
was taken from the IFS data (money market rate, 6Ob) and for 1960-1962, we used IFS
data (lending rate, 6Op) for RL. Not available were government expenditure and taxes
for the years 1960-69 . These where approximated with calculated growth rates. These
growth rates were calculated with the use of OECD data, where government expenditure
is calculated from current disbursements of government (YPG) and taxes from current
receipts of government (YRG).
Appendix C
Appendices of chapter 5
C.1    Derivation of cooperative convergence solutions
In this appendix we derive the formula for computing cooperative convergence outcomes
(CCO). To that end the convergence problem is rewritten into a standard optimal control
problem. First, however, we will formulate the description of the dynamic behaviour of
each country in the SLIM-model:
Assumption C.1 The economic behaviour of the individual countries can be described by
(for i -1,-..,N)   :
N
yi(t) = Aiy,(1 - 1) + E A,jyj(t - 1) + B,u,(t) + Did,(t) (C.1)
/0.
where yi(t) € R"  is the state of the i-th country (endogenous variables), ui(t) C #r'  is the
control vector (instrumental variables) and the vector d, (t) E me. is the purely ezogenous
data-vector. For all i, Ai, Aij, B, and Di are real matrices of appropriate dimensions.
Assumption C.2 Every country solves the problem:
4
min Ji := Il n     ||y'(t) - y;(t)11 ,(t) + liu;(t) - u;(t) lk(:)}14.
subject  to  (C.1).
Using the stacked forms u(t) = (14(t),...,uk,(t))' and y(t) = Cy;(t)'...,yl,(t))' the aspect of
convergence can be described as follows:
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Assumption C.3 The minimization problem with respect to the convergence function is
dejined as:
4
mjn C(u) := min E IIL(t)y(t)11:10(11
t=to
Remark. The matrices L(t), Qo(t) can be chosen dependent on the problem.  For
instance if we want to investigate convergence to the average of the endogenous variables,
the matrices L can be specified as follows (for 1 = to,..., ti):
C   »I     - I         ·        ·        ·        -1NI  \
l I N-,I -lI -1NIN           N              N
L=
' -1/\ N     ·      ·    .-INI  N.L\I)
or if we want to investigate convergence to endogenous variables of a specific country, say
country i, we use
/ -I  0  ... 0 I o ...  0\






The matrices Qo(t) give the weights that each country wants to assign to the convergence
function in each time period. Remark, that in the paper we choose L such that it satisfies
the convergence function as presented in the paper.
Assumption C.4 (cooperative convergence problem) Given
N
O S a i 5  1,      i=l,...,N,      E a i=l,      0 5 A  S 1,
i=l
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the problem to be solved is:
N
min     (1- A) E a, J,    +    ACUl
81
subject to (C.1) for (i=L...,N).
The solution of the above stated control problem can be derived by reformulating it as a
standard LQ problem. We first introduce the overall system vectors:
y(t) I. (14(1),y;(t)'...,VIT(t))'
y (t) = Cy;Yt),y;*(t),...,y*(t))'
uct) = (u;(t),uict),...,4(t))'
u*(t)  ..  (u;*(1),ui*(t),...,u (t))'
d(t)  =  (4(t),4(t),...,4(1))'
Next introduce matrices Q(t), R(t), Q*(t),A, B and D in the following way:
Q(t)  =  (1 - A)diag(a,Qi(t),02Q2(1)'...,aNQN(t))
R(t)  =  (1 - A)diag(01 Rl(t),02R2(t), ...,aNRN(t))
Q'(t) = AL'(t)Qo(t)L(t)
/A l  An · · · AlN J
/121 /12
A=
f A,11    '    ...  ANN )/8 1  0. . .0\
0   B2
B=
0
\O . ..O BN/
/D l  0. . .0\
0   D 
D=
0
\ 0 ... 0 DN/
C.1 Derivation of cooperative convergence solutions 153
The above problem is equivalent with the optimal control problem:
nljn E { 119(t) - 9'(t) 13 ,) + liu(t) - 0*(t)111(t)}
t==to
subject to





0(t)  =    0(1)   0   )0  Q'(t)
R(t) = R(t)
9(t)  ..  C y(t) 3
y(t) j
uct) =  C uct) )
C y.(1) ,
9.(t, I. C o)
6.(t)  =  C U.(t) )
d-(t)  =  ( d(t) )
Theorem C.5 The solution for the cooperative convergence problem is than given, for
t= to,..., tl,  by:
6(t) = E(t + 1)-1  'R(t)0*(t) -  DTK(t + 1) [Ay-(1 - 1) + DJ(t)] -  BTg(t + 1) 
where K(t) satisjies, for t = t o, . . . ,t i +1,  the following backward Riccati diference  equa-
tion:
{
,«t) =  20(1 - 1) + ATK(t + 1) (1 -  DE-1(t + 1)DTK(t + 1)) A
K(t, + 1)   =  20(ti)
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E(t +1)  is dejined, for t= to,...,tf,  by :
E(t + 1) := R(t) +  BTI<(1 + 1)B
g(t) satisjies, for t= to,...,tf +1,  the following backward diUerence equation :
19(t)
=   -20(1 - 1)y'(t - 1) + ATIC(t + 1)DE-1(1 + 1),R(t)0*(t)
+ATIC(t + 1)bd(t) -  AK(t + 1)DE-1(t + 1),0TK(t + 1)Dd(t)
+Arg(t + 1) -  AK(t + 1)DE-1(t + 1)DTg(t + 1)
g(ti + 1)  =   -20(tf)#-'(tf)
Remark, that the standard cooperative problem, without convergence, can be computed
by substituting L=0 (see also Engwerda [27}and de Zeeuw [85]).
The CCO solution is now represented by a particular choice of the weights acco =
(al,  -.'aN, A).  To find  this set we have to  use a constraint optimization procedure. These
procedures are available in existing computer packages. Since, in chapter two is proven that
the CCO outcome coincides  with  the NC outcome  in the Ji,..., JN-plane, the stopping
criterium of the numerical optimization algorithm can be implemented as follows. Stop, if
for all i, i = l, ..., N, J, is 'close' to JNC,
C.2   Description of exogenous values
In this appendix we describe our choices for the exogenous values.  For the two foreign
countries, USA and Japan, we used as starting values, the true 1991 values. From thereon
we constructed the exogenous values for 1992-1999, using linear interpolation. Since, links
between countries in the SLIM-model are of three types: first, financial variables such
as interest rates and exchange rates; second, GDP inflation; and third foreign output, we
present in table C.1 just the (growth) rates for these values. Remark, that we assumed that
the nominal long term interest rate,  RL, is constant for the planning period 1992-1999.  For
Table C.1: The exogenous (growth) rates for USA and Japan in 1999.
rates for endogenous values
Countries    AY Apy RL
USA 2.00 3.00 8.00
Japan 3.00 2.00 6.00
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the other exogenous variables in the model, the noininal exchange rate and the labour force
we constructed the exogenous paths as follows. We used the actual 1991 values and from
thereon we assumed for the labour force the average historical growth rates over the last
ten years 1982-1991 and for the nominal exchange rates we assumed zero growth rates.
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Samenvatting
De invloed van de Europese Commissie is op veel gebieden zichtbaar. Zo ziet men regel-
matig de deelnemende Europese landen bij elkaar komen voor het maken van onderlinge
afspraken omtrent nieuwe wetten en maatregelen op zowel nationaal als internationaal ter-
rein. Een van die bijeenkomsten vond plaats in Maastricht 1991. Tijdens deze bijeenkomst
werden afspraken gemaakt tussen de deelnemende landen opdat men in 1999 gezamenlijk
I.kan overstappen naar een munt. De afspraken tijdens dat verdrag, die in dit proefschrift
onder de loep worden genomen, worden ook wel de convergentie condities genoemd. De
condities waaraan ieder  land moet voldoen  om  in  1999  toe te kunnen treden  tot  een  Eu-
ropese en Monetaire Unie kunnen als volgt worden samengevat:
(i) de consumptie prijs inflatie mag niet meer dan 2% boven het gemiddelde van de drie
landen met de laagste consumptie prijs inflatie uitstijgen.
(ii) de nominale lange rente mag niet meer dan 2% boven het gemiddelde van de drie lan-
den met de laagste consumptie prijs inflatie uitstijgen.
(iii) geen aanpassingen in de wisselkoersen voor tenminste twee jaar.
(iv) het overheidstekort en de overheidsschuld mogen niet te hoog zijn.
De methodologie die in dit proefschrift gebruikt wordt om deze convergentie eisen te analy-
seren is speltheorie. We veronderstellen dat de deelnemende Europese landen een spel met
elkaar spelen waarbij ieder land zijn eigen doelstellingen probeert te maximaliseren. In het
tweede hoofdstuk veronderstellen we dat de landen volledige informatie omtrent elkaars
doelstellingen en structuur hebben en samenwerken om hun eigen doelen te bereiken. Een
ideale co6peratieve spelsituatie dus. In zulk een omgeving lijkt de invloed van een Eu-
ropese Commissie niet gewenst daar elke inmenging van zulk een cotirdinator het optimale
evenwicht wel eens zou kunnen verstoren. Als we echter veronderstellen dat de Europese
Commissie de sleutel tot optimale samenwerking bezit dan is de situatie interessant om
een idee te krijgen in hoeverre de Europese Commissie haar convergentie doelstellingen
kan opleggen aan de deelnemende landen.  Het moge duidelijk zijn dat, als de Europese
Commissie haar eisen te streng doorvoert, sommige landen te ver moeten afwijken van hun
doelstellingen hetgeen zou kunnen resulteren in een gedrag waarbij deze landen liever de
eigen doelstellingen volgen (en dus geen rekening wensen te houden met de convergentie
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eisen). Het evenwicht dat in dit hoofdstuk geconstrueerd wordt is het evenwicht waarbij de
convergentie maximaal is en waarbij ieder afzonderlijk land beter af is dan wanneer ieder
land een onafhankelijk beleid zou volgen. Men zou kunnen zeggen dat dit evenwicht de
maximaal haalbare convergentie aangeeft die tussen de landen mogelijk is. Ofwel, voldoen
de landen in dit evenwicht niet aan de convergentie eisen zoals opgesteld in het verdrag
van Maastricht dan is het bestaan van een EMU in 1999 met alle van de nu deelnemende
landen onwaarschijnlijk.
Het moge duidelijk zijn dat de praktijk vele malen gecompliceerder is dan hierboven
geschetst.  Het is interessant om te onderzoeken hoe dit evenwicht zich gedraagt als er
bijvoorbeeld andere informatie structuren of andere gedragsregels verondersteld worden
tussen de landen. Zo wordt wel verondersteld dat de Europese landen nou niet bepaald
een co6peratief spel spelen, niaar dat de Europese Commissie juist in het leven is geroepen
om landen tot meer cotiperatief gedrag aan te sporen.  Stel nu eens dat we uitgaan van een
situatie waar de Europese landen niet co6peratief gedrag vertonen, dan kunnen we nagaan
of het opleggen van de convergentie eisen de landen dichter bij een cooperatief evenwicht
brengt. Dit is het geval als de negatieve externe effecten die er tussen de landen bestaan
verzwakt en/of de positieve externe effecten tussen de landen versterkt worden.
In hoofdstuk drie worden eigenschappen van bepaalde co6peratieve evenwichten bij
een spel van twee of meer spelers bestudeerd. Indien men in de praktijk co6peratieve
evenwichten wil uitrekenen dan wordt vaak het onderhandelins-evenwicht van Nash of van
Kalai-Smorodinsky genomen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt allereerst een algoritme ontworpen
om de Nash onderhandelings-uitkomst snel uit te rekenen in het geval van meer dan twee
spelers. Verder wordt nagegaan hoe groot de verschillen tussen de twee bovengenoemde
onderhandelings-uitkomsten in de praktijk zijn en in het theoretische geval wordt er een
gebied aangegeven waarin beide uitkomsten altijd moeten liggen. Verder wordt er nagegaan
wat het gedrag van de twee uitkomsten is bij kleine veranderingen van het dreigpunt.
Om deze idee8n na te gaan in de praktijk is er in hoofdstuk vier een klein meerlanden
model, genaamd SLIM, ontwikkeld dat acht landen van de Europese Unie, alsmede de USA
en Japan beschrijft. Het model bevat zes gedragsvergelijkingen per land en is geschat met
behulp van jaarlijkse  data van 1960-1991. De structuur die opgelegd  is aan ieder  land  is
afkomstig van de economen Mundell en Fleming. Een bijzondere eigenschap van het model
is dat het in vergelijking met andere meerlandenmodellen sterkere interactie toestaat tussen
landen.
Het uitrekenen van speltheoretische evenwichten komt aan de orde in hoofdstuk vijf.
In dit hoofdstuk wordt vooral aandacht besteed aan de twee centrale convergentie criteria:
convergentie in consumptie inflatie prijzen en convergentie in nominale lange rentes.  Uit-
gaande van een co6peratieve spelsituatie blijkt er heel wat convergentie tussen de landen
mogelijk te zijn. Het model suggereert in een bepaalde uitkomst echter dat Duitsland, Ned-
erland en Belgi& een iets hoger nominaal rente beleid en wat meer inflatie in de consump-
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tie prijzen moeten toelaten om zodoende de andere EU-landen (Denemarken, Frankrijk,
Ierland, Italii, UK in het SLIM-model) meer ruimte te verschaffen om ook werkelijke
convergentie te kunnen bewerkstelligen. Hiermee wordt dus tevens gesuggereerd dat als,
bijvoorbeeld, Duitsland toch een strikt monetair beleid met lage inflatie wenst te volgen
dat convergentie voor de andere EU-landen moeilijker wordt en dat voor die EU-landen
het eigen beleid in het gedrang zou kunnen komen. Tevens zouden dan de kosten voor fase
twee van de EMU, 0111 daadwerkelijk over te gaan op 66n munt, ook hoger zijn voor de EU
als geheel. Het opleggen van de convergentie eisen in een niet cooperatief spel heeft als re-
sultaat dat sommige landen beter en andere landen slechter af zijn dan in het geval van een
niet co6peratief spel zonder convergentie eisen.  Er is zo bezien dus geen aanwijzing dat het
opleggen van de convergentie eisen negatieve dan wel positieve externe effecten versterkt
dan wel afzwakt. Het blijkt zelfs zo te zijn dat het opleggen van de convergentie eisen
in een niet cotiperatief spel, convergentie nauwelijks doet toenemen. Met andere woor-
den convergentie is alleen mogelijk als er tenminste een bepaalde graad van samenwerking
tussen de landen is. Een andere uitkomst van het experiment is dat de landen Duitsland en
Frankrijk het grootste voordeel hebben bij samenwerking. Het experiment suggereert dat,
aangezien deze twee landen de ineeste invloed hebben in de Europese Unie, voor hun ook
het verschil in welzijn tussen een cooperatieve en niet co6peratieve oplossing het grootst is.
Opmerkelijk zijn de geringe voordelen van het Verenigd Koninkrijk bij samenwerken (t.o.v.
niet samenwerken), hetgeen suggereert dat het Verenigd Koninkrijk niet erg geinteresseerd
is in samenwerking met de andere EU-landen.
De resultaten in dit proefschrift moeten gezien worden als een eerste aanzet tot verdere
analyse van deze interessante problematiek. Het onderliggende proefschrift geeft, in be-
knopte zin, weer hoe men de convergentie-problematiek zou kunnen analyseren in de theorie
en in de praktijk.
Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Dissertation Series
No. Author Title
1    P.J.J. Herings Static and Dynamic Aspects of General Disequilibrium
Theory; ISBN 90 5668 001 3
2'    Erwin van der Krabben Urban Dynamics:   A Real Estate Perspective   -  An
institutional analysis of the production of the built
environment; ISBN 90 5170 390 2
3 Arjan Lejour Integrating or Desintegrating Welfare States? - a
qualitiative study to the consequences of economic
integration on social insurance; ISBN 90 5668 003 x
4     Bas J.M. Werker Statistical Methods in Financial Econometrics;
ISBN 90 5668 002 1
5 Rudy Douven Policy Coordination and Convergence in the EU;
ISBN 90 5668 004 8
' Copies can be ordered from Thesis Publishers, P.O. Box 14791, 1001 LG Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, phone + 31 20 6255429; fax: +31 20 6203395; e-mail: thesis@thesis.aps.nl
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
RUDY DOUVEN StUL 17 000 01360881 6
Eindhoven. He graduated in the field of experimental design. His
PhD research at Tilburg University, for the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) covered the fields of
econometrics, game theory and macroeconomics. Rudy Douven
will be taking up a position at the ESRC Macroeconomic
Modelling Bureau at Warwick University.
This thesis addresses theoretical and empirical aspects of the
impact of the Maastricht Treaty's (1991) convergence conditions
on the EU-Member States. The convergence conditions are
modelled as a restriction on a dynamic game between the
EU-Member States. The theoretical part analyses cooperative
games. In the empirical part a small linear interdependent
multi-country model of eight EU-Member States, USA and Japan
is developed. Some of the empirical results suggest that
coordination is more profitable for the larger (leading, and more
interdependent) economies, such as Germany and France, than
for the smaller (following, and more dependent) economies, such
as Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands.
ISBN 90-5668-004-8
C/ER  Diss€Irtati@ mj
